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1. The European carbon market 
The Kyoto Protocol, approved in December 1997, entered into force on February 
16th, 2005, with the agreement of 141 countries. Linked to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), this international agreement 
sets binding targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (henceforth, GHGE). 
Specifically, by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries commit to 
reducing their global GHGE by at least 5% (8% for the EU) against 1990 levels over the 
period 2008-2012. Because of the Kyoto Protocol, carbon trading has been growing 
continuously. 
The Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the European 
Council establishes that, as a mechanism of flexibility to achieve the reduction 
objectives for GHGE, the companies included in the directive (energy and industrial 
sectors) will receive entitlements at the beginning of each year, in order to cover their 
real verified emissions.1 These permits, denominated European Union Allowances 
(EUAs), allow the owner to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent gas into the 
atmosphere. At the end of the control period, the firms covered by the environmental 
regulations have to check, report, and deliver to the governments a sufficient number of 
allowances to cover their verified real emissions for that year. If these companies emit 
more CO2 than the allowances they own, they would have to go to the European Union 
Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) and buy the difference. Those 
installations/countries that succeed in reducing their emissions are more likely to act as 
sellers of emission credits. Those installations/countries that fail in complying with their 
emission targets are more likely to act as buyers of emission credits. Failing to surrender 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The 2003/87/EC Directive includes the following sectors: combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, 
iron and steel plants, factories making cement, glass, lime brick, tiles, pulp and paper, and other heavy 
industrial sectors. 
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the necessary emission credits will result in an excess emission penalty. The emission 
credits surrendered are immediately cancelled.  
A compliance year equals a calendar year. On February 28th, the companies 
receive their permits. One month later, by March 31st, each company has to submit to 
the European Commission the verified emissions report corresponding to the previous 
year. By April 30th, the permits for the previous year must be surrendered. The 
European Commission has until May 15th, to make public those reports. 
Although there were several prior experiences, the EU-ETS, that officially 
started on January 1st, 2005, is the largest of its kind in the world, both in terms of 
volume traded and in terms of polluting installations covered. The scheme is structured 
as a cap-and-trade system, meaning that total emissions are limited or 'capped', where 
the national cap and its allocation among the installations covered by the 2003/87/EC 
Directive are established by the National Allocation Plans (NAPs) of each Member 
State, until 2012. The NAP had to be presented no later than 18 months before the start 
of each “Phase”, and had to be approved by the European Commission.2 Accordingly, 
each Member State decided each year how to allocate the emission credits among the 
installations covered and about the possibility of banking and borrowing credits phases.3  
So far, the EU-ETS has had three phases. Phase I was a pilot phase that started 
on January 1st, 2005 and ended up on December 31st, 2007; Phase II coincides with the 
Kyoto Protocol commitment period, from January 1st, 2008 to December 31st, 2012. 
There will be at least a Phase III, from January 1st, 2013 to December 31st, 2020. EUAs 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Each “Phase” represents a sequence of several years at once, in order to neutralize irregular CO2 
emissions.  
3 The allocation method in Phase III will differ: only one EU-wide emissions allocation will be 
elaborated, and each installation’s individual allocation will be decided by the European Commission. 
Between 2005 and 2007 (2008 and 2012) a minimum of 95% (90%) of the emissions were freely 
allocated. The other 5% (10%) was auctioned. In Phase III, auctions will play a more prominent role. By 
2020, it is estimated that more than 60% of allowances will be auctioned. 
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can be transferred between years within each phase. The “banking” facility allows 
participants to save surplus EUAs for use during a later compliance period. The 
“borrowing” facility is just the opposite. Banking was not allowed from Phase I to 
Phase II, although it is permitted from Phase II to Phase III. Borrowing is forbidden 
between phases. Therefore, a Phase I EUA is a different asset than a Phase II EUA. In 
each particular phase, banking and borrowing are both allowed between years. 
The 2004/101/EC Directive settles the fundamentals of the project-based flexible 
mechanism, which authorizes EU members to generate and use Kyoto certificates from 
the so-called "project-based flexible mechanisms" to cover their domestic greenhouse 
gas emissions. Under this directive, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
provides that the countries included in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol could exploit 
emissions-reduction projects in developing countries in order to generate credits, known 
as Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), which could be employed to meet their 
emissions targets under the Kyoto protocol. Each CER represents a successful emission 
reduction of one tonne of carbon dioxide. Although CERs are fully fungible with EUAs, 
their use is capped, with varying limits in each of the different countries.4 
In addition, each Member State has to decide which percentage of CERs could 
be used instead of EUAs for borrowing and banking within the phase.5 Unused CERs 
can be transferred from Phase II to Phase III. Not all the CERs can be used for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Limits vary between 0% and 20%, depending on countries and sectors, with the average being about 
13.5% (1,420Mt for the period 2008-2012). 
5 Concerning Phase II, in Latvia and Lithuania, which represent 7% of the potential CER imports, both 
borrowing and banking are prohibited. Borrowing it is also prohibited in Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, 
and United Kingdom, representing 37% of the potential CER imports. In the rest of the countries (Austria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden), banking and borrowing are allowed. 
Introduction 
!
!
6 
compliance purposes. CERs generated by nuclear facilities, land use, land use changes, 
and forestry activities are not permitted.6  
Both EUAs and CERs are the most important traded assets in the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). 
 
2. The ICE ECX 
Trading activity in the EU-ETS is fragmented through electronic organized spot 
and derivative markets and also OTC markets. Each Member State has its own account 
where the balance of the allowances of each installation is captured. Trading activity, 
however, is not restricted to the companies affected by the 2003/87/CE Directive. To 
guarantee additional sources of liquidity, external agents are allowed to trade too. To 
participate, however, they must have a trading account in the corresponding market. As 
the European Commission does not preclude each EU member from having its own 
trading platform, trading of carbon-related assets is fragmented through different 
markets around Europe.7 From 2005 to 2007, spot trades of Phase II EUAs were not 
possible; futures on Phase I and Phase II EUAs, however, were both simultaneously 
traded.8  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 In Phase III, these restrictions will increase and, from 2013 onwards, all CERs generated from projects 
whose objective is the destruction of HFC-23 and N2O gases cannot be used for compliance objectives. In 
addition, the scheme allows the Member States to bank (but not borrow) CERs from Phase II to Phase III 
up to a limit of 2.5% of the EUAs allocated. 
7 Spot markets include BlueNext (Paris), which is part of NYSE-Euronext since December 2007, Energy 
Exchange of Austria (Vienna), NASDAQ OMX Commodities Europe (Oslo), European Energy Exchange 
(EEX, Leipzig), European Climate Exchange (ECX, London), only in Phase II, and Gestore Mercato 
Elettrico (Rome). Future markets on EUAs include European Climate Exchange (ECX, London), 
NASDAQ OMX Commodities Europe, EEX, and BlueNext only in Phase II. Options on EUAs are also 
traded in some of the previous markets, such as ECX. 
8 The first spot trade for Phase II EUAs took place in BlueNext on February 28th, 2008. The first spot 
(future) trade on an organized market on EUAs took place on March 8th, 2005 (February 11th, 2005) in 
EEX (NASDAQ OMX Commodities Europe).  
Introduction 
!
!
7 
Among the different platforms, the European Climate Exchange (ECX), in 
London, is by far the most liquid pan-European platform for carbon emissions trading. 
ECX is a member of the Climate Exchange Plc group, listed on the AIM market of the 
London Stock Exchange. ECX futures contracts are operated by the Intercontinental 
Exchange (ICE) Futures Europe, one of the leading markets in the negotiation of energy 
derivatives in Europe. Trading on ICE ECX contracts is handled either by the ICE 
Electronic Platform, for ordinary trades, the Block Trade Facility, for bilateral 
transactions of large size (minimum 50 lots), or the Exchange of Futures for 
Physicals/Swaps (EFP and EFS), to transfer an OTC position to an on-exchange futures 
position. Members of the ICE Futures Europe enabled for ECX contracts can operate on 
their own account only ('Trade Participant') or also on behalf of their clients ('General 
Participant'). Trading may also be conducted by a Member’s clients ('order routing') 
where the access to the ICE Platform is granted by the Member. 
The ICE Platform daily session starts with a pre-open period of 15 minutes 
(from 6:45 a.m. UK local time) during which traders can submit, modify and cancel 
limit orders, but market orders are not allowed. The limit order book is not displayed 
during this period, but the market reports tentative allocation prices. The pre-opening 
period ends with a so-called "opening match", a single call auction, where the opening 
price and the allocated volume are determined by an algorithm. No new orders are 
allowed during the opening match. 
During the continuous session, from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., investors can submit 
limit orders (default type), which are stored in an electronic limit order book (hereafter 
LOB) following strict price-time priority criteria, market orders, and block orders. Stop 
orders were also introduced in January 2008. Limit orders can be modified (in price or 
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volume) or withdrawn from the LOB. By default, standing limit orders expire at the end 
of a trading session. The contracts are traded in lots. Each lot equals 1,000 tonnes of 
CO2 equivalent, that is, 1,000 EUAs. The quotation is in Euros per lot and the minimum 
tick size for all contracts is !0.01.  
As regards transparency, ECX offers real-time prices through the market screens 
and the major information and data vendors. The LOB is open during the continuous 
session. All orders entered and the resulting executed trades, however, are anonymous. 
Iceberg orders are allowed, which means that traders may choose not to display the full 
size of their limit orders. The unrevealed part of the order is only released when the first 
part of such order is completely filled. The hidden part of the iceberg order loses time 
priority. 
A trade happens in the ICE Platform when two orders of opposite sign for the 
same contract and expiry date match. Matching happens when the price of the bid 
(offer) order equals or is greater (lesser) than the price of the offer (bid). Dynamic price 
limits computed from the prior transaction price are activated during the continuous 
session. When these limits are reached, the order that caused the limit hit ceases 
executing and the remaining volume of the order is cancelled. 
Since 2005, ECX has invited Members to act as market makers for the futures 
contracts on EUAs. However, the first two market makers were announced on July 24th, 
2007. The market maker programs extend for periods of three to six (extensible) 
months, and the positions are limited to a maximum of three to five market makers per 
contract. Market makers must ensure, on a daily basis, that the spread is not wider than 
a predetermined amount. For December contracts the minimum spread is either !0.05, 
!0.08, !0.15 or !0.20 depending on the time the program is announced (it tends to 
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decrease from Phase I to Phase II) and the contract expiry (it is smaller for contracts 
with close expiry). Market makers must also guarantee a minimum depth of ten lots on 
both sides of the book, and they must make the market for at least 85% of the duration 
of the continuous session. 
In general, Phase I and Phase II ICE ECX EUA futures are listed on a quarterly 
expiry cycle, with March, June, September and December contracts up to 2012. The 
first ICE ECX future contract was issued on April 22nd, 2005, with expiry in December 
2005. The contracts are physically delivered by transfer of EUAs. Daily settlement 
prices are obtained as the trade weighted average of transaction prices during the 
closing period (4:50 – 5:00 p.m.) as long as a minimum volume is achieved.   
Most of the trading activity of the ECX is concentrated in December expiry 
contracts, the contract with the closest expiry being the most traded one. 
 
3. EUAs and CERs 
The evolution of both EUAs and CERs’ prices have been affected by two 
relevant events that occurred in the market, one in each phase. The first one was related 
to the over-allocation of Phase I EUAs, which collapsed Phase I prices and affected 
Phase II prices. The second event is the financial crisis, which has dramatically affected 
economic growth in the countries and, consequently, the prices of the allowances. 
The price evolution for EUA futures contracts shows that until April 24th, 2006, 
futures prices had a positive trend, surpassing the price of 30 Euros per contract, but 
continuous rumors of over-allocation caused Phase I prices to crash, negatively 
affecting Phase II prices as well. Before April 24th, 2006, the futures prices for Phase I 
EUAs and Phase II EUAs were quite close. 
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Phase I was finally characterized by an over-allocation of EUAs which 
inevitably resulted in a dramatic fall in prices. Between April 25th and April 27th, The 
Netherlands, The Czech Republic, and France, all declared a surplus of EUAs, while 
Spain was less short than expected. As a consequence, rumors of over-allocation rose. 
From that date on, the spread between Phase I and Phase II future prices progressively 
increased. At the end of 2006, the Phase I futures price was !6.60, while the Phase II 
futures price remained close to !20. In general, the 2006 total emissions surpassed those 
of 2005, but many EU Members were still long in allowances. Rumors of over-
allocation continued and prices experienced a definitive drop. On May 14th, 2007, eight 
months before their expiry date, the price of a December 2007 futures contract on Phase 
I EUAs was below !0.33. From that date, the Phase II EUA futures price started a 
progressive increase, achieving its maximum on July 2008. The appreciation of the 
Phase II EUAs is the result of the approval by the European Commission of more 
conservative NAPs for Phase II. Determined to avoid history repeating itself, the 
European Commission imposed severe cuts on the Members’ initial proposals. 
Moreover, the price of crude oil was steadily increasing by that time. 
Phase II prices were drastically affected by the international crisis and the 
consequent downward revision in the real production expectations, directly connected 
with the expected CO2 emissions. On February 12nd, 2009, the EUA December 2012 
futures price reached a minimum of !9.43. From February 2009 to December 2010 the 
futures price of the EUA fluctuated around !15 per tonne, then started to increase again 
until its peak of !18.27 during May 2011. In June 2011 prices once again began to 
decline until December 2011, achieving a minimum price of !7.32 on the last trading 
day of the month. 
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CERs started trading in the ICE ECX platform in March 2008. Since then, prices 
have been very close to EUAs, but always below, maintaining a positive spread that has 
diminished over time, reaching its minimum during February 2009. In general, the 
behavior has been very similar to EUAs, as these two assets share a common trend. 
Concerning the trading activity, it should not come as a surprise that trading 
activity increased from the December 2005 futures to the December 2012 futures, from 
Phase I to Phase II contracts in general, and that the December 2007 futures experiences 
the lowest price and highest standard deviation of transaction prices. Additionally, 
regular screen-based trades are by far the most extensive, however, in terms of volume 
traded their weight decreases, suggesting that the average size of screen trades is smaller 
than that of other less ordinary trades.  
In general, the number of trades for EUA contracts exceeds by far the number of 
trades for CER contracts; however, CER volume per trade is twice the EUA volume for 
both December 2008 and 2009 contracts, similar for both December 2010 and 2011 
contracts, and half the volume for both December 2013 and 2014 contracts. Finally, it is 
remarkable that although the database finishes in 2011, the CER December 2012 
contract is the most traded one (and not the December 2011 contract), highlighting the 
importance the end of Phase II has on CERs contracts. 
 
4. Dissertation structure 
This PhD dissertation is structured in four different chapters. It focuses on the 
study of statistical properties and market microstructure features of the most frequently 
traded emission credits traded in the European carbon market, EUAs and CERs. This 
dissertation aims to: (a) shed light on the empirical properties of EUA returns; (b) 
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determine the best rollover criterion to generate long EUA and CER price series and 
EUA and CER time series; (c) analyze the evolution through time of the quality of the 
ICE ECX market, and (d) model and evaluate the existence of information-motivated 
trading in the European carbon market. 
The structure of the PhD dissertation is as follows: 
- Chapter I: Is the EUA a new asset class? 
- Chapter II: Rolling over EUAs and CERs. 
- Chapter III: The Timeline of Trading Frictions in the European Carbon 
Market. 
- Chapter IV: Modeling the Probability of Informed Trading in the 
European Carbon Market. 
Chapter I was motivated by the necessity of clarifying the statistical behavior of 
a new asset, the EUA. In our analysis, we aim to discern from an empirical point of 
view whether it performs as a financial asset, a commodity, or another kind of asset. 
Our main conclusion is that the European Union Allowances do not behave like 
common commodities or financial assets, and they should be considered as a new asset 
class.  
Chapter II tests whether or not the election of a rollover criterion affects the 
results of a carbon market analysis. In the carbon market, futures contracts are the most 
relevant assets. Both researchers and traders link different futures contracts in order to 
get a unique time series. We test different methods for rolling over futures contracts and 
look for significant differences between the different criteria. Our results show that in 
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general the election of the rollover criterion does not affect the results of the analysis, so 
the simplest methodology (the last day criterion) seems to be the suitable.  
Chapter III provides a complete analysis of the microstructure of the carbon 
market, studying in depth the trading frictions of the market and the quality of prices. 
Our results show that in general the liquidity of the market has increased over time, 
mainly from Phase I to Phase II, although market quality during Phase II has been 
recovering from the market breakdown at the end of Phase I and the international 
financial crisis, and by the end of 2010 this recovery process had not yet finished. 
Chapter IV provides evidence on the use of private information in the European 
carbon market. We study if the actual structure of the market allows the companies to 
use private information and take advantage of it. Our conclusions prove the existence of 
informed trading before the verified emissions reports are made public and give an 
increasing importance to CERs during 2011.  
 
5. The data 
Both EUAs and CERs can be traded in several organized markets such as spot, 
futures and options markets. From among these markets, most of the trading volume is 
concentrated in the futures markets, especially in the futures contracts listed for 
electronic trading at the European Climate Exchange (ECX), with maturity in December 
of each year. For this reason, we have chosen the futures prices with delivery in 
December in order to obtain the most informative prices for EUAs and CERs. 
Our database is basically composed of daily and high-frequency data from the 
ICE ECX platform for all December futures contracts with maturities between 2005 and 
2014, for both EUAs and CERs. For each day, the daily database contains the open, 
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high, low and settlement prices (in Euros), the total volume (in lots) and the open 
interest (in lots). Regarding the high-frequency data, we have a unique dataset about 
transactions. For each trade, we have the time stamp (to the nearest hundredth of a 
second), the price (in Euros), the volume (in lots), the sign (i.e., whether it is buyer- or 
seller-initiated) and the trade type. In our different analysis, we focus only on screen 
(ordinary) trades, these being the most extended and popular type of trades. During the 
first two Chapters of the dissertation, we only use daily data from the ICE ECX 
platform, while in the third and fourth chapters we use high-frequency data from the 
ICE ECX platform. 
In particular, in Chapter I we have focused on daily data from December 2008, 
2009 and 2010 EUAs futures contracts. In order to carry out our study, we will study 
the EUA returns of these contracts from April 2005 to December 2010. The period 
sample goes from April 22th, 2005 to December 15th, 2008 for the first contract; from 
April 22th, 2005 to December 14th, 2009 for the second one, and from April 22nd, 2005 
to December 20th, 2010 for the third one, collecting 936, 1,190 and 1,446 daily returns 
for 2008, 2009 and 2010 EUA ECX futures contracts, respectively. We limited the 
analysis to Phase II data, as Phase I was a pilot phase dramatically affected by an over-
allocation which inevitably altered Phase I EUA prices, provoking a sharp decline in 
prices and leaving them at around zero at the end of 2007. 
The Chapter II database consists of all the available daily data for both EUAs 
and CERs December futures contracts with maturities between 2005 and 2012, and the 
contract with maturity in March 2008, from their start (April 22nd, 2005, and March 
14th, 2008, for the EUA and CER futures contracts, respectively) to December 30th, 
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2011.9 Additionally, and in order to obtain information related to the number of 
transactions, we have also employed all the intraday data available, for all the futures 
contracts used in the chapter. 
In Chapter III, we employ high frequency data provided by the ICE ECX 
platform covering all of Phase I (from April 22nd, 2005 to December 17th, 2007) and 
part of Phase II (from April 22nd, 2005 until December 31st, 2010) of the EU-ETS. The 
data set covers all EUA December contracts with maturities between 2005 and 2010. In 
order to obtain a single time series for each Phase, we roll over the different December 
contracts, for each Phase, through the “maximum volume criterion”. According to this 
criterion, we switch contracts when the front contract is no longer the most 
systematically negotiated. The resulting Phase I time series covers from April 22nd, 
2005 to December 17th, 2007, while Phase II time series goes from June 17th, 2005 to 
December 31st, 2010. 
In the last chapter of this dissertation (Chapter IV) we use high frequency and 
daily data obtained from the ICE ECX Platform, covering the period from March 14th, 
2008, the day CERs began to quote in ECX, to December 31st, 2011. We focus on trade 
data for all December futures contracts with maturities between 2008 and 2014, for both 
EUAs and CERs. As the methodology employed in Chapter IV requires the use of 
continuous time series and futures contracts have a finite life, we generate single time 
series by rolling over contracts using the “last day criterion”. This criterion switches 
from one contract to another on the expiry date of the first one. For our analysis, we 
considered three rollover series for each asset (EUAs and CERs): the front contract, the 
second nearest delivery contract, and the third nearest delivery contract. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9As an exception, in this chapter we have employed an additional maturity (March 2008) from the usual 
December contracts, because of this contract being the last Phase I futures contract traded in the market. 
Introduction 
!
!
16 
All time series used in the dissertation have been corrected for reporting errors, 
confirmed by ECX staff members. In computing return series, overnight returns are also 
eliminated. Returns are calculated using trade prices in logs. 
 
6. Summary of the chapters 
The thesis dissertation has covered different aspects of the European carbon 
market, highlighting its statistical properties and market microstructure. In particular, 
the thesis is composed of four chapters: Chapter I studies the empirical properties of 
Phase II EUAs returns; Chapter II analyzes the different rollover criteria applied to both 
EUAs and CERs; Chapter III evaluates the impact of the market collapse at the end of 
Phase I and the posterior financial crisis on the quality of the European carbon market, 
and Chapter IV provides evidence of informed trading in the European carbon market. 
Chapter I: Is the EUA a new asset class? The listing of a new asset requires the 
knowledge of its statistical properties prior to its use for hedging, speculative or risk 
management purposes. In this paper, we study the stylized facts of European Union 
Allowances (EUAs) returns. The majority of the phenomena observed, such as heavy 
tails, volatility clustering, asymmetric volatility and the presence of a high number of 
outliers are similar to those observed in both commodity futures and financial assets. 
However, properties such as negative asymmetry, positive correlation with stocks 
indexes and higher volatility levels during the trading session, typical of financial 
assets, and the existence of inflation hedge and positive correlation with bonds, typical 
of commodity futures, are also detected. Therefore, our results indicate that EUAs 
returns do not behave like common commodity futures or financial assets, and point to 
the fact that EUAs are a new asset class. 
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A first version of this chapter was written during the last year of my Quantitative 
Finance Master’s degree. The first version of the chapter was presented at the VII 
Workshop in Banking and Quantitative Finance (Spain, July 2009), organized by the 
University of Basque Country. Preliminary versions of the first chapter were accepted to 
present at the 8th Annual International Conference on Business (Greece, July 2010), 
organized by the Athens Institute for Education and Research, the XII Workshop on 
Quantitative Finance (Italy, January 2011), organized by the University of Padua, and 
the 8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (Croatia, May 2011), 
organized by the University of Zagreb. The chapter has been published in a preliminary 
version as Working Paper (WP-AD 2012-14) by Instituto Valenciano de 
Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE). The final version was submitted to the Quantitative 
Finance in April 2010 and was finally accepted in April 2012.  
Chapter II: Rolling over EUAs and CERs. Whatever derivative contract has a 
finite life limited by its maturity. The construction of long series, however, is of interest 
for academic, hedging and investments purposes. In this study, we analyze the relevance 
of the choice of the rollover date on European Union Allowances (EUAs) and Certified 
Emissions Reduction (CERs) futures contracts. We have used five different 
methodologies to construct long series and the results show that, regardless of the 
criterion applied, there are not significant differences between the resultant return 
distribution series. Therefore, the least complex method, which is to roll over on the last 
trading day, can be used in order to reach the same conclusions. Additional liquidity 
analysis confirms this method as the optimum method to link EUAs and CERs series, 
indicating that simplicity when linking EUAs and CERs series is not at odds with 
liquidity. 
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The chapter was presented at the III Workshop on Energy Markets and CO2 
markets (February 2012, Spain), organized by the Cátedra Banco Santander - University 
of Valencia, and at the 9th International Conference on the European Energy Market 
(May 2012, Italy), organized by the European University Institute of Florence. The 
chapter has been published as a Working Paper by IVIE (WP-AD 2012-15). The final 
version is under review at this moment in an international journal. 
Chapter III: The timeline of trading frictions in the European carbon market. 
The release of verified CO2 emissions and compliance information for 2005 by the 
European Commission in May 2006 and the continued rumors of over-allocation of 
emission allowances (EUAs), resulted in an early collapse of the European Carbon 
Market, with EUA prices about zero by September 2007. We show that this market 
breakdown and the subsequent outbreak of the international financial crisis have had a 
persistent effect on the quality of prices of the most active derivatives market for carbon 
dioxide emissions. We report substantial improvements in terms of liquidity, adverse 
selection costs, and friction-related volatility from Phase I to Phase II. However, price 
quality (the proportion of friction-unrelated price return volatility) during the period 
2008-2010 has been below the levels achieved before the 2007 collapse. Our findings 
suggest that the carbon market has not fully recovered from the negative effects of its 
2007 breakdown and the subsequent financial crisis.  
The chapter was initiated during my stay at the University of the Balearic 
Islands. This paper was presented at the 9th International Conference on the European 
Energy Market (May 2012, Italy), organized by the European University Institute of 
Florence, and at the 10th INFINITI Conference on International Finance 2012 (June 
2012, Ireland), organized by the Trinity College Dublin. The Chapter has been 
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published as a Working Paper by IVIE (WP-AD 2012-05). The final version is under 
review in an international journal at this moment. 
Chapter IV: Modeling the probability of informed trading in the European 
carbon market. We provide evidence of informed trading in the European carbon 
market. We adapt Easley et al.’s (1996) PIN methodology to the particularities of this 
market by isolating the trading activity on the two carbon offsets: European Union 
Allowances (EUAs) and Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). We find that the PIN 
regularly increases before the publication of the yearly verified-emission reports. CERs 
exhibit lower average PIN than EUAs. While the PIN of CERs has increased over time, 
together with its share in total trading activity, EUAs’ PIN has remained pretty stable. 
Our findings suggest that CERs must not be avoided in any decision or analysis made 
by researchers, regulators or traders interested in the European carbon market. 
Chapter IV was elaborated during my research visit to the Johnson Graduate 
School of Management of Cornell University (New York, USA) under the supervision 
of Professor Gideon Saar, Dr. Philip and Rosalyn Baron Professor of Management and 
associate professor of Finance. This paper was presented in the 4th International IFABS 
Conference on Rethinking Banking and Finance: Money, Markets and Models (June 
2012, Spain), organized by the University of Valencia. 
 
7. Stays, grants and prizes 
I developed my PhD dissertation thesis in three different universities:  
- The University of Valencia (Department of Financial Economics, 
Valencia, Spain), as a PhD student from the university. 
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-  The University of the Balearic Islands (Department of Business, 
Mallorca, Spain), during a stay from May 1st, 2010 to July 31st, 2010. 
-  The Johnson Graduate School of Management - Cornell University 
(Ithaca, New York, USA), during a stay from September 1st, 2011 to 
February 29th, 2012.  
The research was financially supported by: 
- A F.P.U. (Formación del Profesorado Universitario) Grant from the 
Ministry of Education (Spain), during the period July 16th, 2007 - July 
15th, 2012. 
- Two Mobility Grants from the Ministry of Education (Spain), one for 
each stay.  
- A Scholar Fellowship during my stay at Cornell University.  
- A Mobility Grant for official master’s degree from the Ministry of 
Education (Spain), during the master’s degree period. 
Finally, I received an academic award for the second best student, after I 
finished my master’s degree. 
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1. Introduction 
In order to achieve the reduction objectives for greenhouse gases emissions, the 
European Union decided that a big part of that reduction would have to be directly 
assumed by the companies of the most polluting sectors. Since 2005, the companies of 
these sectors, included in the 2003/87/CE Directive, receive each year entitlements to 
emit one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent gas, which are denominated European 
Union Allowances (EUAs).1 At the end of the control period, the firms covered by the 
environmental regulations have to give a sufficient number of allowances to cover their 
verified real emissions. If these companies emit more CO2 than the allowances they 
own, they would have to go to the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS) and buy the difference. It is important to highlight that not only the polluting 
companies participate in the EU ETS, but also external agents can trade in it. Therefore, 
knowledge of the statistical properties of EUAs is of interest not only for hedging 
operations, but also for speculative or risk management purposes. 
In spite of the youth of the EU ETS, the academic literature has analyzed the 
CO2 market from diverse perspectives. Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2008) study the 
market at an institutional level. Miclaus et al. (2008), Daskalakis and Markellos (2008), 
Daskalakis et al. (2009) and Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2009) study different aspects 
of the market efficiency. Benz and Hengelbrock (2008), Rotfuss (2009), Rittler (2012) 
and Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2009) analyzed the lead-lag relationship between the 
spot and futures markets, this last one being the market that leads the price discovery 
process. Finally, Borak et al. (2006), Chesney and Taschini (2012), Benz and Trück 
                                                
1 The sectors included in the 2003/87/CE Directive are: energy (electricity, co-generation), refining 
petroleum, iron and steel industry, mineral products, cement, lime, glass, ceramics (roofing tiles, bricks, 
floor tiles, etc.), cardboard, pulp and paper. 
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(2009) and Daskalakis et al. (2009) proposed different alternatives to model the price 
dynamics of CO2 emission allowances.2 
The papers mentioned above analyze short periods of time and the statistical 
properties of EUA returns appear as a secondary objective. This is precisely the main 
purpose of our study. Specifically, starting from the stylized facts described by Cont 
(2001) for financial assets, and from the statistical properties analyzed by Gorton and 
Rouwenhorst (2006) and Gorton et al. (2012) for commodities, we study the stylized 
empirical facts of EUA returns. By doing so, we will determine whether EUA behaves 
like a financial asset, a commodity, or a new asset. The knowledge of its statistical 
properties is of interest for both policy makers and portfolio managers, in terms of 
regulation and portfolio diversification, respectively. The remainder of the paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 presents the stylized facts observed in assets grouped 
into four categories. Section 3 describes the data we used in the study. The results of the 
analysis are presented and discussed in section 4. The last section summarizes with 
some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Stylized facts of asset returns 
Following Cont (2001, p. 233), we define the stylized facts of an asset as a set of 
statistical facts which emerge from the empirical study of asset returns and which are 
common to a large set of assets and markets. Some papers have overviewed the stylized 
facts that are characteristics of the financial assets (see among others, Pagan (1996), 
Cont (2001), Morone (2008), and Sewell (2011)) and those that are common in the 
commodities (see Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) and Gorton et al. (2012)). Although 
some stylized facts are related to each other, the statistical characteristics of assets 
                                                
2 An excellent review of this kind of literature can be found in Convery (2009). 
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returns can be grouped into four large sets of phenomena that have to do with the 
distribution of returns, correlation facts, volatility-related properties and commodity-
related facts. 
In the first group, the characteristics observed in the historical returns 
distribution are analyzed. The first step is to look into the existence of normality in the 
distribution of returns. In the case of not rejecting normality, we could not reject both 
symmetry and the absence of heavy tails. However, the rejection of the hypothesis of 
normality would make necessary a more exhaustive analysis to determine if the reason 
for the rejection comes from the existence of asymmetry or because the frequency curve 
is more or less peaked than the mesokurtic curve. The second aspect we analyze is the 
intermittency which refers to the phenomenon that returns present, at any time scale, 
high variability that is translated in the appearance of outliers throughout the asset life.3 
Thirdly, we investigate the aggregational gaussianity, a third aspect that is detected in 
historical returns distribution and which makes reference to the fact that the aggregation 
of data in bigger time intervals approaches the Gaussian data distribution. While the two 
last phenomena have been observed both in financial assets and commodity futures, the 
empirical evidence regarding asymmetry usually indicates that the skewness is negative 
in financial assets and positive in commodities. Finally, we have analyzed if EUA 
returns are stationary. When series are non-stationary and follow a unit root process, 
persistence of shocks will be infinite. If EUA prices follow a trend stationary process, 
then there exists a tendency for the price level to return to its trend path over time and 
investors may be able to forecast future returns by using information on past EUA 
returns. However, the majority of economic and financial time series exhibit trending 
behavior or non-stationarity in the mean. If EUA price series were non-stationary, any 
                                                
3 Outliers refer to those returns which, by their magnitude, are considered as unusual and infrequent. 
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shock to EUA price would be permanent, implying that EUA future returns would be 
unpredictable based on historical observations. 
The second group refers to some correlation facts observed in the returns of 
whatever asset and to their consequences. Firstly, we study the autocorrelation of the 
returns. This has been the classical way to test the weak form of the efficient hypothesis 
in financial markets. The absence of significant linear correlations in returns has been 
widely documented and it is usually not detected except for very small intraday time 
scales. Secondly, given that the correlation test may be influenced by the presence of 
extreme returns, we carry out a run test in order to check the existence of randomness in 
EUA returns generation. With this test, we get robustness on a possible predictability of 
EUA returns over the short term. Thirdly, we analyze the presence of a slow decay of 
autocorrelation in absolute returns, also known as the Taylor effect. Following Taylor 
(2007), this effect makes reference to the fact that a big return in absolute terms is more 
probably followed by another big one, rather than a small one. This phenomenon, unlike 
the two previous ones, is interpreted as a sign of long-range dependence.  
The third group of facts investigates the specific characteristics observed in 
volatility. The first well-known property about volatility is the positive autocorrelation 
observed in different measures of volatility over several days. This fact is generally 
detected through the existence of autocorrelation in squared returns and it is known as 
volatility clustering. Secondly, we study three volatility-related cross-correlation facts. 
The first one looks at whether volatility responds differently to positive and negative 
shocks of the same magnitude, the second one analyzes the correlation between volume 
and volatility, and the last one examines the correlation between the change in the open 
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interest and the volatility.4 Although studies on the relationship between trading 
measures and the underlying price volatility provide mixed evidence, following 
Bhargava and Malhotra (2007) a number of other researchers report a positive 
correlation between trading activity and volatility. The significance of these two 
relationships would indicate that the volume and/or the change in the open interest, in 
EUA markets, could be used as explanatory variables of volatility. 
The last group alludes to specific features extracted from commodities 
behaviors. The first aspect we investigate is the presence of a non-trading effect 
observed in the volatility of weather sensitive assets. Following Fleming et al. (2006), 
trading versus non-trading period variance ratios in weather-sensitive markets are lower 
than those in the equity markets. Given that Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007) and 
Alberola et al. (2008) have showed empirical evidence about the influence of weather 
on carbon returns, we study the non-trading effect on EUAs by testing whether the 
information flow on EUA markets is evenly distributed around the clock. Another 
stylized fact characteristic of commodities is the negative correlation with stocks and 
bonds. Generally, commodity futures exhibit certain negative correlation, mainly in the 
early part of falling periods, as is noted in Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006). 
Furthermore, the negative correlation becomes greater as we increase the time lag in 
which we hold the positions. Finally, we test the property of inflation hedge. Assets 
hedge against inflation when they correlate positive and significantly against it. 
Following Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006), commodity futures usually show better 
behavior against unexpected inflation, than stocks or bonds do, and therefore, they can 
be used for this kind of hedging.  
 
                                                
4 Open interest is the total sum of all outstanding long and short positions of futures contracts that have 
not been closed.  
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3. The data 
To carry out the analysis of the stylized facts of EUA returns, we have to select 
the most representative EUA asset in the market and the time frame. EUAs can be 
traded in several organized markets such as spot, futures and options markets. From 
among these markets, most of the trading volume is concentrated in the futures markets, 
especially in the futures contracts listed for electronic trading at the European Climate 
Exchange (ECX).5 Furthermore, empirical evidence cited in section 1 supports the 
notion that the price discovery process is led by the futures markets. For these reasons, 
we have chosen the futures prices in order to obtain the most informative EUA return.  
Related to the time frame used in this study, it is convenient to clarify some 
aspects of the EU ETS. The trading on EUAs has been organized into different phases. 
Phase I covered the years from 2005 to 2007 and was considered as a pilot or learning 
phase, characterized by an excess of EUAs that provoked a sharp decline in prices.6 
Phase II matches the Kyoto protocol fulfillment period which goes from January 2008 
to December 2012, while Phase III will include the period 2013 to 2020.7 Another 
important aspect to consider is that Phase I EUAs could not be used in Phase II, 
meaning that banking was not allowed between Phase I and Phase II. Nevertheless, 
                                                
5 The unit of trading of one contract is one lot of 1,000 CO2 EU Allowances. See the User Guide of ICE 
ECX Contracts: EUAs and CERs at the 
https://www.theice.com/productguide/ProductGroupHierarchy.shtml?groupDetail=&group.groupId=19 
for further information about the contract specifications of ECX EUA futures contract (last accessed on 
March 20, 2012). 
6 The special features observed in this period are treated in detail by, among others, Miclaus et al. (2008), 
Paolella and Taschini (2008), Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2009), Benz and Trück (2009), and 
Daskalakis et al. (2009). 
7 Given that the EU ETS is organized in Phases, the Member States must elaborate a National Allocation 
Plan (NAP) for the first two Phases, in which the Member States attribute their emission allowances to 
the different companies, included in the sectors involved in the 2003/87/CE Directive, and establish the 
emission limits for the different sectors, as well as for each one of the facilities covered by EU ETS. 
Therefore, these NAPs establish the EUA supply available in the market until 2012. Contrary to Phase I 
and Phase II, in Phase III, only one EU-wide emissions allocation under ETS Phase III will be elaborated, 
where each installation’s individual allocation will be decided by the European Commission. 
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banking is allowed between Phase II and Phase III, a reason why Phase II EUAs might 
be used during the 2013 to 2020 period. For these reasons, we limit our sample to Phase 
II EUA futures returns. In particular, we focus on 2008, 2009 and 2010 EUA ECX 
futures contracts. The period sample goes from April 22nd, 2005 to December 15th, 2008 
for the first contract; from April 22nd, 2005 to December 14th, 2009 for the second one, 
and from April 22nd, 2005 to December 20th, 2010 for the third one, collecting 936, 
1,190 and 1,446 daily returns for 2008, 2009 and 2010 EUA ECX futures contracts, 
respectively. Figure 1 shows the price evolution for the three EUA futures contracts. In 
general, all three contracts share a common behavior. Until April 24, 2006, future prices 
had a positive trend, over-passing the 30 Euros price per contract, but continuous 
rumours of over-allocation crashed Phase I prices, affecting negatively Phase II prices 
too. From then, prices declined until it reached its first minimum of 14 Euros in 
February 2007. In July 2008, EUA prices approached their maximum quote of over 30 
Euros, following which prices started a new bearish period because of the financial 
crisis. By February 2009, EUA prices reached their historical minimum around 8 Euros. 
Finally, from April 2009 to the end of 2010, EUA prices have been fluctuating around 
14 Euros. 
Additionally, in order to test some correlation facts, other series of data have 
been used: a stock index, a stock index future contract, bond futures contracts, a 
commodity future contract, a risk free asset series and the observed inflation. We have 
chosen for all of these series the European benchmarks, using the same time frame as 
the one we have selected for each EUA contract. Specifically, we have chosen the Euro 
Stoxx 50 and its futures contract, traded at the EUREX market, as indicative of a 
European stock index and its future. Regarding interest rates, the fixed income futures 
have been also obtained from the EUREX market. The three references chosen for this 
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case are the Euro Schatz futures, the Euro Bolb future, and the Euro Bund future, as 
benchmarks for European short-, mid- and long-term bonds prices, respectively. As a 
representative commodity futures contract, we have chosen the Brent futures contract 
traded at International Petroleum Exchange (IPE). The risk free asset has been 
approached through the 1-month Euribor rate and, as a proxy of the inflation rate, we 
have used the European Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICPs). 
We have carried out our study using returns defined as ( )1ttt pplogr != , where 
pt is the closing price of the futures contract on day t. Finally, when it has been needed, 
we have switched futures contracts on the last trading day in order to create a 
continuous series in futures contracts. 
 
4. Results 
In this section, we test the presence of the stylized facts described in section 2: 
the distribution of returns, correlation facts, volatility-related features and commodity-
related facts. For each case, we present the methodology used to test the empirical 
property, the results and the financial implications. 
4.1. Data distribution 
From a financial point of view, the gaussianity of returns data is of interest for 
portfolio theory, derivatives pricing and risk management. However, one of the most 
well-known properties in the distributions of assets returns is precisely the non-
normality of the return series and the fact that they present a greater number of extreme 
values than those observed in series with Gaussian distributions.8 As a background, 
Table I presents the summary statistics of the EUA returns for 2008, 2009 and 2010 
                                                
8 In Catalán and Trívez (2007), some reasons concerning the importance of extreme values are presented. 
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futures contracts, and Figures 2a, 2b and 2c show the histogram of the historical daily 
return distribution. All three daily series are leptokurtic and present negative skewness. 
The Jarque-Bera statistic rejects the null hypothesis of normality for all three series at 
the 5% level. The histogram shows heavy tails and a high number of extreme returns, 
both positive and negative ones. 
The Jarque-Bera statistic is based on the assumption of normality; therefore the 
daily return series can be symmetric but non-normal due to the excess of kurtosis. To 
check this fact, we test the distribution symmetry by applying the method proposed by 
Peiró (2004). Firstly, we divide each sample into two subsamples, where the first 
subsample contains the excesses of positive returns with respect to the mean 
r+ = rt ! r rt > r{ } , and the second one, the excesses of negative returns with respect to 
the mean, in absolute terms r! = r ! rt rt < r{ } . Secondly, we use the Wilcoxon rank test 
to check whether the two subsamples come from the same distribution.  
Given the negative skewness coefficients reported in Table I, the asymmetry 
tests, non-reported, show a statistic of 2.9854 (p-value 0.0028) for the future with 
maturity in 2008, 2.0044 (p-value 0.0450) for the 2009 future and 1.8161 (p-value 
0.0694) for the 2010 future. Therefore, we observe a significant negative asymmetry for 
the first two contracts, something common in financial assets such as stocks, while we 
cannot reject symmetry at the 5% level for the 2010 future. This characteristic has a 
direct implication in margins requirements asked by clearing houses in EUA derivatives 
markets. A negative asymmetry implies more risk for long positions and, as a 
consequence, bigger margins should be asked for those positions.  
The second aspect we have analyzed is the intermittency of the series. To study 
the existence of this empirical fact, we have used the VaR approach and, following 
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Galai et al. (2008), the procedure based on the calculation of the Huber M-estimator to 
distinguish between outliers and the body of the distribution. Table II presents the 
outlier detection based on daily returns for the EUA 2008, 2009 and 2010 futures 
contracts. 5% VaR (95% VaR) provides the outlier detection through the Value at Risk 
method, considering as extreme positive (negative) outliers those returns which are over 
(under) the 5% 1-day VaR (the 95% 1-day VaR).9 The 5% 1-day VaR measure (3.89%, 
3.98% and 3.78% for 2008, 2009 and 2010 futures, respectively) is of interest for 
estimating the risk of loss in short positions in futures markets, while the 95% 1-day 
VaR (4.53%, 4.56% and 4.24% for 2008, 2009 and 2010 futures, respectively) is 
relevant for measuring the same risk but for long positions. Obviously, the number of 
positive and negative extreme returns is the same, but the 95% VaR measure in absolute 
terms is higher than the 5% VaR measure, confirming the negative asymmetry 
previously observed.  
To get robustness in the outlier detection analysis, we have obtained the Huber 
M-estimator. The fifth, ninth and thirteenth columns in Table II present the results 
following this procedure.10 Based on the M-estimator, over 17% of returns in all three 
samples are classified as outliers. Furthermore, in all three samples, the number of 
negative outliers (90, 110 and 126, respectively) far exceeds the number of positive 
ones (66, 89 and 105, respectively). Note that in both cases the number of outliers has 
increased over time. 
                                                
9 Malevergne and Sornette (2004) summarize the virtues of VaR measures in three characteristics: 
simplicity, relevance in addressing the ubiquitous large risks often inadequately accounted for by the 
standard volatility, and their prominent role in the recommendations of the international banking 
authorities. 
10 To obtain outliers by applying the M-Huber estimator, it is necessary to transform the data until the 
convergence is attained. Furthermore, for the generation of the M-Huber estimator, we have to define the 
term k which will be used as a limit during the detection of outliers. Following Galai et al. (2008), we 
have chosen k = 2.496. With this selection, the iterative process ends with an M-Huber estimator of 
0.000879 for the 2008 future, 0.000561 for the 2009 future and 0.000465 for the 2010 future. A detailed 
description of this procedure could be found in Hoaglin et al. (1983, chapter 11). 
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Panel B of Table II presents the size of events measured in the number of 
standard deviations (!) that an outlier return deviates from the mean. Independently of 
the approach, the majority of the outliers have a size between one to four standard 
deviations. This could be considered as usual for normal distributions. However, the 
empirical VaR and the Huber M-estimator approaches also detect diverse extreme large 
movements, in all three futures contracts, that diverge from the mean and the median, 
respectively, from five to eleven !s. Additionally, Panel C of Table II presents the 
clusters of outliers. The Huber M-estimator shows concentrations of up to six 
consecutive outliers while the VaR approach detects clusters of up to three outliers. It is 
important to note that the number of clusters with this procedure is higher when the 
outliers are considered independently of their sign, indicating that extreme returns are 
followed by themselves. On the whole, the results of Table II indicate a high probability 
of occurrence of large movements in the EUA market and prove the existence of 
intermittency in EUA returns. 
Thirdly, we have studied another aspect that is usually detected in historical 
returns distribution, which is the fact that the aggregation of data in bigger time 
intervals approaches a Gaussian data distribution. In order to test the aggregational 
gaussianity, we have generated two subsamples both with weekly and monthly returns. 
The weekly returns have been calculated taking the close price from Monday close to 
the following Monday close, while the monthly returns takes the closing prices of the 
last trading day of two consecutive months. Table I presents the statistics for all three 
subsamples. Given the absence of normality, we have applied the non-parametric 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Moving from daily returns to lower frequency returns, the 
normality of the distributions cannot be rejected at the conventional levels of 
significance. To confirm our results, we have generated two additional subsamples. In 
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the case of weekly returns from Wednesday closing to the following Wednesday closing 
and for monthly returns calculating returns from two consecutive mid-months days, for 
all three futures contracts. We obtain similar results, presented in Table I, that confirm 
the fact that the empirical distribution of EUA returns tends to normality as the 
frequency of observation decreases. 
Finally, we have analyzed if EUA returns are stationary by applying the 
Kwiatkowski et al.’s (1992) unit root test. We have tested the null of stationarity with 
intercept and deterministic time trend for the price series in levels. The critical value (at 
the 1% level) is 0.216 (see Table 1 in Kwiatkowski et al.’s paper, p. 166). If rejected, 
we have then tested the null of stationarity plus intercept for the time series in first 
differences. The results indicate that EUA prices should first be differenced to render 
the data stationary in all three contracts analyzed (see Table III). Therefore EUA prices 
are difference-stationary and EUA future returns would be unpredictable based on past 
observations. This fact should be taken into account for cointegration analysis. 
4.2. Correlation facts 
The second group of empirical aspects is related to some correlation facts 
observed in the returns and to their consequences. On the one hand, we study the 
significance of the autocorrelation coefficients. The study of the presence/absence of 
autocorrelation is a typical way to detect short-term predictability of returns from past 
information. Given the non-normality of daily distributions, we have decided to apply 
the non-parametric Spearman’s ranks correlation coefficient. Table IV presents the 
Spearman’s autocorrelation coefficients and their p-value associated. Autocorrelation is 
significant and positive only for the first lag at the 1% level.  
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Note that the square of the autocorrelation coefficient could be interpreted as the 
fraction of the variation of return on day t explained by a lagged return in simple linear 
regression. In the case of one lagged, the variation of today’s return is (0.124)2=1.53%, 
(0.109)2=1.10% and (0.0779)2=0.61% for 2008, 2009 and 2010 futures contracts, 
respectively. Therefore, although the influence of the past return is positive and 
significant, the short-term predictability is very weak. Additionally, and given that there 
exist a large number of outliers, we have eliminated their effects in the autocorrelation 
analysis by applying a run test. This test assumes an ordered sequence of n1 returns 
above the median and n2 returns below the median. A run of type 1 (type 2) is defined as 
a sequence of one or more returns above (below) the median which are followed and 
preceded by returns below (above) the median. r1 and r2 are the number of runs of type 1 
and 2, respectively, and r is the total number of observed runs. By comparing the 
observed number of runs and the expected number of runs, we test the hypothesis that 
returns follow a random sequence. Too few or too many runs would suggest non-
randomness in the distribution. Table V shows the results that indicate that the null of 
randomness is rejected at the 5% level, for 2008 futures but not for 2009 and 2010 
futures contracts. In summary, correlation analysis and run tests indicate a positive but 
weak short-run predictability of past returns. Furthermore, this small predictability has 
diminished over time. 
Finally, we analyze the presence of a slow decay of autocorrelation in absolute 
returns, also known as the Taylor effect, which would indicate that large returns in 
absolute terms are more probably followed by another large return, rather than a small 
one. Note that we have already obtained preliminary evidence of dependence among 
outliers; however, the Taylor effect makes reference to a feature that is present in the 
entire sample. To test this effect, we have obtained the Spearman’s ranks 
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autocorrelation coefficient taking into account absolute returns. Table VI presents the 
results that indicate a significant slow decay of sample autocorrelation coefficients at 
the 5% level, suggesting a long-range dependence in absolute returns. 
4.3. Volatility-related features 
The third group of facts investigates some aspects of EUA returns related to 
some phenomena of the time series volatility. The first one is related to the positive 
autocorrelation observed in different measures of volatility; the second one makes 
reference to the fact that volatility responds differently to positive and negative shocks 
of the same magnitude; and the last one analyzes the correlation between trading-related 
measures and volatility. 
Firstly, we have depicted the squared returns of all three futures contracts as a 
standard approach to detect volatility clusters. Figures 3a, 3c and 3e exhibit this fact, 
that is very common both in financial and commodities assets series.  
Additionally, we have obtained a high-low daily volatility measure. We have 
chosen the volatility measure proposed by Garman and Klass (1980) due to its higher 
relative efficiency than the standard estimators. The Garman and Klass volatility 
measure (hereafter Garman-Klass volatility) is obtained in the following way: 
( ) ( ){ } 22GK c383.0ud2duc019.0du511.0! !!+!!=  
where Ot = today's opening price; Ht = today's high price; Lt = today's low price; Ct = 
today's close price; tt OHu loglog !=  is the normalized high; tt OLd loglog !=  is the 
normalized low; and tt OCc loglog !=  is the normalized close. 
Figures 3b, 3d and 3f represent the evolution of the Garman-Klass volatility over 
the trading days of all three futures. Both figures show volatility clustering. There are 
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two striking clusters in July 2005 and April 2006. Benz and Hengelbrock (2008) relate 
the first one to unexpected selling by some Eastern European countries and to the 
insecurity perceived in the market as a consequence of the terrorist attacks in London in 
July 2005. The second cluster took place in April 2006 and is explained by the fact that 
in April 2006 the market understood that there was a great excess of allowances in 
Phase I, that also affected Phase II EUA futures. 
Panel A of Table VII presents the positive and significant Spearman’s cross 
autocorrelation coefficients of Garman-Klass volatility for the first ten lags. The results 
confirm the existence of volatility clusters that decay very slowly.  
Secondly, we study the asymmetric volatility, which is the fact that volatility 
responds differently to positive and negative shocks of the same magnitude.11 Cont 
(2001), Bouchaud et al. (2007) and Bouchaud and Potters (2001) comment on the 
existence of a negative correlation between volatility and returns in financial assets, and 
particularly in stocks, which tends to zero as we increase the time lag. Panel B in Table 
VII present the Spearman’s cross correlation coefficients between Garman-Klass 
volatility and returns. Both the contemporaneous and the one-period lagged correlation 
coefficient are significant and negative at the 1% level, confirming that EUA volatility 
responds differently to positive and negative returns. 
Although volatility modeling is not an objective of this study, to get additional 
insights about the volatility asymmetry, we have tested standard GARCH models that 
take into account this stylized fact in Phase II.12 Following Rodríguez and Ruiz (2009), 
we have estimated EGARCH models as the most flexible GARCH model that captures 
the asymmetric effect. In all three series of data, the asymmetric parameter is significant 
                                                
11 A survey of the empirical literature about this fact can be found in Taylor (2005). 
12 Borak et al. (2006), Paolella and Taschini (2008), Miclaus et al. (2008) and Benz and Trück (2009), 
among others, present GARCH models to analyze the conditional volatility of Phase I EUAs returns. 
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at the 1% significance level; however, the residuals of the estimated models still show 
persistence of heavy tails (see the last column in Table I). Therefore, when modeling 
EUA volatility, we suggest assuming fat-tailed unconditional distributions in order to 
capture all the volatility features of EUA return data. 13 
Finally, we have tested the relationship between the trading activity and 
volatility. Given that our measure of volatility is an intraday volatility, we have chosen 
two flow variables, the level of daily trading volume (VOL) and the change in the open 
interest (!OI), to calculate the cross correlations between these trading-related measures 
and volatility.  
Panel A and B in Table VIII presents the results for the case of the volume and 
change in open interest, respectively. The contemporaneous cross correlation 
coefficients in the case of volume are positive and significant (76%, 88%, and 84% for 
2008, 2009 and 2010 futures contract, respectively). The same occurs in the case of the 
open interest (17%, 32%, and 27% for 2008, 2009 and 2010 futures contracts, 
respectively). Furthermore, the cross correlations for lags from one to ten decay very 
slowly in both measures and in all three futures contracts. All in all, these facts indicate 
that both trading-related measures should be considered as explanatory variables in 
volatility models. Additionally, following the classical approach in the financial 
literature that considers the volume as a proxy for day trading and speculative activity, 
and the open interest as a proxy to measure the hedging activity, we could say that both 
speculators and hedgers destabilize the EUA market. 
 
 
                                                
13 See Rachev and Mittnik (2000, chapter 4) for a comparison of conditional and unconditional 
distributional models for the returns on Nikkei 225 stock market index. 
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4.4. Commodity features 
The last group of relevant stylized facts is focused on specific features observed 
in commodities series. The first one we study is the non-trading effect in EUA volatility 
in order to test whether the information flow is more evenly distributed around the clock 
in weather-sensitive markets than in the equity market. Firstly, we have tested a possible 
daily seasonality in returns or variances. Both non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis and 
Brown-Forsythe tests cannot reject the equality of medians and variances.14 Therefore, 
returns and variances are evenly distributed over the trading days. Secondly, two 
subsamples have been generated for each maturity. We have separated the weekend 
from the rest of the week, with the returns from Friday closing to Monday closing 
standing for weekend returns. Finally, we have split each subsample into two, 
separating between trading periods (open to close returns, OC) and non-trading periods 
(close to open returns, CO).  
The results are presented in Table IX. All three futures contracts show similar 
results. We cannot reject the equality in variances between weekend and weekdays both 
for trading and non-trading periods, with the exception of non-trading periods for the 
future 2009. However, when comparing volatility between trading and non-trading 
periods conditioned on weekend or weekdays, we reject the null hypothesis at the 1% 
level of significance (except for weekend periods for future 2009), showing that the 
trading volatility (OC) is higher than non-trading volatility (CO). Taking into account 
that the number of trading hours (7:00 to 17:00, London local time) is lower than the 
number of non-trading hours, our results clearly indicate that information flow is 
                                                
14 The Kruskal-Wallis statistic is 3.849 (p-value = 0.427) for the future 2008, 4.210 (p-value = 0.378) for 
the future 2009 and 6.4956 (p-value = 0.1651) for the future 2010. The Brown-Forsythe statistic takes the 
values 1.591 (p-value = 0.174), 1.817 (p-value = 0.123) and 1.9257 (p-value = 0.1037) for 2008, 2009 
and 2010 futures contracts, respectively.  
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concentrated during the business day, similar to the equity markets, and does not evolve 
randomly around the clock. 
A second phenomenon characteristic of commodities futures is the negative 
correlation with stocks and bonds (see Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2006). We have 
analyzed this aspect by calculating the existing correlation between the EUA futures and 
the main European benchmarks for bonds and stocks markets. Specifically, we have 
chosen the Schatz bond future, the Bolb bond future and the Bund bond future as 
representatives of short-term, medium-term and long-term bonds, and the Euro Stoxx 50 
future contract and its underlying asset as a benchmark for the stock market. Table X 
presents the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the different described 
assets and the three EUA futures contracts. 
The significance of the correlation with all the assets can be seen. Nonetheless, 
the correlation is negative with bonds assets and positive with stocks and Brent, mainly 
in the 2009 and 2010 futures contracts. A possible explanation of these results can be 
found in the fact that in business cycle expansions (contractions), when the stock market 
is normally in a bullish (bearish) moment, the companies produce more (less) and as a 
consequence they pollute more (less) and need a higher (lower) number of EUAs. The 
expansions (contractions) are normally accompanied with an increase (a decrease) in the 
interest rates and a decrease (an increase) in bond prices. Note that the whole significant 
correlation picture has appealing implications for portfolio diversification purposes. 
Finally, we test the property of inflation hedge. If the correlation between EUAs 
and inflation was significant and positive, they would let us hedge against inflation. To 
study this fact, we have carried out a monthly analysis. Furthermore, inflation has been 
divided into three types: the observed, the expected and the unexpected. It is interesting 
to extract the unexpected component of inflation because this is the part we are 
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interested in hedging against since the expected component is anticipated by the interest 
rate, and with fixed income assets we might hedge against it. The Harmonized Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP) monthly series has been chosen for the observed inflation.15 
The expected inflation is the free risk interest rate, reason why we use the 1-month 
Euribor rate as a proxy, leaving the non-expected inflation as the difference between the 
observed and the expected inflation. 
Table XI shows the correlation coefficients between our asset and the different 
definitions of inflation. Note that the Spearman’s correlation coefficients between the 
futures and the unexpected inflation are significant in all the futures contracts; therefore, 
as commodity futures, EUA assets could help us to hedge against inflation. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The objective of our paper is to study the stylized facts of EUA returns. Given 
that the Phase I (2005-2007) is generally considered as a pilot and learning phase, we 
have chosen 2008, 2009 and 2010 futures contracts to test the accomplishment of 
several statistical features that usually appear in both financial and commodities assets.  
We have found evidence of intermittency, aggregational gaussianity, short-term 
predictability, Taylor effect, volatility clustering, asymmetric volatility, and positive 
relation between volatility and volume and between the volatility and the change in the 
open interest. Our findings suggest that temporal dependencies should be modeled with 
                                                
15 Eurostat defines the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICPs) as an economic indicator 
constructed to measure the changes over time in the prices of consumer goods and services acquired by 
households. The HICPs give comparable measures of inflation in the euro-zone, the EU, the European 
Economic Area and for other countries including accession and candidate countries. They are calculated 
according to a harmonized approach and a single set of definitions. They provide the official measure of 
consumer price inflation in the euro-zone for the purposes of monetary policy in the euro area and 
assessing inflation convergence as required under the Maastricht criteria. The elected series is the 
European Union HICP with 25 countries. More details about this index can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat (last accessed on March 20, 2012). 
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ARMA-GARCH structures. However, the persistence of conditional heavy-tails 
indicates that in order to capture the volatility features of EUA return data; fat-tailed 
unconditional distributions should be assumed. Furthermore, unlike commodities 
properties, we have observed negative asymmetry, positive correlation with stocks 
indexes and higher volatility levels during the trading session, an indication that the 
EUA information flow is concentrated during the trading day and does not evolve 
randomly around the clock. The property of inflation hedge and the positive correlation 
with bonds, both characteristics being typical of commodity futures, are also detected. 
Therefore, our results indicate that EUAs do not behave like either common commodity 
futures or financial assets, and suggest that the EUA is a new asset class. The entirety of 
these facts, robust over time, has appealing implications for portfolio analysis, volatility 
modeling, hedging activities and cointegration analysis. 
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Table I. Summary statistics for EUA futures returns 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for 2008, 2009 and 2010 EUA futures contracts traded at the 
ICE ECX market. Panel A, B and C present the statistics for the 2008, 2009 and 2010 EUA futures 
contracts, respectively. “Monday to Monday” (“Wednesday to Wednesday”) column shows the results for 
weekly returns calculated from Monday (Wednesday) close to Monday (Wednesday) close. “Monthly 
Based day 1” presents the results for monthly returns, calculated from the first trading day of each month 
to the last trading day in the same month. “Monthly Based day 15”, “Monthly Based day 14” and 
“Monthly Based day 20” show the results for monthly returns, calculated from one day in mid-month to 
the same day in the next month, being the number for that specific day. “Residuals EGARCH” stands for 
the statistics of the residuals obtained after fitting an AR(1)-EGARCH(1,1) model for each contract. “K-S 
stat” stands for Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic that tests the null hypothesis of the normality of the 
distribution. “2008 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 15th, 
2008, “2009 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 14th, 2009 and 
“2010 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 20th, 2010. 
 
Panel A: 2008 EUA Futures Contract  
 Daily Monday to Monday 
Wednesday to 
Wednesday 
Monthly Based 
day 1 
Monthly Based 
day 15 
Residuals 
EGARCH 
Mean -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0025 -0.0140 
Median 0.0013 0.0072 0.0033 -0.0026 0.0022 0.0209 
Maximum 0.1865 0.2076 0.1441 0.3189 0.2786 3.9433 
Minimum -0.2882 -0.5146 -0.3757 -0.3780 -0.3405 -7.5034 
Std. Dev. 0.0286 0.0767 0.0646 0.1532 0.1317 1.0003 
Skewness -1.3166 -1.8022 -1.3332 -0.2364 -0.2879 -0.5897 
Kurtosis 17.9459 13.1149 9.5885 2.7371 3.0530 7.6354 
Jarque-Bera 8,982.2510 912.8140 397.8340 0.5240 0.5990 891.3000 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7690 0.7410 0.0000 
K-S stat 2.9130 1.2370 1.1710 0.5710 0.5210 2.6360 
p-value 0.0000 0.0940 0.1280 0.9000 0.9490 0.0000 
Observations 936 190 189 43 43 935 
 
Panel B: 2009 EUA Futures Contract 
 Daily Monday to Monday 
Wednesday to 
Wednesday 
Monthly Based 
day 1 
Monthly Based 
day 14 
Residuals 
EGARCH 
Mean -0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0035 -0.0031 -0.0085 
Median 0.0007 0.0050 0.0032 -0.0013 0.0132 0.0283 
Maximum 0.1932 0.2069 0.1782 0.3219 0.4039 3.6552 
Minimum -0.2811 -0.5087 -0.3667 -0.3697 -0.4580 -7.8527 
Std. Dev. 0.0286 0.0757 0.0649 0.1498 0.1487 1.0003 
Skewness -0.8873 -1.4620 -1.0739 -0.2569 -0.3153 -0.5654 
Kurtosis 14.4420 10.9417 8.0011 2.7422 4.1379 7.1086 
Jarque-Bera 6,647.5940 722.1760 2.9740 0.7570 3.8780 899.6650 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6850 0.1440 0.0000 
K-S stat 2.9180 1.2680 1.3740 0.6240 0.6300 2.9260 
p-value 0.0000 0.0800 0.0460 0.8310 0.8220 0.0000 
Observations 1,190 242 241 55 55 1,189 
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Table I. Summary statistics for EUA futures returns (continued) 
 
Panel C: 2010 EUA Futures Contract 
 Daily Monday to Monday 
Wednesday to 
Wednesday 
Monthly Based 
day 1 
Monthly Based 
day 20 
Residuals 
EGARCH 
Mean -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0015 -0.0030 -0.0003 
Median 0.0002 0.0019 0.0018 -0.0020 -0.0020 0.0005 
Maximum 0.1912 0.2078 0.1830 0.3249 0.2801 0.1979 
Minimum -0.2743 -0.5016 -0.3582 -0.3654 -0.3710 -0.2711 
Std. Dev. 0.0268 0.0708 0.0597 0.1392 0.1254 0.0267 
Skewness -0.8500 -1.4094 -1.0625 -0.2087 -0.2978 -0.8110 
Kurtosis 14.5575 11.3714 8.6198 3.1254 3.5760 14.4896 
Jarque-Bera 8,222.0183 959.0620 442.2060 0.5304 1.9451 8,106.6428 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7670 0.3781 0.0000 
K-S stat 3.0339 1.5029 1.7856 0.4845 0.5570 3.0453 
p-value 0.0000 0.0218 0.0034 0.9730 0.9157 0.0000 
Observations 1,446 295 294 67 68 1,445 
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Table II. Outlier detection 
This table presents the outlier detection based on daily returns for the EUA 2008, 2009 and 2010 futures 
contracts. “5% VaR” (“95% VaR”) provides the outlier detection through the Value at Risk method, 
considering as extreme positive (negative) outliers those returns which are over (under) the 5% 1-day 
VaR (the 95% 1-day VaR). Total VaR considers the aggregation of extreme returns. “Huber” provides the 
outlier detection through the M-Huber estimator. The table is divided into three panels. Panel A 
summarizes the outlier detection. Panel B presents the magnitude of the outliers detected in terms of 
standard deviations of returns (!). Panel C shows the number of clusters of outliers that have been 
detected. “2008 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 15th, 2008, 
“2009 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 14th, 2009 and “2010 
EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 20th, 2010. 
 
 
Panel A: Outliers summary 
 
2008 EUA Futures Contract 2009 EUA Futures Contract 2010 EUA Futures Contract 
5% 
VaR 
95% 
VaR 
Total 
VaR Huber 
5% 
VaR 
95% 
VaR 
Total 
VaR Huber 
5% 
VaR 
95% 
VaR 
Total 
VaR Huber 
Number of observations 936 1,190 1,446 
Number of outliers 47 46 93 156 60 59 119 199 73 72 145 231 
% Number of outliers 5.02% 4.91% 9.94% 16.67% 5.04% 4.96% 10.00% 16.72% 5.05% 4.98% 10.03% 15.98% 
VaR return 3.89% -4.53% - - 3.98% -4.56% - - 3.78% -4.24% - - 
Number of positive outliers 47 0 47 66 60 0 60 89 73 0 73 105 
Number of negative outliers 0 46 46 90 0 59 59 110 0 72 72 126 
 
Panel B: Size of Outliers (!s) 
 
2008 EUA Futures Contract 2009 EUA Futures Contract 2010 EUA Futures Contract 
5% 
VaR 
95% 
VaR 
Total 
VaR Huber 
5% 
VaR 
95% 
VaR 
Total 
VaR Huber 
5% 
VaR 
95% 
VaR 
Total 
VaR Huber 
From 0 to 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
From 1 to 2 34 20 54 118 42 28 70 150 48 35 83 170 
From 2 to 3 8 18 26 24 11 22 33 33 17 25 42 41 
From 3 to 4 4 4 8 9 6 5 11 11 5 8 13 13 
From 4 to 5 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 0 2 2 
From 5 to 6 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 0 3 3 3 
From 6 to 7 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
From 7 to 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
From 8 to 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
From 9 to 10 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
From 10 to 11 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
 
Panel C: Clusters of Outliers 
 
2008 EUA Futures Contract 2009 EUA Futures Contract 2010 EUA Futures Contract 
5% 
VaR 
95% 
VaR 
Total 
VaR Huber 
5% 
VaR 
95% 
VaR 
Total 
VaR Huber 
5% 
VaR 
95% 
VaR 
Total 
VaR Huber 
1 value 37 36 63 84 44 45 73 106 57 54 94 129 
2 values 5 5 12 24 8 7 17 31 8 9 18 30 
3 values 0 0 2 5 0 0 4 4 0 0 5 6 
4 values 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 
5 values 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
6 values 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
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Table III. Unit root tests 
This table summarizes the Kwiatkowski et al.’s (1992) unit root tests for the time series of EUAs future 
prices both in levels and in first differences. We test the null of stationarity with intercept and 
deterministic time trend for the price series in levels. The critical value (at the 1% level) is 0.216 (see 
Table 1 in Kwiatkowski et al.’s paper, p. 166). If rejected, we then test the null of stationarity plus 
intercept for the time series in first differences. The critical value is 0.739 (see Table 1 in Kwiatkowski et 
al.’s paper, p. 166). “2008 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 
15th, 2008, “2009 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 14th, 2009 
and “2010 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 20th, 2010. 
 
Futures Contract Level Differences 
2008 EUA Futures Contract 0.3281 0.0949* 
2009 EUA Futures Contract 0.3867 0.0783* 
2010 EUA Futures Contract 0.3392 0.0733* 
* The null of stationarity cannot be rejected (at the 1% level) 
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Table IV. Autocorrelation tests 
This table provides the first 10 lagged sample autocorrelation coefficients for the 2008, 2009 and 2010 
EUA futures contracts returns. ! stands for the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. “2008 EUA 
Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 15th, 2008, “2009 EUA Futures 
Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 14th, 2009 and “2010 EUA Futures 
Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 20th, 2010. 
 
 2008 EUA Futures Contract 2009 EUA Futures Contract 2010 EUA Futures Contract 
Lag ! p-value ! p-value ! p-value 
1 0.1240 0.0001 0.1090 0.0002 0.0779 0.0031 
2 -0.0095 0.7714 -0.0160 0.5814 -0.0250 0.3421 
3 0.0444 0.1748 0.0480 0.0979 0.0395 0.1339 
4 0.0386 0.2381 0.0484 0.0949 0.0385 0.1434 
5 0.0083 0.7996 0.0066 0.8198 0.0131 0.6183 
6 -0.0003 0.9936 0.0044 0.8798 0.0016 0.9526 
7 -0.0280 0.3922 -0.0170 0.5577 -0.0143 0.5875 
8 0.0221 0.4987 0.0156 0.5911 0.0144 0.5858 
9 -0.0083 0.7998 0.0073 0.8023 0.0259 0.3257 
10 0.0660 0.0435 0.0548 0.0587 0.0398 0.1315 
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Table V. Run tests 
This table reports the run test statistics for all three EUA futures contracts where the null hypothesis is 
that returns are generated in a random way. The table shows the observed and the expected number of 
runs, the statistic and its p-value. “2008 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on 
December 15th, 2008, “2009 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 
14th, 2009 and “2010 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 20th, 
2010. 
 
 Observed number of runs 
Expected 
number of runs Statistic p-value 
2008 EUA Futures Contract 429 469 2.4855 0.0129 
2009 EUA Futures Contract 555 596 1.6820 0.0926 
2010 EUA Futures Contract 698 724 1.3679 0.1797  
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Table VI. Taylor effect 
This table provides the first 10 lagged sample autocorrelation coefficients for the 2008, 2009 and 2010 
EUA futures contracts absolute returns. ! stands for the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. “2008 
EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 15th, 2008, “2009 EUA 
Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 14th, 2009 and “2010 EUA Futures 
Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 20th, 2010. 
 
 2008 EUA Futures Contract 2009 EUA Futures Contract 2010 EUA Futures Contract 
Lag ! p-value ! p-value ! p-value 
1 0.1071 0.0010 0.1322 0.0000 0.1301 0.0000 
2 0.0498 0.1280 0.0848 0.0034 0.1106 0.0000 
3 0.1202 0.0002 0.1533 0.0000 0.1583 0.0000 
4 0.0792 0.0154 0.1012 0.0005 0.0964 0.0002 
5 0.0873 0.0075 0.1156 0.0001 0.1233 0.0000 
6 0.0907 0.0055 0.1331 0.0000 0.1398 0.0000 
7 0.0639 0.0507 0.0722 0.0127 0.0776 0.0032 
8 0.0740 0.0235 0.1153 0.0001 0.1268 0.0000 
9 0.0861 0.0084 0.1102 0.0001 0.0988 0.0002 
10 0.0466 0.1541 0.0758 0.0089 0.0874 0.0009 
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Table VII. Volatility-related features 
Panel A presents the Spearman’s autocorrelations coefficients (!) between the daily Garman-Klass 
volatility (") and the daily Garman-Klass volatility lagged # periods. Panel B presents the Spearman’s 
cross correlations coefficients between the daily Garman-Klass volatility and the daily futures return (r) 
lagged # periods. “2008 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 15th, 
2008, “2009 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 14th, 2009 and 
“2010 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 20th, 2010. 
 
Panel A 
!s(","-#) 2008 EUA Futures Contract 2009 EUA Futures Contract 2010 EUA Futures Contract 
Lag Correlation p-value Correlation p-value Correlation p-value 
1 0.7634 0.0000 0.8428 0.0000 0.8641 0.0000 
2 0.7132 0.0000 0.8384 0.0000 0.8514 0.0000 
3 0.6968 0.0000 0.8267 0.0000 0.8400 0.0000 
4 0.7207 0.0000 0.8304 0.0000 0.8287 0.0000 
5 0.7189 0.0000 0.8266 0.0000 0.8377 0.0000 
6 0.7036 0.0000 0.8090 0.0000 0.8249 0.0000 
7 0.6796 0.0000 0.8128 0.0000 0.8243 0.0000 
8 0.6515 0.0000 0.8034 0.0000 0.8218 0.0000 
9 0.6651 0.0000 0.8025 0.0000 0.8181 0.0000 
10 0.6592 0.0000 0.8156 0.0000 0.8226 0.0000 
       Panel B 
!s(",r-#) 2008 EUA Futures Contract 2009 EUA Futures Contract 2010 EUA Futures Contract 
Lag Correlation p-value Correlation p-value Correlation p-value 
0 -0.1008 0.0020 -0.0931 0.0013 -0.0666 0.0113 
1 -0.0915 0.0051 -0.0781 0.0070 -0.0564 0.0321 
2 -0.0777 0.0174 -0.0608 0.0361 -0.0485 0.0652 
3 -0.0626 0.0557 -0.0777 0.0074 -0.0637 0.0154 
4 -0.0655 0.0453 -0.0614 0.0341 -0.0572 0.0298 
5 -0.0613 0.0609 -0.0387 0.1821 -0.0580 0.0278 
6 -0.0692 0.0342 -0.0630 0.0298 -0.0571 0.0304 
7 -0.0506 0.1222 -0.0510 0.0787 -0.0341 0.1956 
8 -0.0554 0.0901 -0.0497 0.0867 -0.0541 0.0402 
9 -0.0572 0.0803 -0.0312 0.2815 -0.0497 0.0594 
10 -0.0789 0.0158 -0.0676 0.0197 -0.0589 0.0256 
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Table VIII. Trading-related features 
Panel A presents the Spearman’s cross correlations coefficients (!) between the daily Garman-Klass 
volatility (") and the daily trading volume (VOL) lagged # periods. Panel B presents the Spearman’s cross 
correlations coefficients between the daily Garman-Klass volatility (") and the change in the daily open 
interest ($OI) lagged # periods. “2008 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on 
December 15th, 2008, “2009 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 
14th, 2009 and “2010 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 20th, 
2010. 
 
Panel A 
!s(",VOL-#)  2008 EUA Futures Contract 2009 EUA Futures Contract 2010 EUA Futures Contract 
Lag Correlation p-value Correlation p-value Correlation p-value 
0 0.7644 0.0000 0.8832 0.0000 0.8403 0.0000 
1 0.7070 0.0000 0.8559 0.0000 0.8210 0.0000 
2 0.6875 0.0000 0.8492 0.0000 0.8122 0.0000 
3 0.6865 0.0000 0.8512 0.0000 0.8132 0.0000 
4 0.6980 0.0000 0.8454 0.0000 0.8082 0.0000 
5 0.6956 0.0000 0.8444 0.0000 0.8082 0.0000 
6 0.6831 0.0000 0.8377 0.0000 0.8049 0.0000 
7 0.6758 0.0000 0.8354 0.0000 0.8045 0.0000 
8 0.6667 0.0000 0.8298 0.0000 0.7981 0.0000 
9 0.6710 0.0000 0.8352 0.0000 0.7918 0.0000 
10 0.6690 0.0000 0.8390 0.0000 0.7946 0.0000 
  
! !Panel B 
!s(",$OI-#)  2008 EUA Futures Contract 2009 EUA Futures Contract 2010 EUA Futures Contract 
Lag Correlation p-value Correlation p-value Correlation p-value 
0 0.1720 0.0000 0.3186 0.0000 0.2705 0.0000 
1 0.1146 0.0006 0.2767 0.0000 0.2658 0.0000 
2 0.1025 0.0021 0.2817 0.0000 0.2460 0.0000 
3 0.1319 0.0001 0.2934 0.0000 0.2536 0.0000 
4 0.1286 0.0001 0.2977 0.0000 0.2554 0.0000 
5 0.1087 0.0011 0.2793 0.0000 0.2570 0.0000 
6 0.1019 0.0022 0.2581 0.0000 0.2641 0.0000 
7 0.1148 0.0006 0.2581 0.0000 0.2504 0.0000 
8 0.0841 0.0117 0.2588 0.0000 0.2419 0.0000 
9 0.1203 0.0003 0.2838 0.0000 0.2325 0.0000 
10 0.1394 0.0000 0.2649 0.0000 0.2334 0.0000 
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Table IX. Information flows 
This table reports the Brown-Forsythe statistic (BF-Statistic) that tests the null of equality of variances among 
trading and non-trading periods. Panels A, B and C present the results for weekends and for weekdays for 2008, 
2009 and 2010 futures contracts, respectively. Weekend results are based on returns from Friday close to Monday 
close and weekday results are based on returns from Monday close to Friday close. The table also reports the 
number of observations and the annualized volatility in percentage for trading (!OC) and non-trading (!CO) 
periods. “2008 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 15th, 2008, “2009 
EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 14th, 2009 and “2010 EUA Futures 
Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 20th, 2010. 
 
Panel A: 2008 EUA 
Futures Contract 
Number of 
observations !OC !CO BF-Statistic p-value 
Weekend 144 47.43 25.17 11.3814 0.0008 
Weekdays 574 41.01 28.24 30.0853 0.0000 
BF-Statistic  0.0144 0.7702   
p-value   0.9044 0.3805     
Total 718 42.36 27.66 41.2757 0.0000 
  
    Panel B: 2009 EUA 
Futures Contract 
 Number of 
observations !OC !CO Statistic p-value 
Weekend 142 42.14 34.53 2.0256 0.1558 
Weekdays 572 39.88 28.14 25.2061 0.0000 
Statistic  0.6069 6.3929   
p-value   0.4362 0.0117     
Total 714 40.32 29.57 25.5893 0.0000 
  
    Panel C: 2010 EUA 
Futures Contract 
 Number of 
observations !OC !CO Statistic p-value 
Weekend 161 34.21 25.17 10.7123 0.0012 
Weekdays 656 30.76 24.91 32.4802 0.0000 
Statistic  1.1193 0.0713   
p-value   0.2904 0.7895     
Total 817 31.49 24.95 43.1415 0.0000 
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Table X. Correlation with bonds, stocks and Brent 
The table gives the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients and their p-value between the EUA 2008, 2009 and 
2010 futures contracts and the Schatz bond future (short-term fixed rent), the Bolb bond future (medium-term 
fixed rent), the Bund bond future (long-term fixed rent), the Euro Stoxx 50 future, the Euro Stoxx 50 index, and 
the Brent futures contract. “2008 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 
15th, 2008, “2009 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 14th, 2009 and 
“2010 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 20th, 2010. 
 
Asset 
2008 EUA Futures Contract 2009 EUA Futures Contract 2010 EUA Futures Contract 
! p-value ! p-value ! p-value 
Schatz bond futures -0.0950 0.0038 -0.1311 0.0000 -0.1145 0.0000 
Bolb bond futures -0.0971 0.0031 -0.1442 0.0000 -0.1248 0.0000 
Bund bond futures -0.0951 0.0038 -0.1465 0.0000 -0.1268 0.0000 
Euro Stoxx 50 futures 0.0585 0.0751 0.1476 0.0000 0.1412 0.0000 
Euro Stoxx 50 Index 0.0577 0.0787 0.1434 0.0000 0.1362 0.0000 
Brent oil futures 0.2413 0.0000 0.2499 0.0000 0.2302 0.0000 
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Table XI. Inflation hedge 
The table shows the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients and its p-value between the EUA futures contracts 
returns and the series of the observed, expected and non-expected inflation. The number of monthly observations 
is 43, 55 and 67 for the 2008, 2009 and 2010 EUA futures contracts, respectively. “2008 EUA Futures Contract” 
refers to the futures contract maturing on December 15th, 2008, “2009 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the 
futures contract maturing on December 14th, 2009 and “2010 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures contract 
maturing on December 20th, 2010. 
 
 Correlation 
2008 EUA Futures Contract Observed inflation Expected inflation Non-expected inflation 
Correlation coefficient 0.2895 -0.0908 0.3241 
Sig. (bilateral) 0.0601 0.5627 0.0345 
    
 Correlation 
2009 EUA Futures Contract Observed inflation Expected inflation Non-expected inflation 
Correlation coefficient 0.2953 -0.0618 0.2863 
Sig. (bilateral) 0.0290 0.6542 0.0345 
    
 Correlation 
2010 EUA Futures Contract Observed inflation Expected inflation Non-expected inflation 
Correlation coefficient 0.3379 -0.0316 0.2973 
Sig. (bilateral) 0.0054 0.7998 0.0149 
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Figure 1. Prices evolution 
Figure 1 shows the prices evolution for the 2008, 2009 and 2010 EUA futures contracts. The period sample goes 
from April 22nd, 2005 to December 15th, 2008 for the first contract, from April 22nd, 2005 to December 14th, 2009 
for the second one and from April 22nd, 2005 to December 20th, 2010 for the last one. 
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Figure 2. Returns histograms 
Figures 2a, 2b and 2c depict the histograms of the daily returns for the 2008, 2009 and 2010 EUA futures 
contracts, respectively, in comparison with the histogram of a normal distribution. The period sample goes from 
April 22nd, 2005 to December 15th, 2008 for the first contract, from April 22nd, 2005 to December 14th, 2009 for 
the second one and from April 22nd, 2005 to December 20th, 2010 for the last one, collecting 936, 1,190 and 1,446 
daily returns for 2008, 2009 and 2010 EUA ECX futures contracts, respectively.  
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Figure 2a. 2008 EUA Futures Contract 
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Figure 2b. 2009 EUA Futures Contract 
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Figure 2. Returns histograms (continued) 
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Figure 2c. 2010 EUA Futures Contract 
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Figure 3. Volatility clustering 
Figures 3a, 3c and 3e exhibit the squared returns representation for the 2008, 2009 and 2010 EUA futures 
contracts, respectively. Figure 3b, 3d and 3f show the Garman-Klass volatility representation for the 2008, 2009 
and 2010 EUA futures contracts, respectively. Volatility clustering is observed in all figures. “2008 EUA Futures 
Contract” refers to the futures contract maturing on December 15th, 2008, “2009 EUA Futures Contract” refers to 
the futures contract maturing on December 14th, 2009 and “2010 EUA Futures Contract” refers to the futures 
contract maturing on December 20th, 2010. 
 
0% 
1% 
2% 
3% 
4% 
5% 
6% 
7% 
8% 
9% 
04/05 07/05 10/05 01/06 04/06 07/06 10/06 01/07 04/07 07/07 10/07 01/08 04/08 07/08 10/08 
Sq
ua
re
d 
R
et
ur
ns
 (%
) 
Date  
Figure 3a. Squared returns representation for 2008 EUA Futures Contract 
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Figure 3b. Garman-Klass volatility for 2008 EUA Futures Contract 
Chapter I: Is the EUA a new asset class? 
 
 
65 
Figure 3. Volatility clustering (continued) 
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Figure 3c. Squared returns representation for 2009 EUA Futures Contract 
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Figure 3d. Garman-Klass volatility for 2009 EUA Futures Contract 
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Figure 3. Volatility clustering (continued) 
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Figure 3e. Squared returns representation for 2010 EUA Futures Contract 
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Figure 3f. Garman-Klass volatility for 2010 EUA Futures Contract 
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1. Introduction 
The first decision to take before carrying out an empirical analysis with EUAs 
and CERs prices both for hedging and for academic purposes is to decide which data 
they are going to take. Hedgers that face carbon risk price for a series of years/periods 
can use a “strip” of derivative contracts to avoid such risk, each with a different delivery 
date, or alternatively, use a stack hedge, in which the most nearby and/or liquid contract 
is used, and it is rolled over to the next-to-nearest contract as time passes. 
In the first case, we find papers by Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2009), 
Chevallier and Benoit (2010), Rittler (2012) and Palao and Pardo (2012), that employ 
the entire lifespan of each EUA futures contract for the econometric estimation, and 
therefore, carry out their analysis using directly the available series. In the second case, 
researchers have to decide how to construct a continuous futures series using the 
different maturity contracts available. Some papers linked the different maturities using 
the expiration day as the timing for the rollover. This is the case for papers such as 
Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2011), who study EUA and CER price drivers; Chevallier 
(2010), who analyzes the inter-relationships between EUAs and CERs price series; 
Chevallier (2011), who proposes a model of carbon price interactions with 
macroeconomic and energy dynamics; and Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2011), who 
consider EUAs as an additional investing option in the framework of portfolio 
management. Another criterion is followed by Koenig (2011). He studies correlation in 
carbon and energy markets using daily observations from April 2005 to August 2010. 
To construct a reference price for EUAs, he combines three maturities into one single 
EUA future price series, labeled “EUA Tracker”. During Phase I, “EUA Tracker” is 
equal to the price of the December 2007 contract. In Phase II, “EUA Tracker” switches 
to the December 2009 contract, until its date of maturity, after which it switches to the 
Chapter II: Rolling over EUAs and CERs 
 
 
70 
December 2010 contract. Finally, the study of the evolution of liquidity in carbon 
futures markets by Medina et al. (2011) analyses the timeline of the liquidity in the 
European carbon market and uses the maximum volume criterion in order to obtain the 
most tradable contract series. After this selected review of several CO2 studies which 
offer a variety of criteria to link series, the question is, can the election of the rollover 
date affect the empirical results obtained in these papers? The analysis that follows tries 
to provide an answer to this question. 
The literature on rolling over futures contracts used to link the data of the nearest 
future contract up to its maturity with the following contract on the next day. This was 
the most popular method until Samuelson (1965) detected an abnormal volatility in the 
last weeks of life of futures contracts, which did not appear in the spot series. Thus, if 
continuous series were constructed taking as reference the prices of the nearest futures 
contract up to its maturity, the (abnormal) volatility could distort the conclusions 
reached from the statistical inferences. Due to this finding, some papers proposed 
different methodologies to try to avoid the possible abnormal volatility. Junkus (1986) 
constructs series without taking into account the data from the first day of the month of 
delivery until the day of maturity when studying weekend and day of the week effects in 
returns on stock index futures. Ma et al. (1992), in addition to this criterion and the 
delivery day method, use also the first notice day to link the different contracts and 
compare the different series obtained. The first notice day is defined as the date on 
which the broker warns their customers that the date of delivery is near, which is done 
two weeks prior to delivery. Finally, Geiss (1995) suggests an alternative method that 
constructs continuous futures series producing a price index which is a weighted 
average of observed prices for contracts with different expiration dates. 
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Ma et al. (1992) analyzed the rollover date in several futures contracts with 
different underlying assets and concluded that the differences between the return series 
obtained with different criteria were significant, and the best methodology depended on 
the underlying asset. Carchano and Pardo (2009) analyzed the relevance of the choice of 
the rolling over date using several methodologies for the case of stock index futures and 
they concluded that regardless of the criterion applied, there are not significant 
differences between the series obtained. Finally, Saunier (2010) studied the effect of 
using different rollover methodologies from the point of view of the investor’s 
commodities portfolio yield, and determined that a trader’s profit depends on the 
rollover choice. On the whole, the miscellany of results obtained in these studies implies 
that a specific empirical analysis must be carried out for each individual futures 
contract. 
Unlike previous studies, in this paper we carry out not only an analysis in terms 
of returns distribution, but also a liquidity analysis. Although different rollover criteria 
can provide similar long return series, following specific criteria to do the rollover 
might not offer appropriate market liquidity conditions. For this reason, using the 
number of transactions, we create long future transaction series based on the different 
rollover criteria and we compare their levels of trading activity. Doing that, we can test 
if the methodology considered proper for constructing long futures return series offers 
also the most suitable liquidity context.  
The behavior of the prices of European Union Allowances (EUAs) and Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs) are of interest for polluting companies, investors and 
academics. Although EUAs and CERs spot markets exist, Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner 
(2009) and Rittler (2012) identify the price traded in the futures markets as the main 
reference in the price discovery process when analyzing the relationships between spot 
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and future markets within the first and second commitment period of the European 
Union emission trading scheme, respectively. 
This paper analyzes the relevance of the choice of the rollover date for European 
Union Allowances and Certified Emission Reductions futures contracts. Section 2 
details the data used in the study. Section 3 describes the different methodologies 
reported in the most relevant works in this line of research. Then, taking them into 
account, different return series are constructed. Section 4 studies if there are significant 
differences between the distributions of the different return series depending on the 
criterion applied. Section 5 repeats sections 3 and 4 for the transaction series. Section 6 
summarizes the paper with some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Data  
EUAs and CERs are the most important assets traded in the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Since 2005, many companies included in the 
2003/87/CE Directive have the obligation to cover their real verified emissions with 
rights which allow them to emit one tonne of CO2 or equivalent gas into the 
atmosphere. At the beginning of each year, each company receives entitlements (EUAs) 
to fulfill its requirements. Any excess or requirement of allowances can be trade off in 
the market. In addition, the 2004/101/CE Directive provides the opportunity to satisfy 
their hedge obligations with CERs, but only up to a determinate percentage, which 
varies amongst the different countries. Taken together, these two assets represent the 
base for any potential empirical study on carbon markets. For more details of the 
market, an excellent description of its particularities is presented in Mansanet-Bataller 
and Pardo (2008). Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that this market is divided 
into different phases, and because of their special characteristics, Phase I allowances 
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cannot be used into Phase II. As a consequence, Phase I and Phase II allowances are two 
different assets.1 
From its beginnings in April 2005, most of the derivative volume has been 
concentrated in the ICE ECX EUA Futures Contracts quoted in the ICE Futures Europe. 
This pattern is repeated with the ICE ECX CER Futures Contracts after their starts in 
March 2008. All in all, for our study we will concentrate on these futures contracts and 
in particular on those with maturity in December, being the ones which show higher 
volumes and a larger number of transactions. As an exception and because of being this 
contract being the last Phase I futures contract traded, we will also use the EUA Futures 
Contract with maturity in March 2008. 
Our database is composed not only by all the available daily data for both EUAs 
and CERs Futures Contracts with maturity in December, but also March 2008 contract, 
from their start (April 22nd, 2005, and March 14th, 2008, for the EUAs and CERs 
Futures Contracts, respectively) to December 30th, 2011. Additionally and in order to 
obtain information related to the number of transactions, we have employed all the 
intraday data available, for all the futures contracts used. For each day the daily 
database contains the open, high, low and settlement prices (in Euros), the total volume 
(in lots) and the open interest (in lots). In addition, the intraday database contains for 
each trade the price (in Euros) and the transaction size (in lots). 
 
                                                
1 Phase I went from 2005 to 2007, Phase II is running from 2008 to 2012 and Phase III will cover 2013 to 
2020. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Rollover criteria 
This section discusses 5 different criteria in order to determine the point in time 
when the switching from the maturing contract to the next one in order to link the series 
takes place. The first criterion is the “Delivery Day” or “Last Day” criterion (LD in 
tables). In this case, the switch occurs when the nearest contract expires. However, if 
abnormal volatility occurs in the sessions prior to the contract maturity, the researcher 
would construct a series with the maximum distortion. 
The next 4 criteria seek the appropriate market liquidity conditions for the 
rollover. The rationale of these criteria is that if a trader was long or short in a futures 
contract and wished to hold it indefinitely, he would try to find the liquidity peak to 
switch the contract. The second criterion of “volume”, defined as the number of 
contracts traded, (Vol in the following tables) implies the switching of the contract on 
the day when the volume of the first maturity is always lower than the volume of the 
second maturity.  
The third “open interest” method (OI in tables) indicates the jump between 
series when the open interest of the second maturity is always bigger than the first one. 
The rationale behind this criterion is that many traders consider the open interest as a 
more reliable indicator of liquidity than volume. The reason is that high trading volume 
could be the result of closed positions and this would imply less liquidity in the market. 
In addition to this, we add a new criterion, the fourth one, which we call the “maximum 
open interest” (M.OI in the tables). In this case (and it is the only one) we allow 
jumping from one contract to another with a maturity different from the next-to-
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maturity contract that has the highest open interest until maturity.2 By doing this, we 
can capture the particular behavior of the CO2 futures markets and achieve some 
interesting conclusions. 
The last criterion is based on the measure proposed by Lucia and Pardo (2010). 
In this case, the jump would occur on the day in which the number of closed positions is 
always larger than the number of opened positions for the nearby contract. This is, when 
the ratio 
tt
t
tt
t
t CO
C
CO
O3R
+
!
+
=  is less than zero until maturity, where ttt OIVO !+=  
and ttt OIVC !"= , being Ot and Ct respectively the overall number of open and closed 
positions in the period t, while Vt and OIt  are the volume and the open interest of the 
period t. This methodology seeks to anticipate the fall of the open interest of the nearest 
maturity contract. With this criterion, the analyst avoids taking into account information 
on days in which the nearby contract has lost the interest of traders.  
In the financial literature, there exists one additional criterion, the “Distortion 
free” methodology proposed by Geiss (1995). As it is pointed out by Saunier (2010), 
this criterion is not found to be adequate to run praxis-oriented tests. This method 
implies a continuous rebalancing each day due to the changing contract proportions. 
This would not be good enough for practitioners because the resultant series doesn’t 
reveal the true prices quoted in the market and as a consequence investors could not use 
these prices in their investment strategies. For this reason, this last methodology is not 
included in our study. 
Finally, it is important to highlight that the choice of the rollover date matters 
depending on what is being tested. For example, in some futures contracts the deferred 
months are more actively traded than the nearby ones. In these cases, the choice among 
                                                
2 Applying this rule to volume or R3 does not produce a new series. 
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liquidity-seeking criteria is likely to be more reliable when constructing a continuous 
series of liquidity-related measures, such as volume or open interest.   
3.2. Timing of rollover 
Next, we consider how many days before the expiration date the rollover would 
be made effective by each of the 5 proposed methods. In the “last day” method, by 
definition, there are zero days between the contract expiration and the rollover date, and 
this would indicate that the last price with which the first maturity series contributes to 
the continuous series is the delivery price.  
Concerning the methods based on the search of liquidity, we compute the days 
when the second contract volume or open interest values are persistently higher than 
those of the first one up to maturity. In order to construct a price series, we take prices 
from the contract with more volume or open interest, respectively. In the case of the 
“maximum open interest” we count the days when any contract systematically exhibits 
the maximum open interest until its expiration date, among all the existing contracts.  
In the R3 criterion, the period computed ranges from the day when the R3 
variable is negative up to the maturity day. This is, when the closed positions surpass 
the open ones in the expiring contract until the maturity day, both included. During 
those days, second contract prices replace the first ones. 
Table I presents the mean and the standard deviation of the number of days 
between the rollover date and the front contract expiration date for the three assets 
considered: Phase I EUAs, Phase II EUAs, and Phase II CERs. In the case of the mean, 
this table informs about the average number of days before maturity, in which the 
information of the nearest contract is not used anymore in the construction of the long 
series. In the case of the “maximum open interest” criterion (M.OI), as this method 
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allows jumping to the contract with the highest open interest, regardless of its maturity, 
this parameter cannot be calculated because data from several front contracts are not 
used for Phase II CERs and EUAs. 
Note that the diverse criteria show results very different in terms of mean and 
standard deviation, especially in the case of Phase II EUAs and CERs, and therefore, the 
resultant constructed series will be expected to be quite divergent.  
3.3. Percentage of data that differs between series 
Table II displays the percentage differences on the number of data that varies 
between the different series. Now, the implications of Table I can be seen more clearly. 
Table II shows that the “maximum open interest” series are the most different in Phase 
II EUAs and Phase II CERs, followed by the “open interest” series for Phase II EUAs 
and CERs.  
Table II shows that the “maximum open interest” and the “open interest” series 
are the most different both in Phase II EUAs and Phase II CERs. 
This is because the open interest methodologies jump to the next contract far 
sooner than the rest of the criteria, as there is a contract with a later expiry date which 
dominates the remaining contracts in terms of OI. The rest of the series only vary up to 
5.21% for the Phase I EUAs case, 1.17% for the Phase II EUAs series, and finally 
4.62% for the Phase II CERs data.  
Taking into account these results, the disparity in the number of data of each of 
the series could make it possible to work with different samples, taken from the same 
raw data. This is what we analyze in the following sections. 
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4. Empirical analysis 
Before testing the equality of the distributions, it is important to clarify how to 
link the series of the different maturities. Note that when we switch from one contract to 
another, a jump in prices takes place. We correct this abnormal return by calculating the 
rollover day return as the log of the quotient between the closing price of the second 
maturity contract and the previous closing price of such maturity. Then, considering the 
return series calculated by making this adjustment only on the rollover day, we have 
tested the equality of means, medians and variances among the futures return series 
constructed following the 5 criteria explained in Section 3.  
The equality of these parameters has been tested with the parametric Anova F-
test, the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test and the Brown-Forsythe’s statistic, 
respectively. The results are displayed in Table III. Panel A (Phase I EUAs), Panel B 
(Phase II EUAs) and Panel C (Phase II CERs) present similar results. The p-values 
indicate that it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of equality of means, medians 
and variances in any case.  
Therefore, independently of the method used to elaborate a unique and 
continuous future return series, we would reach the same conclusions in terms of means 
and variance. However, given that two series with the same parameters of position and 
dispersion could result in different distributions, we have applied the Wilcoxon/Mann-
Whitney test, a non-parametric test based on ranks in order to determine if two groups 
(in this case series) have the same general distribution or not. The results of these tests 
are reported in Table IV. It can be shown that the null hypothesis of equality between 
distributions cannot be rejected in any case as all the p-values are far above 10%. 
Therefore, returns distributions of linked series are not conditioned by the criterion used 
to elaborate them. 
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5. Liquidity analysis 
The previous analysis confirms the “last day” criterion as the simplest 
methodology to construct long futures return series. However, given that the rest of the 
methodologies are focused on different liquidity-seeking criteria, the question is: does 
the “last day” criterion offer appropriate market liquidity conditions? 
To determine possible differences in market liquidity among the criteria, we 
have chosen the variable “number of transactions” (the number of agreements between a 
buyer and a seller to exchange any number of contracts for payment) as the most 
relevant due to the fact that a large number of transactions is indicative of high trading 
activity and this is directly related to market liquidity. Furthermore, it is interesting to 
highlight that given that this variable is based on intraday data, this part of the study 
could be of great interest for microstructure researchers. As high frequency data is not 
always easily at hand, this study would help researchers in their decision of choosing 
the most suitable rollover criterion, when their objective is to obtain the most 
representative series in terms of liquidity.  
Firstly, following the steps described in Section 3, we have constructed the 
continuous transactions series. Then, we have carried out equality and distribution tests 
over the long series to determine possible significant differences among them in terms 
of liquidity. Table V presents the equality tests of means, medians and variances 
between the continuous transaction series, for Phase I EUA, Phase II EUA and Phase II 
CER, respectively.  
The results of Table V are different for Phase I EUAs and for Phase II EUAs and 
CERs. In the first case, there are not significant differences among the long transactions 
series constructed, but in the second case, we reject the assumption of equality in terms 
of mean, median and standard deviation when we compare the five constructed series 
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(H0). This is due to the significantly lower level of transactions for the M.OI series. For 
these two assets, we take a second step and repeat the test, but now comparing all the 
series except M.OI. Again, we reject the hypothesis of equality of the analyzed 
parameters because of the OI series. Although OI series present a higher level of 
number of transactions than M.OI, it is not as high as in the rest of the methodologies. 
Finally, we repeat the tests for the rest of the transaction series constructed and no 
significant differences are found. Table VI confirms the previous results, giving 
evidence of the existence of significant differences in the transactions distribution for 
OI and M.OI and the rest of the series.3 
Therefore, traders following “open interest” or “maximum open interest” 
rollover methodologies will face a more unfavorable intraday liquidity environment for 
the period considered, in both Phase II EUAs and Phase II CERs cases. This can be due 
to the fact that traders in Phase II EUAs and CERs maintain open positions in non-
nearest-to-maturity futures contracts sooner than traders did in Phase I. The most 
striking case is the Phase II ICE ECX CER Futures Contract with maturity in December 
2008 that began to be traded on March 14th, 2008. Only four trading days later, on 
March 20th, 2008, the open interest of the Phase II ICE ECX CER Futures Contract with 
maturity in December 2011 was higher than the open interest in the nearest-to-maturity 
futures contracts (December 2008). 
Finally, it is worth noticing the results in the case of the “last day” method. This 
criterion offers the same level of transactions as the liquidity-seeking criteria and, as a 
                                                
3 These results are qualitatively similar to those obtained using other measures of trading activity as 
liquidity indicators. Specifically, we have repeated all the analysis in Section 5 by using both screen 
transactions and volume as trading activity measures. These results are available upon request from the 
authors.  
 
Chapter II: Rolling over EUAs and CERs 
 
 
81 
consequence, this methodology grants a convenient liquidity frame to switch the 
contract or close the present position. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the relevance of the choice of the rollover 
date when constructing continuous futures contract series in the ICE ECX futures 
market. The main methodologies related to the construction of long futures series have 
been revised, as well as the different adjustments to be made when linking them. One 
new criterion, “maximum open interest”, has been added to the previous literature 
accordingly with the specific futures contract analyzed. Therefore, five criteria have 
been applied to link all the EUAs and CERs futures contracts with maturities between 
April 22nd, 2005 and December 30th, 2011. 
Our findings indicate that there are not significant discrepancies between the 
different continuous futures return series in terms of mean, median and variance. 
Identical conclusions are observed when comparing in pairs the general distribution 
among the different futures series. To sum up, the findings obtained here are consistent 
with Carchano and Pardo (2009) conclusions for the stock index futures. We confirm 
that the simplest methodology, which consists in jumping on the last trading day, can be 
used in order to reach the same results. A liquidity analysis gives robustness to this 
finding, given that the “last day” method offers the same level of transactions as the 
liquidity-seeking criteria. Therefore, in the case of EUAs and CERs futures contracts, 
the ease of construction of log return series is not at odds with the search for liquidity. 
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Table I. Rollover timing for each criterion 
This table indicates the mean and the standard deviation of the number of days between the rollover date 
and the expiration date of the contract for each of the 5 proposed methods. LD, Vol, OI, M.OI, and R3 
stand for last day, volume, open interest, maximum open interest, and R3 criteria, respectively. Sample 
period from April 22nd, 2005 to March 31st, 2008 for Phase I EUAs (Panel A), from April 22nd, 2005 to 
December 30th, 2011 for Phase II EUAs (Panel B), and from March 14th, 2008 to December 30th, 2011 for 
Phase II CERs (Panel C).  
 
Panel A: Phase I EUAs LD Vol OI M.OI R3 
Mean 0.0 13.3 11.3 11.3 2.3 
Std. Deviation 0.0 11.6 19.6 19.6 1.5 
      
Panel B: Phase II EUAs LD Vol OI M.OI R3 
Mean 0.0 5.0 63.8 - 2.0 
Std. Deviation 0.0 2.9 126.8 - 3.4 
      
Panel C: Phase II CERs LD Vol OI M.OI R3 
Mean 0.0 9.5 114.5 - 3.5 
Std. Deviation 0.0 10.3 99.5 - 4.5 
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Table II. Percentage data that differs between long futures return series 
This table indicates the difference in percentage between the number of observations that is different 
when constructing continuous futures series following each criterion. LD, Vol, OI, M.OI, and R3 stand for 
last day, volume, open interest, maximum open interest, and R3 criteria, respectively. Sample period from 
April 22nd, 2005 to March 31st, 2008 for Phase I EUAs (Panel A), from April 22nd, 2005 to December 
30th, 2011 for Phase II EUAs (Panel B), and from March 14th, 2008 to December 30th, 2011 for Phase II 
CERs (Panel C).  
 
Panel A: Phase I EUAs LD Vol OI M.OI 
Vol 5.21%    
OI 4.01% 3.60%   
M.OI 4.01% 3.60% 0.00%  
R3 0.67% 4.54% 3.60% 3.60% 
     
Panel B: Phase II EUAs LD Vol OI M.OI 
Vol 1.17%    
OI 14.94% 15.64%   
M.OI 24.08% 24.66% 9.14%  
R3 0.47% 0.70% 15.29% 24.37% 
     
Panel C: Phase II CERs LD Vol OI M.OI 
Vol 3.83%    
OI 45.92% 42.09%   
M.OI 98.45% 96.28% 71.98%  
R3 1.45% 4.62% 44.88% 98.55% 
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Table III. Equality tests of long futures return series 
Equality tests of means, medians and variances between the continuous return series constructed 
following the criteria explained in Section 3. LD, Vol, OI, M.OI, and R3 stand for last day, volume, open 
interest, maximum open interest, and R3 criteria, respectively. The equality of means, medians and 
variances has been tested with the parametric Anova F-test, the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test and 
the Brown-Forsythe’s statistic, respectively. The corresponding p-values appear in all panels at the end of 
the column. Sample period from April 22nd, 2005 to March 31st, 2008 for Phase I EUAs (Panel A), from 
April 22nd, 2005 to December 30th, 2011 for Phase II EUAs (Panel B), and from March 14th, 2008 to 
December 30th, 2011 for Phase II CERs (Panel C). H0 stands for the p-value of the equality tests of 
means, medians and variances between all the continuous return series constructed. 
 
Panel A: Phase I EUAs Mean Median Std. Deviation 
LD -0.009053 0.000000 0.120161 
Vol -0.009048 0.000000 0.120147 
OI -0.009013 0.000000 0.120177 
M.OI -0.009013 0.000000 0.120177 
R3 -0.009042 0.000000 0.120162 
H0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
    
Panel B: Phase II EUAs Mean Median Std. Deviation 
LD -0.000573 0.000400 0.027361 
Vol -0.000576 0.000400 0.027361 
OI -0.000556 0.000400 0.027344 
M.OI -0.000565 0.000000 0.027327 
R3 -0.000571 0.000400 0.027364 
H0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
    
Panel C: Phase II CERs Mean Median Std. Deviation 
LD -0.001311 0.000000 0.025804 
Vol -0.001334 0.000000 0.025826 
OI -0.001335 0.000000 0.025854 
M.OI -0.001356 0.000000 0.025695 
R3 -0.001354 0.000000 0.025780 
H0 1.0000 0.9999 1.0000 
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Table IV. Distribution tests of long futures return series 
This table shows the p-values of the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test that tests the null hypothesis that two 
continuous return series have the same general distribution. LD, Vol, OI, M.OI, and R3 for last day, 
volume, open interest, maximum open interest, and R3 criteria, respectively. Sample period from April 
22nd, 2005 to March 31st, 2008 for Phase I EUAs (Panel A), from April 22nd, 2005 to December 30th, 2011 
for Phase II EUAs (Panel B), and from March 14th, 2008 to December 30th, 2011 for Phase II CERs 
(Panel C).  
 
Panel A: Phase I EUAs LD Vol OI M.OI 
Vol 0.9799    
OI 0.9966 0.9838   
M.OI 0.9966 0.9838 1.0000  
R3 0.9891 0.9914 0.9924 0.9924 
     
Panel B: Phase II EUAs LD Vol OI M.OI 
Vol 0.9931    
OI 0.9920 0.9854   
M.OI 0.9957 0.9973 0.9882  
R3 0.9991 0.9922 0.9928 0.9952 
     
Panel C: Phase II CERs LD Vol OI M.OI 
Vol 0.9846    
OI 0.9914 0.9945   
M.OI 0.8959 0.9101 0.9026  
R3 0.9628 0.9782 0.9703 0.9355 
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Table V. Equality tests of long futures transaction series 
Equality tests of means, medians and variances between the continuous transaction series constructed 
following the criteria explained in Section 3. LD, Vol, OI, M.OI, and R3 stand for last day, volume, open 
interest, maximum open interest, and R3 criteria, respectively. The equality of means, medians and 
variances has been tested with the parametric Anova F-test, the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test and 
the Brown-Forsythe’s statistic, respectively. The corresponding p-values appear in all panels at the end of 
the column. Sample period from April 22nd, 2005 to March 31st, 2008 for Phase I EUAs (Panel A), from 
April 22nd, 2005 to December 30th, 2011 for Phase II EUAs (Panel B), and from March 14th, 2008 to 
December 30th, 2011 for Phase II CERs (Panel C). H0 stands for the p-value of the equality tests of 
means, medians and variances between all the continuous transaction series constructed. H1 stands for the 
p-value of the equality tests of means, medians and variances between all the continuous transaction 
series constructed except M.OI. H2 stands for the p-value of the equality tests of means, medians and 
variances between all the continuous transaction series constructed except OI and M.OI.  
 
Panel A: Phase I EUAs Mean Median Std. Deviation 
LD 45.92719 36 46.66387 
Vol 47.70877 39 47.09651 
OI 46.40862 37 46.60285 
M.OI 46.40862 37 46.60285 
R3 46.23398 36 46.63303 
H0 0.9683 0.9391 0.9991 
    
Panel B: Phase II EUAs Mean Median Std. Deviation 
LD 665.8476 565.5000 643.4841 
Vol 668.3810 574.0000 643.2869 
OI 539.8628 371.0000 564.4725 
M.OI 464.2176 273.0000 543.2803 
R3 666.6706 569.5000 643.3162 
H0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
H1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
H2 0.9931 0.9918 0.9999 
    
Panel C: Phase II CERs Mean Median Std. Deviation 
LD 76.95114 60.00000 69.08475 
Vol 77.56133 60.00000 70.52860 
OI 69.02601 51.00000 68.91524 
M.OI 48.57878 23.50000 71.24229 
R3 77.09771 60.00000 69.18052 
H0 0.0000 0.0000 0.4537 
H1 0.0183 0.0000 0.9571 
H2 0.9801 0.9985 0.9531 
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Table VI. Distribution tests of long futures transaction series 
This table shows the p-values of the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test that tests the null hypothesis that two 
continuous transaction series have the same general distribution. LD, Vol, OI, M.OI, and R3 for last day, 
volume, open interest, maximum open interest, and R3 criteria, respectively. Sample period from April 
22nd, 2005 to March 31st, 2008 for Phase I EUAs (Panel A), from April 22nd, 2005 to December 30th, 2011 
for Phase II EUAs (Panel B), and from March 14th, 2008 to December 30th, 2011 for Phase II CERs 
(Panel C).  
 
Panel A: Phase I EUAs LD Vol OI M.OI 
Vol 0.3984    
OI 0.7727 0.5800   
M.OI 0.7727 0.5800 0.9999  
R3 0.8584 0.5026 0.9100 0.9100 
     
Panel B: Phase II EUAs LD Vol OI M.OI 
Vol 0.8998    
OI 0.0000 0.0000   
M.OI 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
R3 0.9667 0.9329 0.0000 0.0000 
     
Panel C: Phase II CERs LD Vol OI M.OI 
Vol 0.9954    
OI 0.0000 0.0000   
M.OI 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
R3 0.9593 0.9653 0.0000 0.0000 
 
!
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1. Introduction 
Market microstructure literature has shown that, at very short horizons, 
observable prices may temporarily differ from the "true" value because of trading 
frictions. These frictions are due to imperfections and limitations in the market 
regulation or the organization of trading. Trading frictions matter because they 
introduce noise into the price discovery process, make prices less informative, increase 
the costs of trading, and decrease liquidity.1 According to microstructure literature, 
sources of frictions include price discreteness, market-making costs, temporary order 
imbalances, liquidity shortfalls, price smoothing rules, monopoly rents, etc.2 The more 
important the friction-related component in price changes is, the less informative prices 
are and, therefore, the lower the market quality is. 
In this paper, we study the history of trading frictions and market quality in the 
European carbon market. The EU Emission Trading Scheme (hereafter EU-ETS) 
handles the trading activity on European Union Allowances (EUAs), being the largest 
of its kind in the world, both in terms of volume traded and in terms of polluting 
installations covered. The EU-ETS is a cap-and-trade system, under which large 
emitters of carbon dioxide in the energy and industrial sectors must control and report 
their CO2 emissions each year, and they are obliged to deliver to their corresponding 
governments an amount of EUAs that is equivalent to their emissions in that year. A 
EUA is an emission credit that gives the holder the right to emit one tonne of CO2 or an 
equivalent amount of certain greenhouse gases. The installations covered by the EU-
ETS received an initial endowment of emission credits through the National Allocation 
Plans (NAPs), until 2012. In Phase III, the assignment will be specified by the different 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Trading frictions are also relevant in asset pricing (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson, 1986, 1989). 
2 Excellent literature reviews on market microstructure research include O'Hara (1995), Hasbrouck 
(1996), Madhavan (2000), Harris (2003), Biais et al. (2005), and Hasbrouck (2007), among others. 
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sectors, considering Europe as a whole. Besides this initial allocation, emitters can 
purchase additional EUAs or sell their surplus of EUAs through financial markets. 
EUAs’ trading is fragmented through electronic organized spot and derivative markets 
and also OTC markets. Among them, the European Climate Exchange (ECX), in 
London, is by far the most liquid pan-European platform for carbon emissions trading.  
In this study, we consider the first two phases in the so far short history of the 
EU-ETS, Phase I, which covers emissions from 2005 to 2007, and Phase II, for 
emissions from 2008 to 2012. Phase I is generally considered a pilot or learning period 
(e.g., Ellerman and Buchner, 2006, and Creti et al., 2012, among others). Phase II 
concords with the Kyoto Protocol accomplishment period. A particularity of this 
scheme is that EUAs of Phase I could not be used to comply with the emission targets 
during Phase II (i.e., inter period banking was not allowed). Therefore, a EUA of Phase 
I is a different asset than a EUA of Phase II.  
On May 15th, 2006, the European Commission released the official installation-
level data for verified emissions and EUAs allocations for 2005. An apparent excess of 
emitted EUAs led to a large and sudden price drop in April 2006. Prices fell from 30! to 
10! in a few days.3 Continued rumors of excess supply, resulted in an early market 
collapse, with trading prices of 1.2! by March 2007 and levels close to zero by 
September 2007. In addition to this market breakdown, the history of the EU-ETS is 
marked by the outbreak of the current international financial crisis. The deterioration of 
the real production expectations, inversely connected to the expectation of CO2 
emissions, had a severe negative effect on the EUAs prices by the beginning of 2009. In 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Ellerman and Buchner (2006) argue that earlier before these official statistics were revealed, observers 
recognized that the cap on CO2 emissions was not very demanding. They therefore argue that the surprise 
that caused the drop in prices in April 2006 was not the excess of EUAs allocated, but an unexpectedly 
low level of emissions, either because they over-estimated the level of CO2 emissions and the demand for 
allowances, or because they under-estimated the amount of abatement that would occur in the first year of 
the EU-ETS as the managers of affected facilities incorporated CO2 prices into their production decisions. 
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this paper, we study whether the collapse of Phase I and the subsequent rash of the 
international financial crisis had a persistent negative effect on the market quality in 
Phase II, both in terms of higher friction-related components in prices, higher friction-
related volatility, and lower liquidity.  
The incidence of trading frictions in a financial market can be assessed in 
different ways. Some studies have established a negative link between trading frictions 
and liquidity supply, both in terms of higher immediacy costs and lower depth (e.g., Lee 
et al., 1993). Most of the literature, however, focuses on the bid-ask spread as a natural 
measure of trading frictions (see Stoll, 2000). Liquidity providers (such as market 
makers and limit-order traders) incur in different types of costs when providing 
liquidity. The bid-ask spread embodies the premiums and discounts the market makers 
demand to compensate the costs of immediacy (e.g., Demsetz, 1968). A substantial 
research effort has been devoted to the measurement of the theoretical components of 
the bid-ask spread.4 It is usually distinguished between "real" frictions, such as 
inventory-holding costs (e.g., Ho and Stoll, 1983) and operative or order-processing 
costs (e.g., Roll, 1984), and "information-related" frictions, such as adverse selection 
costs (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). Although the findings of this branch of the 
literature are not easily reconciled, they certainly show that both information-related and 
real frictions matter in explaining the size of the spread.    
An alternative approach to deal with trading frictions is to decompose the 
variance of the price changes into its friction-related and information-related 
components. The higher the contribution of the friction-related volatility is, the lower 
the market quality is. In this case, the focus is on the deviation between the actual 
transaction prices and the unobservable underlying true value. Thus, a random walk 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 See Glosten and Harris (1988); Stoll (1989); George et al. (1991); Lin et al. (1995); Huang and Stoll 
(1996); Madhavan et al. (1997), and Huang and Stoll (1997), among others. 
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specification may be highly satisfactory to describe the dynamics of prices sampled at 
low frequencies, such as weeks, months or quarters. At high frequencies (intraday data), 
however, returns are contaminated by microstructure noise, which leads to a random-
walk-plus-noise representation, in which the friction-related component is transitory in 
nature. Madhavan et al. (1997) and Hasbrouck (1993) propose different methodologies 
to decompose the variance of transaction price returns. The former uses the estimated 
parameters of a structural model of price formation, whilst the latter proposes an 
econometric reduced-form approach. 
In this paper, we employ a unique database with detailed information on all 
trades for the most frequently traded Phase I and Phase II EUA future contracts of the 
ECX market, including transaction data from April 2005 to December 2010. We apply 
three alternative microstructure approaches to measure trading frictions and price 
quality: (a) a simple and stylized structural-model based framework with or without 
adverse selection costs, derived from Roll (1984); (b) Madhavan et al. (1997) structural-
model-based volatility decomposition, and (c) Hasbrouck (1993) reduced-form 
approach.  
We find that during Phase I, excluding the 2007 market collapse, bid-ask 
spreads, relative spreads, adverse selection costs, market making profits per round-trip, 
price return volatility, and its friction-related components were all higher than during 
Phase II, all of these suggesting improved trading conditions during Phase II. However, 
the decomposition of the price return volatility provides a different picture. Summary 
measures of market quality suggested by our three methodological approaches coincide 
in showing that ECX achieved its lowest levels of quality during the 2007 market 
breakdown. They also agree that market quality progressively recovered during Phase 
II. In all cases, however, the market quality levels estimated by the end of our sample 
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period are close but not better than those observed during Phase I before the market 
collapsed. Our findings therefore suggest that during most of Phase II, market quality 
has been recovering from the market breakdown at the end of Phase I and the additional 
negative impact of the international financial crisis. However, by the end of 2010, the 
recovery was incomplete. 
This is not the first high frequency data analysis about the European Carbon 
Market. Using Phase I data on EUA futures, Benz and Hengelbrock (2008) compare 
ECX and NASDAQ OMX Commodities Europe in terms of liquidity and contribution 
to price discovery. Bredin et al. (2011) study the interaction between trading volume 
and price volatility during Phase I. Using 2008 data, Chevallier and Sevi (2011) 
characterize the conditional and unconditional distributions of realized volatility for 
ECX futures. Conrad et al. (2012) focus on modeling the dynamics of EUA prices from 
November 2006 to December 2008 using GARCH-type models. Mizrach (2012) 
provides evidence of common factors in prices for the European and North American 
emissions reduction instruments between June 2007 and April 2010. In a more related 
paper, Mizrach and Otsubo (2011) analyze spreads, price impact, and contribution to 
price discovery of both EUAs and CERs during 2009. Rittler (2012) studies causality 
between Phase II EUA spot and future prices for the period May 2008 to March 2009. 
Rotfuß (2009) deals with different issues about price formation and volatility in the EU-
ETS from June 2005 to September 2008. Rotfuß et al. (2009) examine price reactions 
around the publication dates of the NAPs; their analysis cover between April 2005 and 
September 2008. Finally, Vinokur (2009) employs Phase I and Phase II EUAs and 
CERs spot data from BlueNext to analyze the impact of banking and submission 
constraints on price efficiency. Despite all this research effort, our paper offers the most 
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complete and comprehensive high frequency analysis of liquidity, trading frictions, and 
market quality of the EU-ETS to date. 
The remaining of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we review the EU-
ETS. In section 3, we describe the database and report some descriptive statistics. In 
section 4, we provide the methodological details. In section 5, we summarize our 
empirical findings. Finally, in section 6, we conclude. 
 
2. Institutional details 
2.1. The EU Emission Trading Scheme 
The Kyoto Protocol, approved in December 1997, entered into force on February 
16th, 2005, with the agreement of 141 countries. Linked to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), this international agreement 
sets binding targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (henceforth, GHGE). 
Namely, by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries commit to reduce their 
global GHGE by at least 5% (8% for the EU) against 1990 levels over the period 2008-
2012. Because of the Kyoto Protocol, carbon trading has been growing continuously. 
Although there were several prior experiences, the EU Emission Trading 
Scheme (EU-ETS) is nowadays the most important scheme for the issuance and trading 
of emission credits and derivative products. Established under the 2003/87/EC 
Directive, the EU-ETS officially started on January 1st, 2005 with the aim of regulating 
the carbon dioxide emissions for energy intensive installations across the EU, including 
combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel plants, factories making 
cement, glass, lime brick, tiles, pulp and paper, and other heavy industrial sectors. The 
emission credits distributed among the companies covered by the 2003/87/EC Directive 
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are called European Union Allowances (EUAs). 5 The EU-ETS is a cap-and-trade 
system, meaning that total emissions are limited or 'capped'. Those 
installations/countries that succeed in reducing their emissions are more likely to act as 
sellers of emission credits. Those installations/countries that fail in complying with their 
emission targets are more likely to act as buyers of emission credits.  
In order to neutralize irregular CO2 emissions due to unexpected extreme 
weather events, such as harsh winters or very hot summers, EUAs are given out for a 
sequence of several years at once or “Phase”. Phase I ended up on December 31st, 2007; 
Phase II coincides with the Kyoto Protocol commitment period, from January 1st, 2008 
to December 31st 2012. There will be at least a Phase III, from January 1st, 2013 to 
December 31st, 2020. EUAs can be transferred between years within each phase. The 
“banking” facility allows participants to save surplus EUAs for being used during a later 
compliance period. The “borrowing” facility is just the opposite. Banking was not 
allowed from Phase I to Phase II, although it is permitted from Phase II to Phase III. 
Borrowing is forbidden in any case. This implies that a EUA of Phase I is a different 
asset than a EUA of Phase II. 
Under the EU-ETS, each Member State prepared a National Allocation Plan 
(NAP), which establishes the national cap and its allocation among the installations 
covered by the 2003/87/EC Directive. The NAP had to be presented no later than 18 
months before the start of each “Phase”, and had to be approved by the European 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Other types of emission credits to be imported into the EU-ETS are fully fungible with EUAs. The 
2004/101/EC Directive of the European Parliament (so called 'Linking Directive') allows EU members to 
use Kyoto certificates from the so-called "project-based flexible mechanisms" to cover their domestic 
greenhouse gas emissions. One of these flexible mechanisms is the Clean Development Mechanism. By 
developing an emissions-reduction project in a developing country, the EU country generates credits 
known as Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) that can be used to meet its emissions targets under the 
Kyoto protocol. Each CER represents a successful emission reduction of one tonne of carbon dioxide. In 
this paper, however, we focus exclusively on EUAs. 
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Commission.6 Accordingly, each Member State decided about how the emission credits 
are yearly allocated among the installations covered and about the possibility of banking 
and borrowing credits among phases. The allocation method in Phase III will differ: 
only one EU-wide emissions allocation will be elaborated, and each installation’s 
individual allocation will be decided by the European Commission.7 On an annual basis, 
each installation falling under the EU-ETS must surrender an amount of emission 
credits equivalent to its total emissions during the calendar year. An installation may 
therefore need to buy emission credits to cover actual emissions above its target. Failing 
to surrender the necessary emission credits will result in an excess emission penalty of 
(currently) !100/tonne (!40/tonne in Phase I). An installation emitting below its own 
cap can sell the excess of credits. The emission credits surrendered are immediately 
cancelled.  
In Figure 1, we plot the time series of future prices for two contracts: EUA 
December 2007 futures contract and EUA December 2012 futures contract, as the 
representative futures prices for Phase I and II, respectively. Until April 24th, 2006, the 
future prices for Phase I EUAs and Phase II EUAs were pretty close. By this date, the 
Phase I EUA future price was about !31 and the Phase II EUA future price was !33.5, 
respectively. 
As previously mentioned, Phase I was finally characterized by an over-allocation 
of EUAs which inevitably resulted in a dramatic fall in prices. Between April 25th and 
April 27th, The Netherlands, The Czech Republic, and France, all declared a surplus of 
EUAs, while Spain was less short than expected. As a consequence, rumors of over-
allocation rose. From that date on, the spread between Phase I and Phase II future prices 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 For further details, see Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2008). 
7 Between 2005 and 2007 (2008 and 2012) a minimum of 95% (90%) of the emissions were freely 
allocated. The other 5% (10%) was auctioned. In Phase III, auctions will play a more prominent role. By 
2020, it is estimated that more than 60% of allowances will be auctioned. 
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progressively increased. By the end of April 2006, the Phase I (Phase II) EUA future 
price had decreased 54% (38%). By September 2006, the Phase I EUA prices 
experienced a second large drop. Prices fell steadily below !10. Two events marked this 
second drop: the weather and the crude oil price. Mansanet et al. (2007) find that EUAs’ 
prices are affected by extreme temperatures. August 2009 was cooler and September 
2009 was warmer than usual, decreasing the demand of energy and, therefore, the 
demand of EUAs. Besides, the crude oil price fell below US$60. The most emission 
intensive energy source is coal, followed by oil and then gas. The oil price drop 
depressed the demand of coal and, therefore, the demand of EUAs. An unusually warm 
and wet 2006 autumn, and the increasingly restrictive conditions to carry-over unused 
allowances from Phase I to Phase II (banking), declined even more EUAs prices. At the 
end of 2006, the Phase I future price was !6.6, while the Phase II future price remained 
close to !20. 
In general, the 2006 total emissions overpassed those of 2005, but many EU 
Members were still long in allowances. Rumors of over-allocation continued and prices 
experienced a definitive drop. On February 19th, 2007, Phase I EUAs were priced below 
!1 for the first time. On May 14th, 2007, 8 months before their expiry date, the price of a 
December 2007 future contract on Phase I EUAs was below !0.33. At that date, Phase 
II EUA future price started a progressive increase, achieving its maximum on July 1st, 
2008, !34.38 per CO2 tonne. The appreciation of the Phase II EUAs is the result of the 
approval by the European Commission of more conservative NAPs for Phase II. 
Determined to avoid history repeating, the European Commission imposed severe 
cuttings over the initial Members’ proposals. Moreover, the crude oil price was steadily 
increasing by that time. 
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Phase II prices were severely affected by the international crisis and the 
consequent downward revision in the real production expectations, directly connected 
with the expected CO2 emissions. On February 12nd, 2009, EUA future price was !9.43, 
the historical minimum in Phase II. As was indicated in Tendance Carbone (February 
2009, 33, p.1), the monthly bulletin of the European Carbon Market, “Our European 
temperature indicator was almost 3° below its ten-year average in January [2009]. Such 
an anomaly would normally boost demand for electricity and heat, which in turn tends 
to increase the price of CO2. However, this factor was more than offset by the 
economy's recession. […] Experience shows that in a recession, CO2 emissions exhibit 
elasticity greater than one relative to GDP”. Since February 2009, the future price of the 
EUA has fluctuated around !15 per tonne.  
Trading activity in the EU-ETS is purely electronic. Each Member State has its 
own account where the balance of the allowances of each installation is captured. 
Trading activity, however, is not restricted to the companies affected by the 2003/87/CE 
Directive. To guarantee additional sources of liquidity, external agents are allowed to 
trade too. To participate, however, they may have a trading account in the 
corresponding market. As the European Commission does not preclude each EU 
member from having its own trading platform, trading! of carbon-related assets is 
fragmented through different markets around Europe." From 2005 to 2007, spot trades 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Spot markets include BlueNext (París), which is part of NYSE-Euronext since December 2007, Energy 
Exchange of Austria (Vienna), NASDAQ OMX Commodities Europe (Oslo), European Energy Exchange 
(EEX, Leipzig), European Climate Exchange (ECX, London), only in Phase II, and Gestore Mercato 
Elettrico (Rome). Future markets on EUAs include European Climate Exchange (ECX, London), 
NASDAQ OMX Commodities Europe, EEX, and BlueNext only in Phase II. Options on EUAs are also 
traded in some of the previous markets, such as ECX. 
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of Phase II EUAs were not possible; futures on Phase I and Phase II EUAs, however, 
were both simultaneously traded.!  
Table I provides statistics on total trading volume in lots (1,000 tonnes of CO2 
equivalent) and market shares for the most representative markets in the EU-ETS. Panel 
A (B) of Table I reports statistics on the spot (futures) market for EUAs. Table I shows 
that most of the trading activity of EUAs concentrates on the futures markets. BlueNext 
has historically dominated the spot market. Nonetheless, its market share has decreased 
from 100% in 2008, beginning of Phase II, to 54.7% at the end of 2010. The ECX EUA 
Daily Futures Contract (“spot”) was introduced in March 2009. In two years, the ECX 
spot market reached a 39.5% market share. Regarding the derivatives market, ECX 
clearly dominates, with yearly market shares permanently above 96%. In this paper, we 
will focus exclusively on the futures market of ECX. 
2.2. The microstructure of the European Climate Exchange (ECX) 
ECX is a member of the Climate Exchange Plc group, listed on the AIM market 
of the London Stock Exchange. ECX future contracts are operated by the 
Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) Futures Europe, one of the leading markets in the 
negotiation of energy derivatives in Europe. Trading on ICE ECX contracts is handled 
either by the ICE Electronic Platform, for ordinary trades, the Block Trade Facility, for 
bilateral transactions of large size (minimum 50 lots), or the Exchange of Futures for 
Physicals/Swaps (EFP and EFS), to transfer an OTC position to an on-exchange futures 
position. Members of the ICE Futures Europe enabled for ECX contracts can operate on 
their own account only ('Trade Participant') or also on behalf of their clients ('General 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
9 The first spot trade for Phase II EUAs took place in BlueNext on February 28th, 2008. The first spot 
(future) trade on an organized market on EUAs took place on March 8th, 2005 (February 11th, 2005) in 
EEX (NASDAQ OMX Commodities Europe).  
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Participant'). Trading may also be conducted by a Member’s clients ('order routing') 
where the access to the ICE Platform is granted by the Member. 
The ICE Platform daily session starts with a pre-open period of 15 minutes 
(from 6:45 a.m. UK local time) during which traders can submit, modify and cancel 
limit orders, but market orders are not allowed. The limit order book is not displayed 
during this period, but the market reports tentative allocation prices. The pre-opening 
period ends up with a so-called "opening match", a single call auction, where the 
opening price and the allocated volume are determined by an algorithm. No new orders 
are allowed during the opening match. 
During the continuous session, from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., investors can submit 
limit orders (default type), which are stored in an electronic limit order book (hereafter 
LOB) following strict price-time priority criteria, market orders, and block orders.10 
Stop orders were also introduced in January 2008. Limit orders can be modified (in 
price or volume) or withdrawn from the LOB. By default, standing limit orders expire at 
the end of a trading session. The contracts are traded in lots. Each lot equals to 1,000 
tonnes of CO2 equivalent, that is, 1,000 EUAs. The quotation is in Euros per lot and the 
minimum tick size for all contracts is !0.01.11 
As transparency regards, ECX offers real-time prices through the market screens 
and the major information and data vendors. The LOB is open during the continuous 
session. All orders entered and the resulting executed trades, however, are anonymous. 
Iceberg orders are allowed, which means that the trader may choose not to display the 
full size of their limit orders. The unrevealed part of the order is released only when the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Before January 9th, 2006, the continuous session ran between 08:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. 
11 Before March 27th, 2007, the tick size was !0.05. 
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first part of such order is completely filled. The unveiled part of the iceberg order loses 
time priority. 
A trade happens in the ICE Platform when two orders of opposite sign for the 
same contract and expiry date match. Matching happens when the price of the bid 
(offer) order equals or is greater (lesser) than the price of the offer (bid). Dynamic price 
limits computed from the prior transaction price are activated during the continuous 
session. When these limits are reached, the order that caused the limit hit ceases 
executing and the remaining volume of the order is cancelled. 
Since 2005, ECX has invited Members to act as market makers for the future 
contracts on EUAs. However, the first two market makers were announced on July 24th, 
2007. The market maker programs extend for periods of 3 to 6 (extensible) months, and 
the positions are limited to a maximum of 3 to 5 market makers per contract. Market 
makers must ensure, on a daily basis, that the spread is not wider than a predetermined 
amount. For December contracts the minimum spread is either !0.05, !0.08, !0.15 or 
!0.20 depending on the time the program is announced (it tends to decrease from Phase 
I to Phase II) and the contract expiry (it is smaller for contracts with close expiry). 
Market makers must also guarantee a minimum depth of 10 lots on both sides of the 
book, and they must make the market for at least 85% of the duration of the continuous 
session. 
2.3. The ICE ECX EUA futures contracts 
In general, Phase I and Phase II ICE ECX EUA futures are listed on a quarterly 
expiry cycle, with March, June, September and December contracts up to 2012. The 
first ICE ECX future contract was issued on April 22nd, 2005, with expiry in December 
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2005.12 The contracts are physically delivered by transfer of EUAs. Daily settlement 
prices are obtained as the trade weighted average of transaction prices during the 
closing period (4:50 – 5:00 p.m.) as long as a minimum volume is achieved.13  
In Table II, we report some summary statistics on the trading activity of the 
different ECX EUA future contracts, both from Phase I and Phase II. Table II shows 
that EUA future contracts with December expiry concentrate most of the trading activity 
of the ECX market in both phases. From a total of 980,738 trades on EUA futures of 
Phase I and Phase II between April 2005 and December 2010, 99.41% were on the 
December contracts. In terms of volume traded, December contracts account about 
97.7% of the accumulated volume (in lots) of Phase I and Phase II (10,467,264). Similar 
figures are obtained for Phase I and Phase II separately: 98.34% of trades and 95.7% of 
volume for Phase I and 99.99% of trades and 99.98% of volume for Phase II. 
Figure 2 reports the accumulated volume (in millions of lots) through time of the 
EUA future contracts with expiry date in December 2005 to 2012. This figure shows 
that trading volume generally concentrates on the December contract closest to expiry. 
The notable exception is the December 2007 future contract, surpassed by the 
December 2008 contract early in 2007, the last year of Phase I. Figure 2 also shows that 
ECX trading activity has increased overtime.   
 
3. The database 
In our empirical analysis, we use high frequency data provided by ECX covering 
all Phase I (from April 22nd, 2005 to December 17th, 2007) and part of the current Phase 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 The first EUA daily futures contract or "spot" contract was issued on March 13th, 2009. We will ignore 
the spot market in this paper because of this late start. 
13 For further details on the EUA future contracts, see the ICE ECX user's guide: 
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/ICE_ECX_user_guide.pdf. Last access on December 1st, 2011. 
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II (from April 22nd, 2005 until December 31st, 2010) of the EU-ETS. Our database 
consists of all trades registered in ECX during our sample period for all future contracts. 
For each trade, the database contains the price, the size (in lots), the sign (i.e., whether it 
is buyer or seller-initiated), the trade type, and the time stamp (to the nearest hundredth 
of a second). We consider only “screen” (ordinary) trades from the continuous session; 
we ignore the pre-opening period.  
Table III provides some sample descriptive statistics per contract. Panel A of 
Table III provides price statistics and aggregate trading and trade-size statistics. Given 
previous tables and figures in this paper, it should not come as a surprise that trading 
activity increases from the December 2005 future to the December 2010 future, from 
Phase I to Phase II contracts in general, and that the December 2007 future experiences 
the lowest price and highest standard deviation of transaction prices. Panel B of Table 
III reports trade-related statistics. Notice that even though all Phase I and Phase II EUA 
future contracts were issued on the same day (April 22nd, 2005), Phase II futures took 
several months to generate the first trade. December 2008, 2009, and 2010 (Phase II) 
future contracts are the most frequently traded in our sample, with one trade in average 
every 2 to 3 minutes.   
In addition, Table III reports statistics on two continuous time series obtained by 
rolling over the time series of the finite-life future contracts negotiated in ECX. In this 
way, we generate a single time series representing EUA future prices and trades for 
each EU-ETS phase. We use the maximum volume criterion in order to rollover the 
series.14 According to this criterion, we switch contracts when the front contract is no 
longer the most negotiated systematically. Table IV provides details on the rollover 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Following Carchano et al. (2012), the distribution properties of the resulting time series, considering 
alternative rollover criteria, are not affected by the rollover selection, reason why we decided to use the 
maximum volume criterion, as the one which guarantees the most traded time series in terms of volume. 
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dates, that is, the points in time when we switch from the front contract series to the 
next one, for each EU-ETS phase. Our Phase I time series covers from April 22nd, 2005 
to December 17th, 2007.15 Phase II time series covers from June 17th, 2005 to December 
31st, 2010. These time series for Phase I and Phase II are the main input of our posterior 
analysis.  
Table V provides statistics on the different types of trades available for our 
study. Panel A of Table V shows that regular screen-based trades are by far the most 
extended, representing 63.1% of Phase I future trades and 83.53% of Phase II future 
trades. Panel B shows that in terms of volume traded, however, their weight decreases 
to 44.54% for Phase I future trades and 51.85% of Phase II future trades, suggesting that 
the average size of screen trades is smaller than that of other less ordinary trades, such 
as Exchange of Futures for Physical/Exchange of Futures for Swaps (EFP/EFS) trades. 
EFP/EFS trades in Phase I (Phase II) represent 34.29% (13.15%) of future trades, but 
they account for 53% (45.4%) of volume traded. Unfortunately, EFP/EFS trade data do 
not contain the trade direction, information we need to apply the methodologies 
described in the next section. Therefore, we discard them from our empirical analysis. 
As Table V shows, the other categories of trades are of minor relevance. 
All time series used in this paper are corrected for reporting errors, confirmed by 
ECX staff members. In computing return series, overnight returns are also eliminated. 
Returns are calculated using trade prices in logs. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 As indicated by the 2003/87/EC Directive, member states must cancel the EUAs that are no longer 
valid. Moreover, companies must surrender the allowances of a given year no later than April 30th of the 
next year. Thus, Phase I EUAs were no longer valid after May 2008 and were cancelled by April 30th, 
2008. We exclude, however, all trades during 2008, because they were scarce and spaced.  
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4. Measuring trading frictions and market quality 
Since ECX quote and limit order book data is not available, our analysis of 
trading frictions and market quality in the history of ECX relies on methodologies based 
exclusively on trade data. In this section, we briefly review these methodologies. For 
more details, we redirect the interested reader to the original papers.16 
As previously discussed, some authors understand trading frictions as the 
concession needed for an immediate transaction, that is, the price of immediacy (e.g., 
Stoll, 2000). The bid-ask spread is the most commonly used proxy for immediacy costs, 
a generally accepted dimension of liquidity (e.g., O'Hara, 1995). Nowadays, data on at 
least the best ask and bid quotes are available for all major financial markets. In the 70's 
and 80's, however, researchers had only access to trade prices. In this context, Roll 
(1984) developed a methodology to estimate an implicit bid-ask spread using the 
covariance of transaction returns.  
Define the efficient price ( tm ) as the expectation about the true value of the 
asset at some terminal time given the information that is publicly available, i.e., 
( )t T tm E= ! " . This expectation only changes when new information arrives at the 
marketplace, which means that changes in tm  are unpredictable. Thus, tm is generally 
assumed to follow a random-walk process, 1t t tm m !"= + , where t!  is an information-
related white-noise innovation with ( )20t iid , !! "! . In a frictionless market, the actual 
trade prices ( tp ) are always equal to tm .  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Most of the discussion that follows is based on seminal structural models of price formation such as 
Roll (1984), Glosten and Harris (1988), Stoll (1989), and Madhavan et al. (1997). For comprehensive 
reviews of these models and the concepts involved see Hasbrouck (1996, 2007), Huang and Stoll (1997), 
and de Jong and Rindi (2009). 
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Roll (1984) assumes a world without information asymmetries, where the 
trading process conveys no information. Trading frictions are captured by a constant 
bid-ask spread entirely due to real frictions, to be precise, market makers' order-
processing costs. Additionally, Roll (1984) assumes that all trades are with the market 
maker; all trades are of equal size (unitary); buys and sells are equally likely, and the 
trading process is serially uncorrelated. Because of the constant bid-ask spread, 
transactions happen at either the ask or the bid quote, not at tm . This so-called 'bid-ask 
bounce' effect generates negative serial correlation in the changes in transaction prices. 
To see this, consider that ( )2t t tp m S x= + , where S is the constant bid-ask spread and 
tx  is the trade indicator, which equals 1 for buyer-initiated trades and -1 for seller-
initiated trades. Under the Roll (1984) assumptions, 
( ) [ ]
2
1 1 4p t t t t
SCov Cov p , p E p p! " "
"
= ! ! = ! ! = .   (1) 
The Roll's bid-ask spread estimator S can be obtained from the serial covariance 
of price changes and (1).17 Alternatively, given that  
( )( )12t t t tp S x x !"# = " + ,     (2) 
S can be obtained as 2 times the estimated a1 coefficient of the regression equation 
0 1t t tp a a x e! = + ! + , with expected values 0 0a = , 1 2a S /= , and [ ] 2tVar e !"= . Finally, 
from (2), we can decompose the variance of tp!  into a friction-related and an 
information-related component, ( ) 2 20 5tVar p . S!"# = + , implying that the Roll's 
measure of the quality of prices is given by ( )2 2 20 5RQ . S! !" "= + . 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Because by assumption xt and !t are serially uncorrelated, the negative correlation in (1) is entirely 
friction-related, due to the bid-ask bounce.  
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Roll (1984) stylized framework assumes that there are no information 
asymmetries in the market. Instead, suppose that the innovation to tm  can be 
decomposed as ( )2t t tS x u! "= + , where ut is an innovation due to public news, and 
! is the adverse selection costs parameter. Let 0,  ,t i t jE x u i j! !" # = $% & , so that there are 
two sources of information, trade-related (private) and trade-unrelated (public) news. 
Besides, there are no lagged effects of trades on prices, and signed trades are serially 
uncorrelated or ( )1 1Pr | 1/ 2t t tx x !" "# $ = = . With the additional assumption that 
quotes are ex-post rational, as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), ( )2t t tp q S x= + , where 
1t t tq m u!= +  is the quote midpoint. With this price decomposition, ( )2S!  and 
( )1 2S!"  are the adverse selection costs component and the real friction component 
of the spread, respectively. Given that, 
( ) ( )( ) 12 1 2t t t tp S x S x u! "# = " " + ,   (3)  
the relevant parameters can be recovered from the estimated coefficients of the 
regression equation 0 1 2 1t t t tp b b x b x e!" = + + + , where expected values are 0 0b = , 
1 2b S /= , ( )( )2 1 2b S!= " "  and [ ] 2uVar e != . From (3), ( )
0 5 21 0 25.pCov . S!
"
# = " " , 
meaning that Roll's bid-ask spread estimator underestimates the true spread whenever ! 
> 0. Regarding quote quality, the variance of tp!  in (3) is 
( ) ( )2 2 20 25 2 1t uVar p . S! " "# $% = + & +' ( .    (4) 
The second RHS term of (4) is friction-related. Because 
( ) 2 2 20 25t uVar m . S! "# = + , it turns out that ( )20 5 1. S !"  is the only fraction of (4) that 
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is transitory (i.e., noisy) in nature. From (4) we can see that, unless ! = 0, RQ  
overestimates the quality of prices, which is given by ( )2A u tQ Var p!= " . 
Another interesting measure that can be obtained from the former price 
decomposition is the expected realized spread. It measures the expected gains of the 
liquidity provider after a roundtrip, and it is given by 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1| 1 | 1r t t t tE S E p x E p x! += " = ! ! " = .   (5) 
In a frictionless market, the expected realized spread equals S. Under our simple 
adverse selection costs model ( ) ( )1rE S S!= " , that is, the market makers expect to 
realize the part of the quoted spread, which is not lost with informed traders.  
As previously mentioned, Roll (1984) assumes no serial correlation in trades. 
Empirical studies, however, show the trade indicator is serially correlated, that is, 
1 / 2! " .18 Under this condition, [ ]1 1 2t tE x x !" = "  and ( )1 11 2t t tE x x x!" "# $ = "% & . Choi 
et al. (1988) showed that, with serial correlation in trade signs, 2
pCov S!" = # . 
Therefore, if ! <1 / 2 , Roll's estimate of the bid-ask spread in (1) underestimates the 
true spread. Moreover, ( ) 2 2tVar p S!" #$ = + ; thus, if ! <1 / 2 , RQ  overestimates the 
quality of prices. If we allow for both adverse selection costs and serial correlation in 
trades, it is straightforward to prove that ( ) ( )2 2 20 25 4 1t uVar p . S! " # #$ %& = + ' +( ) , and 
( ) ( )2rE S S ! "= # . So, the higher the probability of a trade reversal, the higher the 
transitory component in the volatility of prices and the higher the expected realized 
spread. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Serial correlation in trade sign may arise because of imitative or 'herding' behavior by traders; traders 
splitting large orders into smaller ones (stealth trading), different traders reacting progressively to the 
same information (e.g., Hasbrouck, 1996).   
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 In the prior adverse selection costs version of Roll's model, we have assumed 
that the efficient price depends on tx . However, as long as 1/ 2! " , there is a 
predictable component in tx  which, by definition, does not convey information. Let 
1t t t tw x E x x != ! " #$ %  be the unexpected component in the trading process. By assuming 
that t t tw u! "= + , only the unexpected trade-related component ( tw ), has an effect on 
the efficient price. In this case, ! is the adverse selection costs parameter, and 
2(0, )t uu iid !!  is a public information innovation. Now, let ! be the market making 
costs parameter covering real frictions; by further assuming ex-post rational ask and bid 
quotes, t t t tp m x! "= + + , where 
2(0, )!! "!t iid  is an innovation that accounts for 
rounding errors and price discreteness.19 Under the prior assumptions, Madhavan et al. 
(1997) show that ( ) ( ) 1 1! " #! " $ % %& &' = + & + + + &t t t t t tp x x , where " is the first order 
autocorrelation the trading process, that is, ( ) ( )1 1 1 2t t tE x x Var x! "# #= = # . Thus,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 22 22 2t uVar p !" " # $ %# $ %# $ # $ %& = + + + + + ' + + .!! !(6) 
From expression (6), the variance of price changes can be decomposed into the 
following terms: 22 !" , due to price discreteness; ( )2 21 ! "# , due to adverse selection 
costs; ( ) 22 1 ! "# , due to real frictions, and ( )22 1!" #$ , an interaction term.20 In this 
model, our measure of quality of prices is given by ( )2MRR u tQ Var p!= " , where 
( )tVar p!  is given by (6). Finally, under the assumption that 1 1tw ! = !  and 1tw = , the 
expected realized spread is ( ) ( )2 2rE S ! " # "= + $% &' (. Madhavan et al. (1997) suggest 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 The parameter ! can be seen as #(S/2) and ! as (1-#) (S/2), so that the implicit spread S = 2(! + !). 
20 In Madhavan et al.'s (1997) original model specification, the authors account for the possibility of 
transaction prices within the spread (price improvements). In the ECX futures market, price 
improvements are not possible, so we simplify the model accordingly. 
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estimating the model parameters { }2 2, , , ,u !" # $ % % ! using the generalized method of 
moments (GMM). 
As an alternative to the structural-model-based approach described so far, 
Hasbrouck (1993) proposes an econometric reduced-form approach to evaluate the 
quality of prices. He considers a very general price decomposition model, t t tp m s= + , 
where ts  is the pricing error, which impounds information-uncorrelated microstructure 
effects. This pricing error is assumed to be a zero-mean covariance-stationary stochastic 
process. Hasbrouck proposes the standard deviation of the pricing error (!s) as a 
summary measure of market quality, as it captures how closely the transaction price 
tracks the efficient price. The variance of log transaction prices ( 2p! ) is decomposed 
into the variance of the efficient price ( 2m! ) and 
2
s!  by means of inverting a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model for transaction prices and trade-related information (i.e., 
trade sign and size). Following Boehmer et al. (2005), we use the ratio s! / p!  as a 
relative measure of market quality.21 Because of its general dynamic specification, the 
VAR model accounts for the lagged effects from trades to prices and vice versa. In 
order to identify ts , however, Hasbrouck needs to impose identification restrictions a la 
Beveridge and Nelson (1981), the main implication being that only a lower bound for 
2
s!  can be obtained. 
Following Hasbrouck (1993), we estimate a VAR model in trade time over the 
variable set { }1/2, , ,s st t t tr x x x , where tr  is the continuously compound return, the first 
difference in the log trade price; tx  is the previously defined trade indicator; 
s
tx  is the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Boehmer et al. (2005) use Hasbrouck (1993) methodology to analyze the impact on market quality of 
the increase in pre-trade transparency that came about in the NYSE after the introduction of the 
OpenBook in January 2002. 
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signed trade size (in shares), and 1/2stx  is the signed square root of the trade size. The use 
of various powers of the signed trade size is intended to capture non-linearities in both 
tm  and ts .
22  The VAR model is truncated at 3 lags.23  
 
5. Empirical findings 
We apply the statistical methods described in the previous section to the Phase I 
and Phase II future contracts time series. The analysis is performed for each calendar 
quarter between July 2005 and December 2010. In Table VI, we provide trading activity 
statistics per quarter. Exceptionally, the first and last "quarters" of Phase I cover more 
than 3 months of data: from January 1st, 2005 to September 30th, 2005 and from July 1st, 
2007 to December 17th, 2007, respectively. We join up transactions from different 
calendar quarters so as to have enough observations to apply the statistical methods. 
During the first semester of 2005, there were only 560 trades in ECX; during the last 
two quarters of Phase I there were only 182 and 319 trades, respectively. Similarly, 
future contracts on Phase II EUAs were thinly traded up to the last calendar quarter of 
2006 (only 989 transactions). Thus, the 3,349 trades reported for the Phase II future 
contracts on the last quarter of 2006 include all trades since April 2005. 
During Phase I, there was a median of 2,116 trades per quarter, with a minimum 
of 501 trades (last quarter of 2007) and a maximum of 3,966 (second quarter of 2006). 
For Phase II EUA future contracts, the median trades per quarter were 7,834, with a 
minimum of 3,349 (first quarter considered) and a maximum of 105,584 (second quarter 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 For details on the VAR specification, the vector moving average (VMA) representation of the VAR 
model, and the specific expressions for computing both !m and !s from the estimated coefficients of the 
VMA representations, see Hasbrouck (1993, p. 201-202). These technical details are omitted for brevity. 
23 We have also considered time series models truncated at 5 lags. Our main findings are basically the 
same. 
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of 2010). The median volume traded per quarter for Phase I future contract series was 
17,867 lots, while it was 57,428 lots for Phase II series. The median net volume (buyer-
initiated minus seller-initiated) per quarter was negative (-1,171 lots) in Phase I and 
positive (3,466 lots) in Phase II.  
In Table VII, we report the estimates of Roll’s (1984) structural model of price 
formation. We show the estimates of the model with and without information 
asymmetries. In Panel A (B) of Table VII, we report the findings for Phase I (II) EUA 
futures. In Panel C, we include a regression-based estimate of the average slope of the 
trend of each quarterly time series, and several non-parametric tests for the equality of 
medians across phases and sub-periods.24 
The structural model without information asymmetries reports a median 
estimated bid-ask spread (S) of 0.0472! for future contracts on Phase I EUAs, with a 
maximum of 0.11! in the second quarter of 2006, coinciding with the first large drop in 
Phase I future prices. For futures on Phase II EUAs, the median estimated bid-ask 
spread was 0.0404! during Phase I period and 0.0160! during Phase II period. The 
negative slopes in the S trend for Phase II EUA futures, during both Phase I and Phase II 
periods, are corroborated by the statistical tests in Panel C. During Phase I, S was 
statistically higher than during Phase II, even when we exclude the 2007 collapse. For 
example, the median difference in S between Phase I before the collapse and the 
beginning of Phase II (2008) was 0.0363!, but it increases to a median of 0.0491! if all 
Phase II is considered.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 The average trend is obtained by fitting a deterministic time polynomial to each quarterly time-series, 
that is, 0 1t ty a a t != + + , using robust regression to account for outliers. Table VII, Panel C, reports the 
estimated 1a  coefficient. We use the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test for small samples to test for 
differences in medians.  
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To obtain an estimate of the relative spread at each quarter, we use price returns 
instead of price changes in estimating the structural model parameters. From Panel A of 
Table VII, the median relative spread before the April 2006 price drop was about 
0.32%. The market collapse led to relative spreads of 13.68% by the end of 2007. For 
Phase II EUAs futures, during Phase I the median relative spread was 0.2%, 0.13% 
during 2008 and 0.06% by the end of 2010. The maximum relative spread of Phase II, 
0.25%, was achieved during the first quarter of 2009.25 Statistical tests in Panel C 
confirm that the relative spread was higher during Phase I, even before the collapse, 
than during Phase II (both during 2008 and after 2008). The median difference between 
both phases was 0.36%. 
The structural Roll model with information asymmetries provides additional 
insights. The estimated bid-ask spread (S) follows a similar temporal pattern than in the 
previous model. As expected, however, S estimates are generally higher, as the original 
Roll (1984) estimator underestimates the true spread in the presence of information 
asymmetries. The median S for Phase I EUA futures was 0.0675!, and for Phase II EUA 
futures was 0.0347! during Phase I and 0.0186! during Phase II. Regarding the 
estimated adverse selection costs parameter (!), for Phase I EUA futures ! decreased 
from a global maximum of 65.2% of the spread the third quarter of 2005 to a global 
minimum of 17.5% of the spread two years later, when the price of the Phase I EUA 
was almost zero. Phase II EUA futures achieved its maximum !, about 50%, the last 
quarter of 2006; afterwards, ! decreased to 38.6% at the end of Phase I. During Phase 
II, ! was stable, about 30% of the spread. Statistical tests in Panel C of Table VII show 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 The peak in both bid-ask spreads and relative spreads during the first quarter of 2009 is probably due to 
the liquidity shortage generated by the financial crisis. In January 2009, firms were able to predict their 
EUAs requirements for 2008 quite precisely. In April 2009, they had to deliver the EUAs needed to cover 
their 2008 emissions, and in February 2009, they were expecting their 2009 EUAs allocation. So, many 
firms sold their expected surplus of EUAs to get cash and bought December futures on EUAs to hedge 
this short position, leading to the increase in immediacy costs. 
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a significant median difference in ! of about 18% between phases, but no remarkable 
variations between different sub-periods of Phase II.  
Figure 3 plots the resulting adverse selection costs (hereafter ASC), as given by 
!S, for Phase I and Phase II EUA futures. ASC for Phase I EUA futures decreased from 
0.088! per one lot round-trip during the third quarter of 2005 to 0.0017! at the end of 
Phase I. In the second quarter of 2006, a period with high uncertainty about the true 
value of the asset, ASC increased to 0.0862!. Regarding Phase II EUA futures during 
Phase I, median ASC were about 0.0231!; during Phase II, however, they fell to 
0.0053!. The statistical tests in Panel C of Table VII, confirm: (a) the downward slopes 
of the ASC curves in Figure 3; (b) the higher costs during Phase I, with a median 
difference of 0.0353! (ranksum test p-value, 0.0001); (c) the higher costs for Phase II 
EUAs during Phase I than afterwards (0.0178!, p-value 0.0003), and (d) the lower ASC 
towards the end of Phase II (0.0011!, p-value 0.0040) than at early stages of Phase II.  
Finally, we also include in Table VII the ASC expressed in relative terms to the 
average future price during each quarter. The median relative ASC for Phase I EUA 
futures were 0.24% before the market collapse and 0.74% during 2007; for Phase II 
EUA futures, the median relative ASC dropped from 0.11% in Phase I to about 0.05% 
during 2008 and 0.03% afterwards. The maximum relative ASC during Phase II were 
achieved, again, during the first quarter of 2009, 0.07%, far below the minimum relative 
ASC of Phase I: 0.16% (1st quarter of 2006). Statistical tests in Panel C of Table VII 
verify the negatively sloped trend for the relative ASC for Phase II EUA futures during 
both Phase I and II, and the higher relative costs for Phase I EUAs than for Phase II 
EUAs.  
Now, we turn to the volatility decomposition. In Figure 4(a), we plot the 
estimated price return volatility for Phase I and Phase II EUA futures according to Roll 
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(1984) with ASC. Volatility showed a decreasing pattern during both phases, with 
abnormally high levels at the begging of each one, and with only one remarkable outlier 
at the second quarter of 2006. In Figure 4(b), we plot the estimated friction-related 
components of volatility: the noisy or transitory component ( )20 5 1. S !" , and the trade-
related efficient component 2 20 25. S ! , due to information asymmetries. Excluding the 
above-mentioned outlier, both components showed negative slopes. Statistical tests like 
those in Panel C of Table VII (not reported) reveal that friction-related volatility was 
statistically higher for Phase I EUA futures than for Phase II EUA futures; also for 
Phase II EUA futures during Phase I than during Phase II, and slightly higher during 
2008 than during the rest of Phase II. 26 Figure 4(b) also shows that information-related 
frictions caused systematically less volatility than real frictions.  
In Figure 5, we show the quarterly time series of the components of the return 
volatility as a proportion of the total volatility, according to Roll (1984) with ASC. Grey 
(black) curves represent Phase I (II) EUA futures. The contribution of the efficient 
volatility ( 2m! ) decreased to a global minimum of 50.32% at the end of Phase I, during 
the market collapse, suggesting a lot of noise is price changes during that period. In fact, 
transitory volatility achieved its maximum level of contribution during the market 
collapse. The previously reported low average prices and high relative spreads during 
2007 suggest that the peak in transitory volatility was largely caused by the bid-ask 
bounce effect. Meanwhile, trade-related efficient volatility fell from median levels about 
6% of total volatility before the market collapse to less than 1% during the market 
collapse, consistent with the decrease in information asymmetries previously shown. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 These tests are available upon request from the authors.  
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For Phase II EUA futures, the contribution of efficient (transitory) volatility 
during Phase II was 16.7% lower (higher), in median terms, than for Phase I EUA 
futures (p-value 0.0001). During Phase II, information-related frictions caused, in 
median terms, 2.11% of price returns volatility while real frictions accounted for a much 
remarkable 36.5%. Friction-related volatility showed a steady decrease since the second 
quarter of 2008. Thus, information-related frictions caused 3.97% of the volatility the 
first quarter of 2008 vs. 2.05% the last quarter of 2010 (p-value 0.0040), whereas real 
frictions caused 40.73% of the volatility the first quarter of 2008 and about 28.4% the 
last quarter of 2010 (p-value, 0.0161).  
Finally, Figure 5 shows that the most important contributors to the efficient price 
volatility were the trade-unrelated innovations. Thus, about 95.6% of the volatility of 
the efficient price for Phase I EUA futures and 97% for Phase II EUA futures (during 
Phase II) were friction-free. Moreover, as ASC decreased, the relative importance of the 
friction-related efficient volatility for Phase II EUA futures decreased, from 6% in 
Phase I to 3% in Phase II (p-value 0.0038). Market quality ( AQ ), that is, ( )2u tVar p! " , 
sharply deteriorated during the 2007 market breakdown, independently of the 
underlying asset, but most notably for Phase I EUA futures. For Phase II EUA futures, 
AQ  increased from 55.3% during the first quarter of 2008 to 70% during the last quarter 
of 2010 (p-value 0.0080). Despite this improvement in price quality, ECX in 2010 
showed quality levels only close to those observed during the early stages of Phase I, 
before the market collapse, about 73.43% in median terms. The median difference in 
quality between Phase I before 2007 and Phase II is about 11.8% (p-value 0.0001).   
Next, we consider Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) (hereafter MRR) 
structural model. We therefore deviate from our prior framework in two ways: First, we 
allow for serial correlation in the trading process ( 1/ 2! " ). Second, we isolate the 
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unpredictable component of the trading process ( tw ) and we assume that any 
information content in the trading process must be contained in it. Table VIII provides 
the estimated MRR parameters by GMM for each quarter. All the parameters are 
statistically significant at least at the 5% level; so, we save any reference to significance 
levels in the Table. The ASC costs (!) show similar levels and the same decreasing 
pattern than with the Roll model with ASC previously discussed (see Figure 3). Market 
making costs (") are quite stable across time and across phases. The median " for Phase 
I EUA futures is 0.28% and for Phase II EUA futures during Phase II is 0.20%. 
Statistical tests fail to reject the null of equal medians between any two sub-periods. 
Finally, our estimates are consistent with our assumption of serial correlation in the 
trading process. The probability of trade sign reversal ! is always less than 0.5 and 
higher for Phase I EUA futures than for Phase II EUA futures. Accordingly, the first 
order autocorrelation of the trading process (!) is always positive, moving between 0.4 
and 0.6. 
In Figure 6, we plot the estimated bid-ask spread and expected realized spread 
( )rE S  according to the MRR model. The bid-ask spread estimate is very close to that 
obtained using Roll (1984) with ASC (see Table VII). The realized spread showed a 
downward trend. During Phase I, the realized spread was 0.113! the third quarter of 
2005 or 0.5% of the average price; at the end of that phase, it was negative (-0.0025!) or 
-3.6% over the average price. Therefore, the expected profit of market makers per lot 
round-trip was negative during the collapse of the market. For Phase II EUA futures 
during Phase I, ( )rE S  experienced a -85.5% decrease, from a maximum of 0.0872! at 
the end of 2006 (0.43% in relative terms) to 0.0126! (0.06% in relative terms). The 
downtrend continued throughout Phase II: the median difference in ( )rE S  between 
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Phase I EUA futures before the collapse and Phase II EUA futures during Phase II was 
0.0407! (p-value 0.0001) per lot round-trip, or 0.21% (p-value 0.0001) over the average 
price; the median difference in ( )rE S  between Phase II EUA futures during Phase I and 
Phase II was 0.0243! (p-value 0.0094) per lot round-trip, or 0.11% (p-value 0.0003) in 
relative terms. Therefore, even though ASC decreased during both in Phase I and II, the 
expected market making profits per lot round-trip also decreased through time with the 
decline in bid-ask spreads. Our findings suggest that market makers translated their 
lower information-asymmetry risk, their operative costs advantages exploiting 
economies of scale, and their decreased inventory holding costs due the increased 
trading intensity, to lower bid-ask spreads and, therefore, lower expected market making 
profits per lot transacted.    
In Figure 7, we show the estimated friction-related volatility and its components 
based on the MRR model. Transitory volatility is the sum of the real frictions 
component and the price discreteness component, that is, ( )2 22 2 1!" # $+ % . Trade-
related efficient volatility is due to ASC, that is, ( )2 21 ! "# .27 As in the Roll’s model 
with ASC, Figure 7 reveals downward sloping trends in friction-related volatility during 
both phases. In median terms, friction-related volatility was 0.1453% (p-value 0.0094) 
greater for Phase I EUA futures during Phase I than for Phase II EUA futures during 
Phase II. If we exclude the 2007 market collapse, that difference increases to 0.2653% 
(p-value 0.0001). Informational and real frictions were also larger during the Phase I in 
median terms, 0.1382% (p-value 0.0001) and 0.0581% (p-value 0.0414), respectively. 
For Phase II EUA futures, its highest friction-related volatility levels were achieved 
during the 2007 market collapse (median 0.1168%). Once Phase II started, friction-
related volatility dropped to a median 0.0189% (0.0453% in 2008 and 0.0098 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 The friction-related volatility includes also the interactive term. Its contribution, however, is negligible. 
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afterwards). For Phase II EUA futures, real and information-related frictions were 
equally relevant in absolute terms.28 Finally, Figure 7 shows that the two abnormal 
periods previously highlighted, second quarter of 2006 and first quarter of 2009, were of 
a very different nature. During the former, related to the increasing suspicion of over-
allocation of EUAs, friction-related volatility was dominated by information-related 
frictions, i.e. information asymmetries; during the later, linked to the effects of the 
financial crisis, an abrupt but temporary increase in real frictions accounted for most of 
the friction-related volatility.    
In Figure 8, we plot the quarterly time series of the estimated theoretical 
volatility components as a proportion of the total estimated volatility of price returns. As 
in prior figures, grey (black) lines represent Phase I (II) EUA futures. Solid lines 
represent the quote quality measure in the MRR model ( MRRQ )! Consistent with Roll’s 
model results, trade-unrelated efficient volatility ( 2u! ) is found again to be the most 
important component of the efficient volatility (85% during Phase I and 81% during 
Phase II). The MRR model, however, reports a lower weight for efficient volatility over 
( )tVar p!  during the market collapse for Phase I EUA futures, with a minimum of 
30.5% at the end of Phase I. Phase II EUA futures efficient volatility contribution also 
decreased during the market collapse to a minimum of 75.08%. Accordingly, MRRQ  
shows a global minimum at the end of Phase I (28.91%). Its median before the market 
collapse was about 68.9%. As a consequence, friction-related variance achieved its 
global maximum, 63%, at the end of 2007, 61.4% of which was transitory in nature and 
only 1.57% was information-driven. 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
28 In general, by considering the unexpected component of the trading process, the role attributed to 
information frictions has increased with respect to Roll’s (1984) model with ASC. 
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Comparing Phase I for Phase I EUAs before the 2007 market collapse with 
Phase II for Phase II EUAs, we find that, in median terms, the role played by frictions in 
total volatility increased about 14% (p-value 0.0134), 18% if we look only to real 
frictions (p-value 0.0104). As a result, MRRQ  decreased by a remarkable 20.61% (p-
value 0.0047). We find no statistical variation in the contribution of the information-
related frictions during Phase II with respect to Phase I, meaning that the median 
decrease in the price quality level is entirely explained by real frictions. Comparing 
Phase I period for Phase II EUAs, with the commitment period, we get to the same 
conclusion: the contribution of the transitory volatility increased by 11.66% (p-value 
0.0061), efficient volatility weight decreased by 16.48% (p-value 0.0012), and no 
difference is reported for the contribution of informational frictions. As a result, MRRQ  
decreased 11.89% (p-value 0.0194). Figure 8 shows an inflection point after the first 
quarter of 2009, where the contribution of real frictions achieved its maximum of Phase 
II (56.52%). Afterwards, price quality progressively increased as the influence of 
transitory volatility progressively decreased. By the end of 2010, transitory volatility 
represented only 22.76% of ( )tVar p!  and MRRQ  was about 63.6%, levels that are just 
similar to those observed in ECX before the market collapse.  
As a last methodological approach, we apply the reduced-form approach of 
Hasbrouck (1993). In Figure 9, we plot the estimated standard deviation of the pricing 
error ( s! ) estimated using the VMA representation of the VAR model over the variable 
set { }1/2, , ,s st t t tr x x x , with the VAR model truncated at 3 lags. To account for changes in 
price return volatility through quarters, we express s!  in relative terms to p! . Notice 
that the ratio s! / p!  plotted in Figure 9 is an inverse measure for market quality. 
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The findings in Figure 9 are consistent with prior methodologies. According to 
Hasbrouck (1993) approach, the ECX futures market for EUAs achieved its worst 
quality levels during the 2007 market collapse. The median s! / p!  before the market 
collapse was 17.44%, increasing to 53.45% the last quarter of 2007. For Phase II EUA 
futures, the worst quality levels achieved during Phase II are found the first quarter of 
2009 (31.92%). The difference between the median quality during Phase I (excluding 
2007) and Phase II is -6.17% (p-value 0.0414). During the most recent quarters, s! / p!  
has decreased towards 21.7% the last quarter of 2010. The average decrease with 
respect to 2008 levels is -2.8% (p-value 0.0161). As in previous methodologies, the 
market quality levels at the end of 2010 are close but not better than those achieved by 
ECX during the Phase I before the collapse. In fact, with this methodology, Phase II 
EUA futures during Phase I showed higher quality levels than during Phase II (-9.19%, 
p-value 0.0061). 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
We have studied the history of trading frictions and market quality of the 
European carbon futures market. Two overlapping major events, the market collapse at 
the end of Phase I, in 2007, and the irruption of the current international financial crisis 
during Phase II, have characterized the short history of this pan-European platform.  
We have used a unique database provided by ICE ECX futures market, the most 
active trading platform of the EU-ETS. The database offers detailed information on all 
ECX trades on EUA future contracts, covering maturities both on Phase I and II. We 
have applied three different microstructure approaches to obtain estimates of trading 
frictions and market quality: a structural model of price formation with and without 
Chapter III: The timeline of trading frictions in the European carbon market 126 
information asymmetries based on Roll (1984) stylized framework; the alternative 
structural model proposed by Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997), and the 
reduced-form approach proposed by Hasbrouck (1993). 
In terms of trading frictions, the two structural model approaches previously 
mentioned lead to similar conclusions. According to Roll (1984) model with adverse 
selection costs (ASC), the estimated bid-ask spread and relative spreads were higher in 
median terms during Phase I (0.0675!) than during Phase II (0.0186!). Although we 
evidence a downtrend in bid-ask spreads during both phases, relative spreads were 
abnormally high during the 2007 market collapse, when EUA prices fell below 1!, 
achieving a maximum of 13.68% of the EUA future price at the end of Phase I.  
Regarding adverse selection costs (ASC), they represented 65% of the bid-ask 
spread (0.088!) at the start of Phase I, but only 17.5% (0.0017!) by the end of 2007. 
During Phase II, ASC were about 30% of the spread (0.0053!). In median terms, the 
difference in ASC between Phase I and Phase II was about 18% of the spread (or 
0.0353!). In relative terms, the median ASC dropped from 0.11% of the EUA futures 
price during Phase I to 0.03% towards the end of Phase II. The maximum relative ASC 
was achieved during the market collapse (0.74% during 2007).  
According to the MRR model, even though ASC, in absolute terms, decreased 
during both in Phase I and II, the expected market making profits per lot round-trip, as 
measured by the expected realized spread, also decreased through time with the decline 
in bid-ask spreads. We suggest that market makers translated their lower market making 
costs (i.e., ASC, inventory holding costs, order processing costs) to their quoted bid-ask 
spreads and, therefore, lower expected market making profits per lot transacted. 
Price return volatility decreased during both phases and also its friction-related 
components, either information-related (due to ASC) or information-unrelated (due to 
Chapter III: The timeline of trading frictions in the European carbon market 127 
real frictions). In absolute terms, friction-related volatility and its components were 
higher during Phase I than during Phase II. Both methods also coincide in the fact that 
real-frictions caused systematically more volatility than informational frictions. In 
relative terms, however, the picture we report is different. The two structural models 
considered attribute an increasingly less important relative role to efficient price 
volatility along Phase I and, consequently, an increasing relative role to friction-related 
volatility. According to the MRR model, efficient volatility accounted for only 30.5% of 
the price return volatility during the 2007 market breakdown. However, when Phase I 
before the collapse is compared with Phase II, the median contribution of friction-
related volatility to price return volatility was 14% higher (18% if we look only to real 
frictions) during Phase II, with a maximum contribution of 56.52% the first quarter of 
2009. After that quarter, the weight of friction-related volatility has progressively 
decreased. 
Summary measures of market quality proposed by the three methodological 
approaches generate the same conclusions. ECX achieved its lowest levels of quality 
during the 2007 market breakdown. With Roll (1984) with ASC, 49.4% of the price 
return volatility was not friction-related by the end of Phase I; with MRR model, this 
contribution decreases to 28.91%, and with Hasbrouck (1993), the standard deviation of 
the pricing error increases to a maximum of 53.54% of the price return variance. All 
models coincide in that market quality progressively recovered during Phase II. Roll 
(1984) with ASC shows a steady recovery, which started from the very beginning of 
Phase II, whereas MRR and Hasbrouck (1993) show a late recovery, which started the 
second quarter of 2009. In all cases, however, the market quality levels observed by the 
end of our sample period (2010) are close but not superior to those observed during 
Phase I before the market collapsed. 
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Our analysis identifies one intermediate unusual period in each Phase, the 
second quarter of 2006, when the initial suspicions about over-allocation of EUAs 
raised, and the first quarter of 2009, a period market by the definitive outbreak of the 
current financial crisis after the collapse of Lehmann Brothers on September 15th, 2008, 
and all the events that followed, including the worst two-month period (January and 
February 2009) in the history of S&P500, with a 18.62% drop and the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average Index showing historical minimums since 1996, and the Euro Stoxx 
50 at minimums not achieved since 2003. During the second quarter of 2006, ECX 
showed abrupt peaks in bid-ask spreads, relative spreads, adverse selection costs, and 
price return volatility. MRR model results however, suggest that most of the volatility 
increase was information-related, rather than transitory, so that market quality does not 
deteriorated. During the first quarter of 2009, there were also peaks in price return 
volatility, but MRR and Hasbrouck (1993) methodologies both indicate that, in this 
case, transitory volatility dominated, so that market quality decreased.  
Given the previous evidence, we must conclude that the quality of the ECX 
market has not remarkably changed from futures contracts with maturities in Phase I to 
those in Phase II. Even though Phase II shows higher trading intensity, lower 
immediacy costs (as measured by the bid-ask spread), lower risk of information 
asymmetries or adverse selection costs, and lower both price return volatility and 
friction-related volatility than Phase I (before the market collapse), friction-related 
volatility contribution to total volatility has been above ordinary Phase I levels. Our 
findings suggest that market quality has been recovering from the market breakdown at 
the end of Phase I and the additional negative impact of the international financial crisis 
on the real economy expectations. By the end of 2010, this recovery process has not 
finished yet. 
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Table I. Market shares 
This table reports yearly market shares of the two most representative market platforms of the EU-ETS, 
BlueNext and ECX, in the spot (Panel A) and futures (Panel B) markets for EUAs. Volume is measured 
in lots. Each lot represents 1,000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent. 
  
Panel A: Spot Market             
 Phase I* Shares  Phase II Shares   
Year Total (lots) BlueNext Others Total (lots) BlueNext ECX Others 
2005 7,110,791 61.34% 38.66%     
2006 40,222,846 78.18% 21.82%     
2007 29,647,143 83.11% 16.89%     
2008 3,389,504 80.72% 19.28% 244,480,000 100% 0% 0.00% 
2009    1,246,871,011 90.07% 4.85% 5.08% 
2010       493,347,359 54.70% 39.48% 5.82% 
        Panel B: Futures market             
 Phase I Shares  Phase II Shares   
Year Total (lots) ECX Others Total (lots) BlueNext ECX Others 
2005 89,409,000 100% 0.00% 3,554,000  100.00% 0.00% 
2006 315,280,000 100% 0.00% 128,306,505  99.66% 0.34% 
2007 110,089,000 100% 0.00% 872,876,000  99.18% 0.82% 
2008    2,017,544,000 0.08% 98.57% 1.35% 
2009    3,803,708,650 0.01% 98.95% 1.04% 
2010       4,429,652,000 0.00% 96.40% 3.60% 
* NASDAQ OMX Commodities Europe data not available. 
     Source : CDC Climat, using data from BlueNext, ICE ECX, GreenX and Reuters. 
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Table II. Trading activity per future contract 
This table provides statistics on trading activity for the different ECX EUA future contracts, both in Phase 
I and Phase II. 
Phase Delivery 
Number 
of trades 
Average 
price 
Volume 
(lots) 
Average trade 
size (lots) 
First trade: 
Day 
First trade: 
Time 
Last trade: 
Day 
Last trade: 
Time 
1 Dec-05 4,784 22.47 51,812 10.83 4/22/2005 7:00 AM 12/19/2005 12:35 PM 
1 Mar-06 476 24.76 7,7 16.18 10/11/2005 4:10 PM 3/24/2006 4:57 PM 
1 Jun-06 43 22.47 879 20.44 1/9/2006 12:02 PM 6/23/2006 7:08 AM 
1 Sep-06 10 16.33 220 22 7/18/2006 1:45 PM 9/19/2006 12:46 PM 
1 Oct-06 8 12.63 80 10 10/13/2006 12:23 PM 10/19/2006 8:15 AM 
1 Nov-06 4 15.01 80 20 7/25/2006 3:37 PM 10/30/2006 9:43 AM 
1 Dec-06 20,855 18.12 248,6 11.92 4/28/2005 9:30 AM 12/18/2006 4:19 PM 
1 Jan-07 3 18.88 30 10 12/29/2006 10:37 AM 1/9/2007 4:51 PM 
1 Feb-07 1 1.6 25 25 2/9/2007 5:15 PM 2/9/2007 5:15 PM 
1 Mar-07 70 4.39 8,638 123.4 1/19/2006 12:22 PM 3/26/2007 4:27 PM 
1 Jun-07 1 0.19 200 200 6/13/2007 11:29 AM 6/13/2007 11:29 AM 
1 Dec-07 13,541 8.5 213,636 15.78 4/26/2005 10:30 AM 12/17/2007 4:13 PM 
2 Jan-08 14 20.62 300 21.43 3/15/2007 6:05 PM 1/24/2008 5:21 PM 
2 Feb-08 24 90.18 24 1 1/18/2008 6:10 PM 1/21/2008 12:19 PM 
1 Mar-08 42 1.96 1,838 43.76 2/2/2006 1:44 PM 3/31/2008 3:59 PM 
2 Dec-08 238,647 21.93 2,188,980 9.17 6/17/2005 4:04 PM 12/15/2008 4:41 PM 
2 Mar-09 170 11.47 11,905 70.03 12/1/2008 11:15 AM 3/30/2009 3:17 PM 
2 Jun-09 4 17.95 105 26.25 11/6/2008 3:47 PM 4/24/2009 3:46 PM 
2 Sep-09 28 14.11 796 28.43 5/27/2009 2:19 PM 9/25/2009 4:26 PM 
2 Dec-09 312,130 13.85 3,057,609 9.8 10/12/2005 1:20 PM 12/14/2009 5:17 PM 
2 Mar-10 32 13.81 1,804 56.38 9/4/2009 2:46 PM 3/19/2010 11:46 AM 
2 Jun-10 8 14.85 335 41.88 2/17/2010 5:03 PM 6/28/2010 3:23 PM 
2 Sep-10 14 15.07 390 27.86 4/15/2010 4:32 PM 9/24/2010 9:32 AM 
2 Dec-10 289,726 14.57 3,078,319 10.62 1/26/2006 5:05 PM 9/27/2010 4:48 PM 
2 Mar-11 9 15.17 454 50.44 3/10/2010 12:35 PM 6/15/2010 4:07 PM 
2 Jun-11 3 15.67 75 25 5/6/2010 2:37 PM 5/11/2010 1:50 PM 
2 Sep-11 3 15.78 75 25 5/6/2010 2:37 PM 5/11/2010 1:51 PM 
2 Dec-11 49,427 15.46 652,982 13.21 3/23/2006 1:39 PM 9/27/2010 4:12 PM 
2 Mar-12 5 15.7 137 27.4 4/14/2010 12:34 PM 6/8/2010 11:53 AM 
2 Jun-12 3 15.71 75 25 4/14/2010 12:34 PM 5/11/2010 1:48 PM 
2 Sep-12 3 15.88 75 25 4/14/2010 12:35 PM 5/11/2010 1:47 PM 
2 Dec-12 50,650 16.6 981,907 19.39 3/22/2006 5:21 PM 9/27/2010 4:44 PM 
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Table III. Sample data: General statistics 
This table contains sample descriptive statistics per contract. Panel A provides price statistics and 
aggregate trading and trade-size statistics.! Panel B reports trade-related statistics. One lot equals 1,000 
tonnes of CO2 equivalent. We also include statistics for two continuous time series obtained by rolling 
over the time series of the finite-life future contracts negotiated in ECX. There is one rollover time series 
for each phase of the EU-ETS we consider.  
 
Panel A: General statistics 
Phase Delivery Average price 
Price std. 
deviation 
Maximum 
price 
Minimum 
price 
# price changes 
per day # trades 
Volume 
(lots) 
Average trade 
size (lots) 
1 Dec. 2005 22.47 2.95 29.50 6.50 20.44 4,784 51,812 10.83 
1 Dec. 2006 18.12 6.60 31.00 6.30 33.02 20,855 248,600 11.92 
1 Dec. 2007 8.50 8.34 32.05 0.01 10.82 13,541 213,636 15.78 
2 Dec. 2008 21.93 3.38 33.70 10.75 143.75 238,647 2,188,980 9.17 
2 Dec. 2009 13.85 2.77 32.50 7.70 113.93 312,130 3,057,609 9.80 
2 Dec. 2010 14.61 1.61 32.22 8.25 92.28 330,390 3,598,073 10.89 
2 Dec. 2011 15.35 2.57 32.98 8.60 20.21 64,224 890,617 13.87 
2 Dec. 2012 16.46 3.41 34.65 8.23 19.55 58,109 1,141,885 19.65 
1 Rollover 14.97 8.95 31.00 0.01 26.52 32,108 406,228 12.65 
2 Rollover 16.25 4.26 33.70 7.70 268.43 818,322 7,863,240 9.61 
!
Panel B: Trading statistics 
Phase Delivery 
First 
trading 
day 
First trade 
Last 
trading day 
(in sample) 
Last trade # trading days 
# trades 
per day 
# trades 
per 
minute 
Average trade 
duration in 
minutes (excl. 
overnight) 
1 Dec. 2005 4/22/05 4/22/05 7:00 AM 12/19/05 12/19/05 12:35 PM 169 28.31 0.0489 20.43 
1 Dec. 2006 4/22/05 4/28/05 9:30 AM 12/18/06 12/18/06 4:19 PM 423 49.30 0.0858 11.65 
1 Dec. 2007 4/22/05 4/26/05 10:30 AM 12/17/07 12/17/07 4:13 PM 679 19.94 0.0341 29.28 
2 Dec. 2008 4/22/05 6/17/05 4:04 PM 12/15/08 12/15/08 4:41 PM 934 255.51 0.4347 2.30 
2 Dec. 2009 4/22/05 10/12/05 1:20 PM 12/14/09 12/14/09 5:17 PM 1,188 262.74 0.4454 2.25 
2 Dec. 2010 4/22/05 1/26/06 5:05 PM 12/20/10 12/20/10 4:59 PM 1,447 228.33 0.3862 2.59 
2 Dec. 2011 4/22/05 3/23/06 1:39 PM 12/31/10 12/31/10 11:59 AM 1,454 44.17 0.0748 13.38 
2 Dec. 2012 4/22/05 3/22/06 5:21 PM 12/31/10 12/31/10 11:59 AM 1,454 39.96 0.0676 14.78 
1 Rollover 4/22/05 4/22/05 7:00 AM 3/31/08 3/31/08 3:59 PM 750 42.81 0.0732 13.66 
2 Rollover 4/22/05 6/17/05 4:04 PM 12/31/10 12/31/10 11:59 AM 1,454 562.81 0.9525 1.05 
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Table IV. Rollover 
This Table reports the rollover dates resulting from applying the maximum volume criterion to obtain two 
time series, one for each phase of the EU-ETS, from the time series of the finite-life future contracts 
negotiated in ECX. 
 
Futures Phase I 
Maturity First day Last day 
Dec-05 4/22/2005 11/18/2005 
Dec-06 11/21/2005 11/21/2006 
Dec-07 11/22/2006 12/17/2007 
Futures Phase II 
Maturity First day Last day 
Dec-08 4/22/2005 12/8/2008 
Dec-09 12/9/2008 12/3/2009 
Dec-10 12/4/2009 12/16/2010 
Dec-11 12/17/2010 12/31/2010 
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Table V. Trade types 
This table contains statistics on the different types of trades available in the ECX database we use in our 
study. We provide the number of trades (Panel A) and the total volume (Panel B) in each type of trade for 
the ECX EUA future contracts of Phase I and Phase II of the EU-ETS. 
 
Panel A: Number of trades     
  Future Phase I Future Phase II 
EXC trade type # trades % # trades % 
Screen trade (regular, on-exchange) 20,260  63.10 683,584  83.53 
Screen cross trade (same Clearing Member) 771  2.40 26,448  3.23 
On-screen corrections 66  0.21 514  0.06 
Block trade 2  0.01 168  0.02 
EFP/EFS trade 11,009  34.29 107,601  13.15 
Bilateral off-exchange 0  0.00 2  0.00 
Settlement trade 0  0.00 5  0.00 
Total 32,108  100 818,322  100 
Panel B: Volume     
  Future Phase I Future Phase II 
EXC trade type Volume % Volume % 
Screen trade (regular, on-exchange) 180,934  44.54 4,076,857  51.85 
Screen cross trade (same Clearing Member) 7,959  1.96 183,756  2.34 
On-screen corrections 1,459  0.36 10,981  0.14 
Block trade 500  0.12 21,714  0.28 
EFP/EFS trade 215,376  53.02 3,569,836  45.40 
Bilateral off-exchange 0  0.00 36  0.00 
Settlement trade 0  0.00 60  0.00 
Total 406,228  100 7,863,240  100 
!
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Table VI. Trading activity per quarter 
We provide trading statistics per quarter in our sample period. We distinguish between Phase I trading 
activity and Phase II trading activity. For each phase of the EU-ETS we report the number of trades, the 
traded volume (in shares), the net number of trades (buys minus sells) and the net volume (buy volume 
minus sell volume). 
 
    Phase I trading activity 
 
Phase II trading activity 
Quarter   Trades Volume Net trades Net volume   Trades Volume Net trades Net volume 
3 2,005 2,063 15,324 241 1,580 
     4 2,005 1,127 9,545 55 721 
     1 2,006 2,672 27,057 -64 -1,499 
     2 2,006 3,966 35,990 -180 -2,042 
     3 2,006 2,116 17,867 -66 -1,171 
     4 2,006 3,499 23,186 -125 -310 
 
3,349 30,610 -133 -1,320 
1 2,007 3,057 22,594 -509 -3,098 
 
5,014 43,965 148 2,263 
2 2,007 1,259 15,431 -125 -2,923 
 
10,655 70,891 973 6,547 
3 2,007 501 13,940 3 40 
 
13,542 97,693 812 4,669 
4 2,007 
     
11,531 70,679 923 7,097 
1 2,008 
     
27,826 128,874 1,604 15,618 
2 2,008 
     
31,095 144,194 3,523 20,396 
3 2,008 
     
43,550 200,428 1,394 3,982 
4 2,008 
     
38,687 162,838 -1,867 -8,658 
1 2,009 
     
60,357 290,421 -1,535 -14,401 
2 2,009 
     
85,770 338,841 4,962 -2,553 
3 2,009 
     
59,823 278,654 -1,273 -18,214 
4 2,009 
     
39,992 271,628 -2,084 -12,638 
1 2,010 
     
53,540 390,655 -1,148 -12,069 
2 2,010 
     
105,584 727,938 4,566 25,926 
3 2,010 
     
54,476 436,825 292 15,223 
4 2,010           38,793 391,723 645 8,973 
!
!
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Table VII. Bid-ask spread and adverse selection costs: Roll (1984) model 
This table reports the estimates of the Roll (1984) estimate of the bid-ask spread and the relative bid-ask 
spread (S) for each quarter in our sample. We also estimate a version of Roll’s model with adverse 
selection costs. We report the adverse selection costs parameter (!), the bid-ask spread (S), the adverse 
selection costs (!S), and the relative adverse selection costs (!S/P), where P is the average price. Panel A 
reports the findings for Phase I EUAs future contracts and Panel B reports the findings for Phase II EUAs 
future contracts. All the reported coefficients in Panels A and B are statistically significant at usual levels. 
Panel C contains estimates of the average trend of each statistic for the Phase II EUAs future contracts, 
both including and excluding Phase I data. Panel C also includes non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-Tests 
for differences in medians between different sub-periods. 
 
Panel A: Phase I EUAs          
Roll (1984) original model  Roll (1984) with adverse-selection costs 
Quarter Year S Relat. S  !" S !#" $!S/P)% 
3 2005 0.0910 0.0040  0.6519 0.1350 0.0880 0.3895 4 2005 0.0702 0.0032  0.4837 0.0928 0.0449 0.2031 1 2006 0.0599 0.0023  0.5251 0.0812 0.0426 0.1595 2 2006 0.1100 0.0070  0.5628 0.1531 0.0862 0.5337 3 2006 0.0472 0.0030  0.6010 0.0675 0.0406 0.2488 4 2006 0.0401 0.0045  0.4224 0.0509 0.0215 0.2349 1 2007 0.0264 0.0148  0.4100 0.0332 0.0136 0.6478 2 2007 0.0179 0.0391  0.2037 0.0200 0.0041 0.7400 3 2007 0.0091 0.1368  0.1749 0.0100 0.0017 2.4965 
 
Panel B: Phase II EUAs          
4 2006 0.0826 0.0045   0.5053 0.1105 0.0558 0.2725 1 2007 0.0558 0.0038   0.4406 0.0715 0.0315 0.2074 2 2007 0.0405 0.0020   0.4431 0.0521 0.0231 0.1056 3 2007 0.0315 0.0016   0.4082 0.0395 0.0161 0.0797 4 2007 0.0272 0.0012   0.3866 0.0337 0.0130 0.0577 1 2008 0.0282 0.0013   0.3547 0.0343 0.0122 0.0571 2 2008 0.0253 0.0010   0.3009 0.0298 0.0090 0.0352 3 2008 0.0294 0.0012   0.3355 0.0353 0.0118 0.0484 4 2008 0.0298 0.0016   0.2947 0.0350 0.0103 0.0568 1 2009 0.0281 0.0025   0.2511 0.0322 0.0081 0.0717 2 2009 0.0194 0.0014   0.2699 0.0225 0.0061 0.0444 3 2009 0.0125 0.0009   0.3061 0.0148 0.0045 0.0317 4 2009 0.0120 0.0009   0.3158 0.0142 0.0045 0.0326 1 2010 0.0122 0.0009   0.2777 0.0142 0.0039 0.0302 2 2010 0.0101 0.0007   0.2817 0.0118 0.0033 0.0217 3 2010 0.0090 0.0006   0.3043 0.0106 0.0032 0.0219 4 2010 0.0082 0.0006   0.3147 0.0098 0.0031 0.0206 
 
Panel C: Tests          
Average trend of Phase II EUAs 
(%):        
a. Including pre-Phase II data -0.2216 -0.0075  -1.1344 -0.2916 -0.1013 -0.8145 b. Excluding pre-Phase II data -0.2237 -0.0072  -0.2026 -0.2687 -0.0893 -0.5416 Mann-Whitney U-test PI vs. PII 
EUAs:        
c. PI vs. PII since 2008 0.0312 0.0036  0.1811 0.0488 0.0353 0.2412 d. PI except 2007 vs. PII since 2008 0.0490 0.0027  0.2414 0.0683 0.0385 0.1323 e. PI except 2007 vs. PII only 2008 0.0362 0.0023  0.2258 0.0523 0.0327 0.1125 Mann-Whitney U-test PII EUAs:        f. Before 2008 vs. after 2008 0.0246 0.0010  0.1380 0.0334 0.0178 0.0526 g. Only 2008 vs. PII after 2008 0.0039 0.0001  0.0096 0.0044 0.0011 0.0089 
* Bold format means statistically significant (at least) at the 5% level. 
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Table VIII. MRR (1997) parameter estimates 
This table reports the estimated parameters of Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans’s (1997) structural 
model of price formation for each quarter in our sample. The model is estimated by GMM. ! is the 
adverse selection costs parameter; " is the market making costs (real frictions) parameter; ! is the first 
order correlation in the trade sign, and # is the probability of a trade sign reversal. Panel A (B) contains 
the findings for Phase I (II) of the EU-ETS. All the reported coefficients in Panels A and B are 
statistically significant at usual levels. Panel C includes non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-Tests for 
differences in medians between different sub-periods. 
 
Panel A: Phase I EUAs !! !! !! !!
Quarter Year ! " # $ 
3 2005 0.0899 -0.0147 0.4459 0.2771 
4 2005 0.0406 0.0151 0.3778 0.3111 
1 2006 0.0419 0.0028 0.4419 0.2790 
2 2006 0.0902 -0.0095 0.4944 0.2528 
3 2006 0.0354 0.0016 0.3926 0.3037 
4 2006 0.0230 0.0040 0.5144 0.2428 
1 2007 0.0149 0.0022 0.5633 0.2183 
2 2007 0.0051 0.0054 0.6038 0.1981 
3 2007 0.0016 0.0041 0.5000 0.2500 
Panel B: Phase II EUAs !! !! !! !!
4 2006 0.0722 -0.0072 0.4395 0.2803 
1 2007 0.0340 0.0028 0.4996 0.2502 
2 2007 0.0295 -0.0024 0.5980 0.2010 
3 2007 0.0183 0.0022 0.5353 0.2323 
4 2007 0.0165 0.0010 0.5812 0.2094 
1 2008 0.0155 0.0020 0.5941 0.2030 
2 2008 0.0124 0.0028 0.6280 0.1860 
3 2008 0.0149 0.0031 0.5916 0.2042 
4 2008 0.0130 0.0049 0.6007 0.1997 
1 2009 0.0105 0.0056 0.6056 0.1972 
2 2009 0.0078 0.0034 0.6086 0.1957 
3 2009 0.0059 0.0015 0.6132 0.1934 
4 2009 0.0057 0.0014 0.6042 0.1979 
1 2010 0.0052 0.0019 0.6194 0.1903 
2 2010 0.0042 0.0017 0.6039 0.1980 
3 2010 0.0041 0.0013 0.6019 0.1991 
4 2010 0.0038 0.0012 0.5847 0.2076 
Panel C: Tests ! " # $ 
Average trend of Phase II EUAs (x100): 
    a. Including pre-Phase II data -0.1202 -0.0079 0.0575 -0.0287 
b. Excluding pre-Phase II data -0.1162 -0.0190 -0.0347 0.0173 
Mann-Whitney U-test PI vs. PII EUAs: 
    c. PI vs. PII since 2008 0.0286 0.0008 -0.1096 0.0548 
d. PI except 2007 vs. PII since 2008 0.0344 0.0002 -0.1601 0.0801 
e. PI except 2007 vs. PII only 2008 0.0273 -0.0008 -0.1535 0.0767 
Mann-Whitney U-test PII EUAs: 
    f. Before 2008 vs. after 2008 0.0227 -0.0010 -0.0688 0.0344 
g. Only 2008 vs. PII after 2008 0.0014 0.0003 -0.0009 0.0004 
* Bold format means statistically significant (at least) at the 5% level. 
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Figure 1. EUA future prices 
We plot the time series of future prices for two contracts: EUA December 2007 futures contract and EUA 
December 2012 futures contract, as the futures prices representative for Phase I and II, respectively. 
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Figure 2. December EUA futures: Accumulated volume 
We plot the accumulated volume (in millions of lots) through time of the EUA future contracts with 
expiry dates from December 2005 to December 2012. 
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Figure 3. Adverse selection costs (!S):  
Roll's (1984) model with adverse selection costs  
We plot the adverse selection costs evolution through time according to Roll (1984) model extended, to 
account for information asymmetries. 
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Figure 4. Friction-related volatility:  
Roll's (1984) model with adverse selection costs  
In Figure 4(a), we plot the estimated price return volatility for Phase I and Phase II EUA futures 
according to Roll (1984) model with adverse selection costs. In Figure 4(b), we plot the estimated 
friction-related components of volatility: the noisy or transitory component, and the trade-related efficient 
component, due to information asymmetries. 
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Figure 5. Volatility decomposition: Roll's (1984) model with adverse selection costs 
Based on the volatility decomposition obtained with the estimates of Roll (1984) model with adverse 
selection costs, we plot the evolution through time of the portion of price return volatility due to: (a) the 
efficient price volatility; (b) the trade-related efficient volatility (“trade-related volatility”); (c) the trade-
unrelated efficient volatility (“trade-unrelated volatility”), which is our measure of quote quality (QA), 
and (d) the real friction-related (noisy) volatility (“transitory volatility”). We estimate the model for each 
quarter in our sample, and for each of the first two phases of the EU-ETS. 
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Figure 6. Bid-ask spread and expected realized spread: MRR (1997) approach 
Based on the estimated structural model of price formation proposed by Madhavan, Richardson, and 
Roomans (1997), we plot the estimated bid-ask spread and expected realized spread for each quarter in 
our sample period and for both Phase I and Phase II of the EU-ETS. 
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Figure 7. Friction-related volatility decomposition: MRR (1997) approach 
Based on the estimated structural model of price formation proposed by Madhavan, Richardson, and 
Roomans (1997), we plot the estimated friction-related volatility and its components for each quarter in 
our sample. We distinguish between the trade-related efficient volatility (due to informational frictions), 
and the transitory volatility (due to real frictions). We estimate the model for each quarter in our sample, 
and for each of the first two phases of the EU-ETS. 
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Figure 8. Quality of prices: MRR (1997) approach 
Based on the estimated structural model of price formation proposed by Madhavan, Richardson, and 
Roomans (1997), we plot the evolution through time of the portion of price return volatility due to: (a) the 
trade-related efficient volatility (“trade-related volatility”); (b) the trade-unrelated efficient volatility 
(“trade-unrelated volatility”), which is our measure of quote quality (QMRR), and (c) the real friction-
related (noisy) volatility (“transitory volatility”). We estimate the model for each quarter in our sample, 
and for each of the first two phases of the EU-ETS. 
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Figure 9. Quality of prices: Hasbrouck (1993) approach 
We plot the estimated standard deviation of the pricing error according to reduced-form methodology 
proposed by Hasbrouck (1993). We use the VMA representation of a VAR model over a variable set 
which includes the continuously compounded price return, the trade sign, the signed trade size, and the 
signed square root of the trade size, with the VAR model truncated at 3 lags. The standard deviation of 
the pricing error is represented in relative terms to the standard deviation of the continuously compounded 
price return. This metric is an inverse proxy for market quality. 
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1. Introduction 
According to data form Kossoy and Ambrosi (2011) (World Bank), carbon 
offsets were the second most traded “commodity” around the world in 2010. We 
contribute to the growing line of research that studies the characteristics and 
particularities of this relatively new market by studying information-motivated trading 
in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS).  
Informed trading is analyzed using the very well-known PIN methodology 
introduced by Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996) (hereafter, EKOP).1 
Building on the fundamentals discussed in Easley and O’Hara (1987, 1992), EKOP 
develop the original PIN model to test whether differences in informed trading intensity 
could explain the differences observed in spreads between frequently and infrequently 
traded NYSE-listed stocks. Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1996, 1997), and Easley, 
Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) provide examples of alternative applications of the 
original PIN methodology. Extension of the original methodology for particular 
research problems are provided, among others, by Easley, O’Hara and Saar (2001) and 
Easley, Engle, O’Hara and Wu (2008).2 In this paper, we adapt the EKOP model to the 
particularities of the EU-ETS.  
Under the EU-ETS, there are two main emission certificates that polluting 
companies can use to cover their surplus of greenhouse gas emissions: European Union 
Allowances (EUAs) and Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). Both assets are traded 
simultaneously in several European platforms, being the European Climate Exchange 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 In the context of emissions reduction projects, the term PIN is used to refer to the document which 
describes the initial particularities of a CDM project, known as Project Idea Note. In this paper, PIN 
means Probability of Informed Trading, as it is widely understood in market microstructure literature. 
2 It is important no mention that several papers have criticized the PIN model. See Aktas, de Bodt, 
Declerck and Van Oppens (2007), Boehmer, Grammig and Theissen (2007), Kaul, Lei and Stoffman 
(2008), Duarte and Young (2009) and Akay, Cyree, Griffiths and Winters (2012). 
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(ECX) the one which concentrates most of the futures contracts traded volume.3 Our 
adaptation of EKOP’s PIN model takes into account that informed traders can choose to 
trade either EUAs or CERs.  
With our ad hoc version of the EKOPs’ model, we provide evidence of the 
presence of informed traders in the European carbon market. CERs exhibit lower 
average PIN than EUAs. We also show that the PIN of the EU-ETS has changed over 
time. While the PIN of CERs has increased over time, together with its share in total 
trading activity, EUAs’ PIN has remained pretty stable. Additionally, we find a 
significant impact of the current financial crisis on the theoretical daily opening spread 
for EUAs and CERs derived from our PIN model. 
EKOP methodology has been previously used to study informed trading around 
particular non-regular events such as stock splits, mergers and acquisitions 
announcements, etc. (e.g., Easley et al., 2001 and Aktas et al., 2007, among others). In 
this paper, we focus on informed trading around specific events that repeat every year in 
the European carbon market. By March 31st, the companies submit their emissions 
reports for the prior calendar year. The corresponding emission permits must be 
surrendered by April 30th. Finally, the European Commission publishes the information 
for all companies by May 15th. Consequently, each polluting company manages private 
information about their own emissions during several months that they can use to open 
profitable positions in the carbon market. Thus, if the companies anticipate they would 
be long (short) of permits in the future, based on their own verifications, they could sell 
(buy) future contracts in the market, before this information gets public. We therefore 
expect an increase in the PIN during the first months of each year and a sudden decrease 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 ECX futures contracts are operated by the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) Futures Europe, which is 
one of the leading markets in the negotiation of energy derivatives in Europe. 
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after May 15th. Consistently, we report that the PIN of EUAs regularly increases before 
the publication of the yearly verified-emission reports. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we review the 
particularities of the European carbon market. In section 3, we examine the traditional 
PIN methodology and adapt it to fit the characteristics of the European carbon market. 
In section 4, we describe the database and report some descriptive statistics. In section 
5, we present our empirical findings. Finally, we conclude in section 6.  
 
2. The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) 
The Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the European 
Council establishes that, as a mechanism of flexibility and in order to achieve the 
reduction objectives for greenhouse gasses emissions, the companies included in the 
directive will receive entitlements each year to cover their real verified emissions. These 
permits denominated European Union Allowances (EUAs) allow the owner to emit one 
tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent gas into the atmosphere. Nowadays, the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) is the world’s largest market for carbon 
permits, both in terms of installations covered and volume traded.  
The scheme is structured as a cap-and-trade system, where emissions are limited 
and any deficit or surplus can be managed through the emission allowances market. So 
far, the scheme has been structured in three phases. Phase I was a pilot phase and ran 
from 2005 to 2007; Phase II covers the period 2008 to 2012, and Phase III will last from 
2013 to 2020. Under the EU-ETS, each Member State has to prepare a National 
Allocation Plan (NAP) 18 months prior to the start of each phase. Each Member State 
proposes a cap for the corresponding phase and determines if banking and borrowing 
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facilities are allowed. Banking refers to the possibility of transferring allowances from 
one phase to the following phase and it was not allowed between Phases I and II, while 
it is possible between Phases II and III. Borrowing refers to the opposite of banking and 
is not allowed between phases. This implies that a Phase I EUA is a different asset than 
a Phase II EUA.4 In each particular phase, banking and borrowing are both allowed 
within years.5 
The 2004/101/EC Directive settles the fundaments of the project-based flexible 
mechanism, which authorizes EU members to generate and use Kyoto certificates in 
their compliance objectives. Under this directive, the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) exposes that the countries included in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol could 
exploit emissions-reduction projects in developing countries in order to generate credits, 
known as Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), which could be employed to meet 
their emissions targets. Although CERs are fully fungible with EUAs, their use is 
capped, with varying limits in each of the different countries (Trotignon, 2010).6 In 
addition, each Member has to decide which percentage of CERs could be used instead 
of EUAs, as the borrowing and banking facilities for that limit within the phase.7 
Unused CERs can be transferred from Phase II to Phase III. Not all the CERs can be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 As Phase I and Phase II EUAs are different assets, their prices can differ. Phase I was marked by an 
over-allocation of allowances. By the end of Phase I, the price of a Phase I EUA was almost zero. In 
contrast, since 2005 Phase II EUAs prices have moved between 34 Euros and 6.5 Euros. 
5 For a more detailed review, a complete description of the carbon market can be found in Mansanet-
Bataller and Pardo (2008). 
6 Trotignon (2010) reports that this limit varies between 0% and 20%, depending on countries and sectors, 
with the average being about 13.5% (1,420Mt for the period 2008-2012).  
7 Concerning Phase II, in Latvia and Lithuania, which represent 7% of the potential CER imports, both 
borrowing and banking are prohibited. Borrowing it is also prohibited in Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, 
and United Kingdom, representing 37% of the potential CER imports. In the rest of the countries (Austria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden), the banking and borrowing facilities 
are allowed. For a more detailed explanation, Trotignon (2010) presents an excellent review of all CER 
aspects. 
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used for compliance purposes. CERs generated by nuclear facilities, land use, land use 
changes, and forestry activities are not permitted.8  
EUAs and CERs are fully fungible; they serve to the same purpose but they do 
not have the same price. CER prices should be lower than EUA prices since the use of 
CERs is restricted. Companies could take advantage of this fact by selling EUAs and 
buying CERs simultaneously, up to the established limit. Trotignon (2010) shows, 
however, that companies do not exploit this situation. In fact, companies are not 
surrendering as many CERs as they could do. 
Annually, each company has to report and surrender the necessary permits to 
cover its verified emissions. Table I reports a timeline of the different yearly deadlines. 
A compliance year equals a calendar year. On February 28th, the companies receive 
their permits. One month later, by March 31st, each company has to submit to the 
European Commission the verified emissions report corresponding to the previous year. 
By April 30th, the permits must be surrendered. The European Commission has until 
May 15th, to make public those reports. Therefore, during two months (March and 
April), companies have allowances for two different years, so they can either use them 
to cover their emissions for the previous year, sell them in the market, or keep them in 
their own accounts. 
This is the first study that deals with the design of a PIN model for the European 
carbon market. Nevertheless, other authors have previously analyzed trading frictions 
and price efficiency in the EU-ETS. Using daily data, Miclaus, Lupu, Dumitrescu and 
Bobirca (2008) test the impact on prices of the Phase II National Allocation Plans 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 In Phase III, these restrictions will increase and, from 2013 onwards, all CERs generated from projects 
whose objective is the destruction of HFC-23 and N2O gases cannot be used for compliance objectives. In 
addition, the scheme allows the Member States to bank (but not borrow) CERs from Phase II to Phase III 
up to a limit of 2.5% of the EUAs allocated. 
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(NAPs) announcements and the verified emissions reports from April 2005 to 
December 2007, concluding that the EUA market prices are not efficient. Daskalakis 
and Markellos (2008) analyze the efficiency of Powernext, NASDAQ OMX 
Commodities Europe, and ECX platforms through econometric testing procedures and 
trading strategies, concluding that these markets do not fulfill the weak-form efficiency, 
and Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2009) analyze the impact of regulatory 
announcements from October 2004 to May 2007, concluding that prices are affected 
before and during the announcement.  
Using high frequency data, Benz and Hengelbrock (2008) study liquidity 
provision and contribution to the price discovery between ECX and NASDAQ OMX 
Commodities Europe using data from Phase I. Rotfuß (2009) with spot data form 
Bluenext and future contracts from ECX, studies the price formation and volatility in 
the EU-ETS. Rotfuß et al. (2009) propose a model to examine the behavior of prices 
before, during and after the announcements of the Phase II NAPs, and find evidence 
that the adjustment of EUA prices to new information is not immediate. Vinokur (2009) 
analyzes if there is a disposition effect in the Bluenext spot market. Bredin et al. (2011) 
investigate the market microstructure and trading behavior with ECX data from 2005 to 
2008. Chevallier and Sévi (2011) characterize the conditional and unconditional 
distributions of the realized volatility present in the ECX Futures Contract with delivery 
in 2008. Medina et al. (2011b) analyze the history of trading frictions and market 
quality in the ECX using data from April 2005 to December 2010 showing that the 
quality of the ECX market has not remarkably changed from Phase I to Phase II. 
Mizrach and Otsubo (2011) analyze the market microstructure of the ECX in terms of 
liquidity and price discovery during 2009 and suggest that the ECX is a highly liquid 
market, where the price discovery takes place on the ECX futures market. Conrad et al. 
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(2012) model the EUA price dynamic with a GARCH model, considering the impact of 
the European Commission decisions regarding Phase II NAPs, and concluding that the 
decisions of the European Commission on second National Allocation Plans have a 
strong and immediate impact on EUA prices. Rittler (2012) studies the relationship 
between Phase II EUA futures and spot prices proving the leadership of the futures 
market and it increasing importance.  
Finally, our PIN model explicitly models the relationship between EUAs and 
CERs. The existing literature has provided some mixed evidence on this relationship. 
Using daily data, Chevallier (2010) studies the inter-relationships between EUA and 
CER prices, while Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2011) analyze the spread between EUAs 
and CERs. Both studies conclude that EUA prices and CER prices significantly cause 
each, but the EUA futures market leads the price discovery. Medina et al. (2011a) use 
high-frequency data to end up with the same conclusion; they also conclude that the 
CER market may come to play a larger role in the EU-ETS. In contrast, Nazifi (2010) 
tests for long-term links and causal relations between EUA and CER prices with daily 
data, concluding that EUA and CER prices do not have a common long-run component. 
Similarly, Mizrach (2012) concludes that the null of no-common factors between EUA 
and CER prices cannot be rejected. Finally, Nazifi (2011) finds that a significant portion 
of the price spread between EUAs and CERs can be explained by the lack of 
competitiveness between markets, access constraints on the use and the availability of 
CERs, and the lower substitutability of CERs. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. The Traditional PIN Model 
In the spirit of the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) sequential trade model, Easley, 
Kiefer and O’Hara (1996) propose a microstructure model to estimate the probability of 
information-based trading (PIN). In their model, liquidity providers and traders interact 
to exchange stocks during I trading periods. At the beginning of each period, an 
informational event could occur with probability !. These events are assumed to be 
independent. Given an informational event has occurred, this could be positive with 
probability 1-", or negative with probability ". Informed traders anticipate that at the 
end of the day, the value of the stock will be! Vi  if news is bad or! Vi ! if news is good, 
where! Vi >Vi  and i is the trading period. In the model, we find two types of traders: 
liquidity traders who do not have private information about the true value of the asset 
and do not know if an informational event has occurred, and informed traders who 
know the true value of the asset. The uninformed market maker observes the order flow, 
but he is not able to distinguish between uninformed and informed traders. The market 
maker posts ex-post rational bid and ask quotes. After observing the arrival of orders, 
the liquidity provider updates its beliefs and, consequently, the prices move. During 
each period, orders arrive to the market according to independent Poisson processes. As 
there is no informative event, only uninformed traders trade, with buy and sell arrival 
rates #b and #s, respectively. When there is an informative event, informed traders also 
trade with arrival rate µ. If the signal is bad (good) news, informed traders sell (buy). 
Consequently, with bad (good) news, buy order flow arrives with daily intensity #s+µ 
(#b+µ). 
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The trading tree presented in Figure 1 shows the structure of the trading process. 
Normal volume activity is due to uninformed activity, from which !b and !s can be 
estimated. Anomalous trading activity comes from informed trading, from which µ can 
be estimated. Disequilibrium is quantified along the different periods, from which " and 
# can be estimated too. Via maximum likelihood, the model can be estimated and the 
unobservable parameters ! = ",#,µ,$b,$s( )  obtained. In particular, the likelihood function 
for one single day “i” is defined as  
f Bi,Si !( ) =!" exp !#b( )
!b
Bi
Bi!
exp ! !s +µ( )"# $%
!s +µ( )
Si
Si!
+! 1!"( )exp ! !b +µ( )"# $%
!b +µ( )
Bi
Bi!
exp !!s( )
!s
Si
Si!
+ 1!"( )exp !!b( )
!b
Bi
Bi!
exp !!s( )
!s
Si
Si!
 (1)
 
where Bi is the total number of buyer-initiated trades on day i and Si the total number of 
seller-initiated trades. Since days are assumed to be independent, the estimation of the 
parameters for a period of I days, can be obtained by maximizing the product of the 
daily likelihoods. The resultant likelihood function to maximize is defined as 
L D !( ) = f Bi,Si !( )
i=1
I
!
 
where D = Bi,Si( )i=1
I , !," ! 0,1[ ] and µ,!b,!s ! 0,"[ ) . 
EKOP derive the unconditional probability of informed-based trading, defined 
as PIN = !µ
!µ +"b +"s
 where "µ+!b+!s! ! represents the expected order flow, and "µ the 
expected informed order flow. This ratio converges to high values when there are big 
and infrequent jumps in the number of trades, while frequent jumps lead with low PIN 
values. 
3.2. The PIN of the European Carbon Market 
In this section, we adapt the traditional PIN methodology to the case of the 
European carbon market. Informed and uninformed traders have the possibility to trade 
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two related assets: EUAs and CERs. As previously discussed, their price cannot be 
equal, but they must share a common long-run component. Our model extends the basic 
PIN model by allowing traders to choose between EUAs and CERs. In Figure 2, we 
present the probability tree of the trading model for the European carbon market. The 
difference with the traditional PIN model is that, in this case, traders can operate with 
two different, but linked, assets. In this case, ! (1- !) is the fraction of informed traders  
trading CER (EUA) contracts, " (1-") is the fraction of uninformed traders buying CER 
(EUA) contracts and # (1-#) is the fraction of uninformed traders selling CER (EUA) 
contracts. 
In this context, the likelihood function of orders arrivals for one single day 
would be defined by 
 
f BiEUA,SiEUA,BiCER,SiCER !( ) =! !" !BE +! ! 1""( ) !GE + 1"!( ) !NE  (2) 
where ! = ",#,$,% ,&,µ,'b,!s( ) , BiEUA  represents the number of initiated buy orders trading 
EUAs, SiEUA  represents the number of initiated sell orders trading EUAs, BiCER  represents 
the number of initiated buy orders trading CERs, and finally SiCER  represents the number 
of initiated sell orders trading CERs. 
In (2),  
BE = exp ! 1!!( )"b"# $%
1!!( )"b"# $%
BiEUA
BiEUA!
exp ! 1!#( )"s + 1!$( )µ( )"# $%
1!#( )"s + 1!$( )µ"# $%
SiEUA
SiEUA!
exp !!"b( )
!"b( )
BiCER
BiCER!
&exp ! #"s +$µ( )"# $%
#"s +$µ( )
SiCER
SiCER!
 (3) 
stands for the likelihood of executed orders on a bad-event day; 
GE = exp ! 1!!( )"b + 1!#( )µ( )"# $%
1!!( )"b + 1!#( )µ"# $%
BiEUA
BiEUA!
exp ! 1!$( )"s"# $%
1!$( )"s"# $%
SiEUA
SiEUA!
&exp ! !"b +#µ( )"# $%
!"b +#µ( )
BiCER
BiCER!
exp !$"s( )
$"s( )
SiCER
SiCER!
 (4) 
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is the likelihood of executed orders on a good-event day and, finally,  
NE = exp ! 1!!( )"b"# $%
1!!( )"b"# $%
BiEUA
BiEUA!
exp ! 1!#( )"s"# $%
1!#( )"s"# $%
SiEUA
SiEUA!
exp !!"b( )
!"b( )
BiCER
BiCER!
exp !#"s( )
#"s( )
SiCER
SiCER!
(5) 
is the likelihood of executed orders on a day with no event. 
The estimation of the parameters can be obtained by maximizing the product of 
the daily likelihoods, L D !( ) = f BiEUA,SiEUA,BiCER,SiCER !( )
i=1
I
!  where D = BiEUA,SiEUA,BiCER,SiCER( )i=1
I , 
!,",#,$ ,% ! 0,1[ ] and µ,!b,!s ! 0,"[ ) . 
In order to reduce convergence problems in the estimations, because of 
numerical overflow, when the number of buys and sells is very large we use the 
approach described in Appendix A.9 
As a result, the derived PINs, which are the percentage of informed trading over 
the total orders, are defined as: 
PINEUA =
! 1!!( )µ
! 1!!( )µ + 1!!( )!b + 1!!( )!s
 (6) 
PINCER =
!"µ
!"µ +#$b +%$s
 (7) 
The characteristics of our trading tree, allow us to define an individual PIN 
measure for EUAs in (6) and CERs in (7). In both cases the numerator represents the 
informed trading activity and the denominator the total trading activity, of the 
corresponding asset. 
3.3. The opening bid-ask spread 
Easley, O’Hara and Saar (2001) and Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) 
propose an approach to estimate the theoretical opening bid-ask spread through the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 For more details see Duarte and Young (2009). 
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estimated parameters of the PIN model in section 3.1. Denote!Vi  as the value at the end 
of day when bad news is revealed, Vi  as the value at the end with good news and Vi*  as 
the expected value of a day without information, Vi* = !Vi + 1!!( )Vi . Considering that the 
market maker beliefs at time t are given by the probabilities of no event Pn(t), good 
event Pg(t) and bad event Pb(t), conditioned by the history prior to t the expected value 
of the asset on day i is E Vi t!" #$= Pn t( )Vi* +Pb t( )Vi +Pg t( )Vi . 
At time t, the zero profit bid price should be 
b t( ) = E Vi t!" #$%
µPb t( )
!s +µPb t( )
E Vi t!" #$%Vi( ) = E Vi t!" #$% µ!"#s +µ!"
E Vi t!" #$%Vi( )   (8) 
which is the expected value conditioned on the history arrival of selling orders. In a 
similar way, the ask price of the asset is 
a t( ) = E Vi t!" #$+
µPg t( )
!b +µPg t( )
Vi %E Vi t!" #$( ) = E Vi t!" #$+
µ! 1%!( )
!b +µ" 1%!( )
Vi %E Vi t!" #$( )   (9) 
The theoretical relative spread will be defined as  
STH = ! 0( )V * = µ !" 1""( )
1
!b +µ" 1"#( )
+
1
!s +µ"#
#
$
%
%
&
'
(
(
$V
 
(10) 
where !V !is the standard deviation of the percentage changes in the price of the asset.10 
Easley, O’Hara and Saar (2001) pointed out that this standard deviation could be seen as 
the market makers’ possible losses for trading with informed traders, while the rest of 
the parameters symbolize the probability of trading with an informed trading. 
Similarly, we can obtain the theoretical opening spreads for the carbon market 
model. As we consider two assets in the model, we will obtain two theoretical opening 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Following Easley, O’Hara and Saar (2001), we calculate the standard deviation of the daily percentage 
changes in the value of the stock, as the standard deviation of the percentage difference between the daily 
closing price and the daily opening price.  
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spreads. All in all, the bid and ask prices for both EUAs and CERs would be the 
following:  
b t( )EUA = E Vi
EUA t!" #$%
µ 1%!( )Pb t( )
1%!( )!s +µ 1%!( )Pb t( )
E ViEUA t!" #$%Vi
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Expressions (11) and (12) show the bid and ask prices for the EUA contracts 
posted by the market maker, taking into account all the available history of the orders 
arrivals. Expressions (13) and (14) present the corresponding bid and ask quotes for the 
CER contract.  
In this sense, the spread for the EUA contract is determined by 
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while the theoretical opening spread would be defined as 
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The spread for the CER contract would be defined by 
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and the theoretical opening spread would be calculated as 
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Both expressions (16) and (18) would be employed in our work to analyze how 
the opening spreads have developed over time. 
 
4. The data 
We use high frequency and daily data obtained from the ICE ECX Platform, 
covering the period from March 14th, 2008, the day CERs began to quote in ECX, to 
December 31st, 2011.  
Our dataset contains all trades registered in the ECX for EUA and CER futures 
contracts. For each trade, the database reports the time stamp (to the nearest second), the 
price (in Euros), the volume (in lots), the sign (buyer- or seller-initiated) and the trade 
type.11 In our analysis, we will focus only on screen (ordinary) trades. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Screen-trade orders (or regular orders) are the most common trades in the ECX. During the period 
2008-2010 represented around 83% of the total number of trades registered in the ECX. The rest of the 
orders (Screen Cross trades (same clearing member), On-screen corrections, Block trades, Exchange for 
Physical (EFP)/Exchange for Swap (EFS) trades, Bilateral off-exchanges and Settlement trades) have a 
residual importance. 
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Table II presents several sample descriptive statistics for all December futures 
contracts with maturities between 2008 and 2014, for both EUAs and CERs. Panel A 
(B) presents the statistics for the EUA (CER) futures contracts. In general, the number 
of trades for EUA contracts exceeds by far the number of trades for CER contracts; 
however, CER volume per trade is twice the EUA volume for both December 2008 and 
2009 contracts, similar for both December 2010 and 2011 contracts, and the half for 
both December 2013 and 2014 contracts. Paying attention to the maximum number of 
trades in a day, the measure shows an increase over time, for both EUAs and CERs.12 
Table II also shows that the EUA (CER) December 2011 (2012) contract is the most 
traded one, followed by the EUA (CER) December 2010 (2011) contract. Nevertheless, 
these results are distorted by the fact that these contracts consider more trading days 
than the rest. Finally, it is remarkable that although the database finishes in 2011, CER 
December 2012 contract is the most traded one (and not December 2011 contract), 
highlighting the importance the end of Phase II has on CERs contracts. 
Figure 3 plots the average number of trades for all December futures contracts. 
Panel A in Figure 3 plots the evolution for the EUA contracts. In general, the monthly 
number of trades has been increasing since 2008. In addition, the trading activity 
increases during the months of April and May and then decreases as it approaches the 
end of the year. Nevertheless, this pattern changed during 2011, where we distinguish 
an increase of the volume during June, July August and November, coinciding with the 
announcements of several news related to Phase III. Panel B plots a different sequence 
for the CER contracts. The number of trades per month has also increased since 2008, 
and shows no seasonality during April and May. Figure 3 suggests that EUA trading 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 We pay attention to the maximum number of trades in a day instead of the average or the median, 
because in further maturities these statistics are affected by days in which the contracts are not the front 
contract one and their volumes are very low. If we focus on the trading activity for the period where each 
contract acts as the front contract we corroborate, for both EUAs and CERs contracts, the increase of the 
trading activity over time. 
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activity concentrates in April and May, while CER volume increases as the contract 
approaches maturity. 
Our methodology requires the use of continuous time series. Since futures 
contracts have a finite life, we generate single time series by rolling over contracts using 
the “last day criterion”.13 This criterion switches from one contract to another on the 
expiry date of the first one. For our analysis, we consider 3 rollover series for each asset 
(EUAs and CERs): considering the front contract, the second nearest delivery contract, 
and the third nearest delivery contract. Table III displays the different rollover dates. 
 
5. Empirical findings 
5.1. Seasonality patterns of the PIN in the European carbon market 
In this sub-section we estimate a unique PIN per month, in order to identify a 
possible pattern on the informed trading activity along the year. We estimate a weighted 
PIN per calendar month, using the front contract rollover series. Thus, April’s PIN 
estimation is obtained using data from April 2008 (EUA and CER December 2008 
contracts), April 2009 (EUA and CER December 2009 contract), April 2010 (EUA and 
CER December 2010 contracts) and April 2011 (EUA and CER December 2011 
contracts). We fix ! and ", along the different years, leaving the “order intensity” 
parameters (µ, #b, #s) and the “ratio” parameters ($, %, &) free for the different years. 
Figure 4 plots the estimated ! and the PINs for both EUAs and CERs, for each 
month. The PIN measures have been calculated as an aggregate of the different 
informed trading behaviors observed in each month, for the different years. The 
following expressions illustrate the method: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Carchano, Medina and Pardo (2012) conclude that there are no statistical differences in using the “last 
day criterion” or other different criteria, in both EUAs and CERs series, using December contracts. 
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with M being the number of years considered for each month. Expression (19) 
corresponds to EUA’s PIN and expression (20) corresponds to CER’s PIN.14 
Firstly, as expected, the PIN for EUAs exhibits higher values before the 
emissions reports are made public. Before March 31st, polluting companies can take 
advantage of the private information they manage about their actual emissions. Between 
March 31st and May 15th, several reports could be made public and by May 15th all the 
information is available. The highest PIN values correspond to December and March. 
December is the end of the compliance year and coincides with the maturity of the 
relevant futures contract. March corresponds to the last month before the verified 
emissions reports are submitted. PIN steadily increases from January to March. Then, 
decreases until October when it starts to increase again until December. Finally, it is 
interesting to highlight that although most of the EUA volume is traded during April 
and May (see Figure 3a), informed trading concentrates on the preceding months. 
According to Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) seminal work, both liquidity-motivated and 
informed traders prefer to trade when the market is “thick” (trading has little effect on 
prices). Liquidity traders have incentives to trade all together to avoid big movements 
on prices and diminish the probability of trading with informed traders, while informed 
traders can hide their activity better. Actual emissions information in the EU-ETS starts 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Because of the available sample, both January and February estimations consider only data from years 
2009, 2010 and 2011, while the rest of the months include data from 2008 to 2011 in the estimation. 
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being public during April and May. Therefore, our findings suggest that liquidity traders 
enter the market when the probability of trading with informed traders has decreased. 
However, because informed traders also operate when uninformed traders do so, the 
PIN remains high during April and May. From December to March liquidity traders do 
not have incentives to trade, as informed traders are acting on the market. This behavior 
leaves lower trading volumes, but higher PIN levels.  
The CER PIN shows a different pattern. It is more volatile and increases as we 
approach the end of the year. This behavior could be explained by companies delaying 
the trading of CERs, until they know exactly their needs for the year (see Figure 3b). 
CER users are not usually CER producers, but they do own EUAs. So, if they want to 
use CERs they have two options: either they trade the corresponding December contract 
before the delivery day or they have to buy CERs in the spot market. As the spot market 
is not very liquid, informed traders, in order to hide their position, would prefer to trade 
in the futures market, rather than in the spot market, thereby increasing the futures 
contracts trading activity and their PIN levels (see Figure 4). In addition, CERs show 
lower PIN levels in January, February and March, than at the end of the year, although 
most of the private information concentrates in the first quarter of each year. During 
these months informed traders probably prefer to focus on EUA contracts, as these are 
more liquid than CER contracts. These results are consistent with Chowdhry and Nanda 
(1991). 
Finally, ! achieves its maximum value in April. This fact should not come as a 
surprise. Between March 31st and May 15th, the emissions reports have been submitted 
to the European Commission, but have not yet been officially published. If any report is 
leaked before May 15th, an informational event takes place. Although the pattern is 
Chapter IV: Modeling the probability of informed trading in the European carbon market 
!
171 
stable, we can distinguish a negative trend from April to September and a positive trend 
from September to April.  
5.2. Time evolution of PIN in the European carbon market 
The PIN patterns observed in Figure 4 suggest that a good division for our time 
evolution analysis could be to split each year into natural quarters: January-March, 
April-June and July-September and October-December.15 
In this sub-section, we estimate the PIN for each calendar quarter in the period 
April 1st, 2008 to December 31st, 2011, by including in a joint-estimation, data for the 
three nearest December rollover series for each asset. In the joint-estimation, we fix 
again ! and " along the different rollover series, as these parameters should be common 
to all futures contracts in the market.16 The results are presented in Figure 5. 
Figure 5a plots the evolution of ! and ". In general, ! and " exhibit two different 
trends. The first one shows a slightly negative trend, suggesting that informational 
events are less likely over time, although the variable seems to be pretty stable. This fact 
could be interpreted as the market is maturing and that informational events appear less 
often. The case of " is different; the variable presents a positive trend, but with higher 
volatility. The high values during 2010 and 2011 could reflect the negative market 
perception (market is long on EUAs) and the scandals (robbery of permits from 
members’ accounts, VAT frauds, phishing attacks and cyber-attacks against the 
emission allowance registries of EU Member States), which occurred over those years. 
Figure 5b presents the aggregated PINs. As we did in the seasonality analysis, 
we have calculated a PIN for the EUA contracts and another for the CER contracts. In 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 This division coincides with the one chosen in Medina et al. (2011b), making it easier to compare our 
results with their findings. 
16 In the estimation we eliminated four outliers from the front contract rollover series. The deleted outliers 
correspond to the following days: 3/15/11, 6/21/11, 6/23/11 and 12/20/11. 
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each estimation, we have taken into account the three nearest maturity rollover series. 
Simplifying, our PINs are defined as: 
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(22) 
Expressions (21) and (22) present the formulas for both the aggregated EUA 
PIN and the aggregated CER PIN. “n” symbolizes the rollover series: “1” being the 
front contracts rollover series; “2” the second nearest maturity rollover series, and “3” 
the third nearest maturity rollover series.  
Figure 5b plots a volatile pattern for the EUA PIN, with a stable trend, 
suggesting that informed trading on EUA contracts has maintained stable over time. The 
case of CERs is different as its trend is clearly positive, but with values below those 
exhibited by the EUAs. The average PINs for EUAs and CERs are 0.159522 and 
0.113869, respectively. We reject the equality of means (t-test) and medians (Kruskal-
Wallis test) at the 5% level. Nevertheless, in the last 3 quarters of 2011 this gap 
converged to almost zero, which could suggest that informed trading is starting to focus 
its activity, not only on EUA, but also on CERs. Another possible explanation could be 
that a lot of news concerning CERs, specifically concerning Phase III CERs, appeared 
during 2010 and 2011, thereby increasing the amount of news in the CER market, and 
consequently, the informed trading activity of this asset. 
Similarly, Figure 5c plots in this case the PINs per rollover series. In the Figure, 
“Dec T” refers to the front December rollover series, “Dec T+1” refers to the second 
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nearest maturity December rollover series, and “Dec T+2” refers to the third nearest 
maturity December rollover series. In general, the nearest maturity series seem to 
exhibit lower PINs than the rest, moreover, the longer the maturity is, the higher the 
PIN levels are, although this effect is more appreciable in the EUA series. EUAs show 
higher PINs than CERs.17 Additionally, PINs in longer maturities have been decreasing 
over time. A possible explanation could be that the volume in these contracts has 
increased over time (see Figure 3) and informed trading could have been losing 
importance in favor of uninformed orders. Focusing on the PIN volatility, on the one 
hand, EUA rollover series seem to show less volatility levels than CERs, but equality 
tests of variances (Brown-Forsythe test) reject this possibility. On the other hand, the 
volatility is higher in longer maturities.18 Finally, the EUA PIN for the nearest maturity 
rollover presents a very stable trend, while the other two EUA series show a negative 
slope. CER behavior is different and, although the volatility is higher, in all three 
contracts we observe a positive trend. These last results are in accordance with what we 
observed in Figure 5b. 
In Figure 5d, !, " and # parameters are presented. In general, !, for all three 
rollover series, exhibits lower values than " and #, indicating that informed traders 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 The average PINs for the EUA (CER) rollover series are 0.136568 (0.084875), 0.248974 (0.101213) 
and 0.319906 (0.210743), for the nearest maturity, the second nearest and the third nearest maturity 
series, respectively. Equality tests of means (t-test) and medians (Kruskal-Wallis test) reject the 
similarities between the rollover series, at the 5% level, with three exceptions; we cannot reject the 
equality of both means and medians, when we compare the CER front contract rollover series and the 
CER second nearest rollover series, and the equality of medians when we compare the EUA second and 
third nearest maturity series.  
18 The PIN standard deviations for the EUA (CER) rollover series are 0.022920 (0.037318), 0.069031 
(0.075187) and 0.103985 (0.167398), for the nearest maturity, the second nearest and the third nearest 
maturity series, respectively. Equality tests of variances (Brown-Forsythe test) reject the similarities 
between series, at the 5% level, with two exceptions; we cannot reject the equality of variances between 
the second and the third nearest rollover series, for both EUAs and CERs. 
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prefer trading EUAs to CERs.19 If informed trading concentrates on EUAs, it is not 
surprising that EUAs lead price discovery. 
In addition, we report an unusual behavior in the first quarter of 2009. Medina et 
al. (2011b) observe a decrease in liquidity during that quarter they attribute to the 
consequences of the financial crisis. During that period, and in order to obtain cash, 
many companies sold EUAs (spot) and bought EUA futures contracts, concentrating 
trading activity onto EUAs.20 This unusual activity generated an increase in EUA 
volume, negatively affecting market liquidity and widening the differences in prices 
between contracts.  
Figure 5e plots µ, !b and !s behavior. As we expected, the front contract series 
variables show the increases in volume reported during the second quarter (April and 
May) of each year (see Figure 3), while in the other two rollover series, the picture 
changes and the positive trend suggests a systematic increase in volume for further 
December contracts. This increase could affect the weight of informed trading in the 
total activity, diminishing its influence. This fact corroborates the negative trend found 
in the PINs of these rollover series. In addition, equality tests in means and medians do 
not reject the equality of µ, towards !b and !s in our three rollover series.21 In order to 
compare the relative influence of µ, we plot the percentage of informed trading, defined 
as µ
µ +!b +!s
. Figure 5f plots this quotient for our three rollover series. The results 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 The average values for " are 0.037680, 0.078405 and 0.137026, for the nearest, the second nearest and 
the third nearest maturity cases, respectively, while the average values for # ($) are 0.061113 (0.061092), 
0.174525 (0.161340) and 0.209509 (0.214686), for the nearest, the second nearest and the third nearest 
maturity cases, respectively. Equality tests of means (t-test) and medians (Kruskal-Wallis test) reject the 
similarities between " and #, and " and $, at the 5% level, with two exceptions; when we compare " 
towards both # and $, for the third nearest rollover series. 
20 During the 4th quarter of 2008, the median of the daily ratio between the EUAs volume and the total 
volume, for the nearest maturity rollover series, was 92.1184%, while during the 1st quarter of 2009 the 
ratio was 96.5705%. We reject the equality of medians (Kruskal-Wallis test) and means (t-test) at the 5% 
level, proving an increase in the EUAs trading activity over the total trading activity, during the first 
quarter of 2009. 
21 We reject the equality of means (t-test) and medians (Kruskal-Wallis test), at the 5% level, in all cases. 
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exhibit lower ratios of informed trading on nearest maturity contracts,22 although the 
differences have narrowed over time.23 
We conclude this section by contrasting three hypotheses regarding the model 
employed. Firstly, we will test whether !=". Failing to reject this hypothesis would 
imply that both uninformed buy and sell orders trade CERs and EUAs in the same 
proportion. Our second hypothesis claims that #, ! and " are equal throughout the three 
rollover series, meaning that informed do not have preferences between contracts. The 
third hypothesis combines the previous two. 
In order to test the hypotheses, we have carried out a chi-test, by comparing the 
likelihoods of the respective restricted and unrestricted models. The results clearly show 
a rejection of all three hypotheses, in all the analyzed quarters, at the 5% level. These 
results suggest that both informed and uninformed traders behave differently depending 
on the maturity of the contract, and in addition, uninformed orders are also conditioned 
to their sign, consistent with Lei and Wu (2005).24 
5.3. The theoretical opening spread 
Figure 6 plots the theoretical opening spread for both EUAs and CERs, and for 
all three rollover series. Figure 6a plots the evolution for the three EUA rollover series. 
All three series present positive trends between the second quarter of 2008 and the first 
quarter of 2009. This increase could be explained by the financial crisis, where many 
companies sold spot and acquired futures contracts, dramatically affecting market 
liquidity (see Medina et al. (2011b)). From the peak of 2009 until the fourth quarter of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 The means for the percentage of informed trading are 0.289831, 0.436567 and 0.519641, for the 
nearest, the second nearest and the third nearest maturity series, respectively. In all cases, we reject the 
equality of means (t-test) and medians (Kruskal-Wallis test), between series, at the 5% level. 
23 In order to obtain robustness, we repeated the analysis with the spot contracts, obtaining similar results, 
with higher PINs and lower levels of µ, $b and $s. These results are available upon request. 
24 These results are not included for the sake of brevity, but are available from authors upon request. 
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2010, we report a decrease in the spread, but the fourth quarter of 2010 is also an 
inflexion point, where the spreads started to increase again because of the doubts of the 
market and the fall in prices.  
The front rollover series shows the lowest spreads, followed by the second 
nearest maturity series and the third one, respectively. The average spreads for the 
EUAs rollover series are 0.9980%, 1.6672% and 2.0051% for the nearest maturity, the 
second nearest and the third nearest maturity series, respectively.25 There is a certain 
convergence between the spreads, especially towards the fourth quarter of 2010, but 
from that moment on, the differences increase again. Finally, the volatility of the spread 
seems to be lower in the front contract series than in the other two series, maybe 
because of the noise of the series. The standard deviation of the opening spreads for the 
EUAs rollover series are 0.3971%, 0.7166% and 0.9774% for the nearest maturity, the 
second nearest and the third nearest maturity series, respectively.26 
CER spreads exhibit a different pattern (see Figure 6b), keeping quite stable over 
time and only exhibiting a peak in the first quarter of 2009 for the third nearest maturity 
series. Nevertheless, like EUAs, the spread increases in 2011 for all three series, 
perhaps because of the financial crisis, the subsequent fall in prices and the PIN 
increase. Comparing among the series, the average spreads for the CERs rollover series 
are 0.5193%, 0.6267% and 1.0514% for the nearest maturity, the second nearest and the 
third nearest maturity series, respectively.27 Focusing on 2011, the nearest maturity 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 We reject the equality of means (t-test) and medians (Kruskal-Wallis test) between the nearest maturity 
rollover series and both the second and the third nearest maturity series, at the 5% level, but we cannot 
reject the equality of means and medians between the second and the third nearest maturity series, at the 
5% level. 
26 We reject the equality of variances (Brown-Forsythe test) between the nearest maturity rollover series 
and both the second and the third nearest maturity series, at the 5% level, but we cannot reject the equality 
of variances between the second and the third nearest maturity series, at the 5% level. 
27 We cannot reject the equality of means (t-test) and medians (Kruskal-Wallis test), between the different 
rollover series, at the 5% level. 
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series shows lower spreads than the further maturity series. The front maturity series 
seems to show also less volatility in the spread than the other two series. The standard 
deviation of the theoretical opening spreads for the CERs rollover series are 
0.260367%, 0.561156% and 0.994281% for the nearest maturity, the second nearest and 
the third nearest maturity series, respectively.28 
If we now compare between EUAs and CERs, in general, CER spreads show 
lower values than EUA spreads.29 This result could be surprising because CERs are less 
traded than EUAs, but they are reflecting the higher PIN levels of EUAs compared to 
CERs. In general, EUAs and CERs spreads show different behaviors before 2011, the 
moment when both series start a positive trend, and their spreads and PINs start to 
converge, especially for the front contract rollover series. We cannot reject significant 
differences between the variances (Brown-Forsythe test) of both EUAs and CERs 
rollover series, at the 5% level.30 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper we have studied the Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) of the 
two principal assets (both EUAs and CERs) included in the EU-ETS. We extend the 
traditional PIN model in order to adapt it to the particularities of the European 
Emissions Market. The adapted structural model allows us to extract information from 
unobservable microstructure parameters by analyzing the trading activity of both assets. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 We reject the equality of variances (Brown-Forsythe test) between the nearest maturity rollover series 
and the second nearest maturity series, at the 5% level, but we cannot reject the equality of variances in 
the other two cases.  
29 We reject the equality of means (t-test) and medians (Kruskal-Wallis test), at the 5% level, in all cases.  
30 In order to obtain robustness, we repeated the entire analysis with the spot contracts, obtaining higher 
spreads for both EUAs and CERs. These results are available upon request. 
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Specifically, we presented the informed trading behavior, identified seasonality patterns 
and analyzed the derived theoretical opening spreads. 
Our database is composed of all the available “screen” trades, for all EUA and 
CER December futures contracts, registered on the ICE ECX market (London) from 
March 2008 to December 2011. This platform represents the main reference of the 
futures market for both assets.  
We observe a seasonality pattern in the estimated PIN. Higher PIN levels for 
EUAs are observed during December, January, February and March, exhibiting a 
positive trend during these four months, and suggesting an increase in informed trading 
activity before the publication of the verified emissions reports. On the other hand, 
CERs exhibit higher PIN levels as we approach the end of the year, consistent with the 
idea that traders acquire CERs when they have the certainty of how many they will 
need. We identify the maximum probability of occurrence of an informational event (!) 
in April, again consistent with the verified emissions calendar, as all the verified 
emissions reports will be made public between April 1st and May 15th. 
The PIN history analysis presents a negative trend of !, in accordance with a 
decrease in the probability of occurrence of informational events over time. Although 
the slope is not very steep, this fact reveals an increase in the maturity of the carbon 
market. In a parallel way, the probability that the informational event is negative (") 
shows a positive trend over time, with the slope being steeper during the last quarter of 
2010 and 2011, in accordance with both EUA and CER price decreases. We observe 
that the EUA PIN stays stable on average during the sample period, while the CER PIN 
rises in accordance with the trading activity, which ratifies its increasing importance. 
We corroborate the leadership of the nearest December contract, although we observe 
an increasing importance of those contracts with further maturities. Nevertheless, 
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further maturity contracts still exhibit higher PIN values than the December front 
contract, for both EUAs and CERs. 
The theoretical opening spread in the case of the EUA (CER) shows a 
decreasing (stable) trend until the fourth quarter of 2010, when the spread starts 
increasing, probably because of the financial crisis, and the subsequent fall of EUA 
(CER) prices. We also report a remarkable peak on the EUAs opening spread in the first 
quarter of 2009. A peak is also detected in the furthest CER December rollover series. 
In general, the theoretical opening spread presents lower values for the nearest maturity 
contracts and on CER contracts, because of their lower PIN levels. 
The analysis of the whole picture illustrates the increasing importance of CERs 
in the European carbon market, reason why they should be considered by traders, 
researchers and regulators in their portfolio analyses, research projects and regulator 
decisions, respectively. The inefficiencies detected around the verified emissions 
calendar, where the emitter companies can take advantage of their private information, 
highlights the need for regulators to take actions to avoid this practice, provide 
transparency and guarantee the protection of all the external traders, which will help to 
increase market liquidity.  
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Table I. Compliance timeline 
This table contains the essential deadlines of the compliance timeline, which each company should attend 
to every year. “Date” refers to the specific day or month of the requirement. “Compliance Requirements” 
refers to the event that must be attended to. 
 
Date Compliance Requirements 
January 1st Compliance year begins. 
February 28th EUAs for the present year must be issued by this deadline. 
March 31th Deadline for submitting the verified emissions report for the previous year and entering the emissions into the Registry. 
April 30th The involved companies must surrender the EUAs for the previous compliance year. 
May 15th The European Commission publishes the verified emissions by this date. 
June 30th Those companies which fulfill certain conditions are obligated to submit their improvement reports to their regulator. 
Between June 
and August Companies should commence their verification process for the present year. 
By December Companies should start preparing the annual emissions report for the present year. 
December 31st Compliance year ends. 
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Table II. Sample data: General statistics 
This table contains sample descriptive statistics per contract. We display exclusively statistics for screen trades. Panel A (B) provides the time stamp for the first and the last 
trades, several trading activity and trade-size statistics, the number of trading days, and the aggregated number of trades and volume for each EUA (CER) futures contract 
used in the study. During the work we employed data from 7 different December contracts, specifically those with maturities between December 2008 and December 2014. 
“Buy” (“Sell”) refers exclusively to initiated buy (sell) trades. One lot equals 1,000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent gas.   
 
Panel A: EUA Futures Contracts Delivery!
  December 2008 December 2009 December 2010 December 2011 December 2012 December 2013 December 2014 
First trade: Day 03/14/08 03/14/08 03/14/08 03/14/08 03/14/08 01/21/11 02/02/11 
First trade: Time 7:01:17 AM 7:21:31 AM 9:20:20 AM 8:04:59 AM 9:35:17 AM 9:36:00 AM 12:51:00 PM 
Last trade: Day 12/15/08 12/14/09 12/20/10 12/19/11 12/30/11 12/30/11 12/30/11 
Last trade: Time 4:41:34 PM 4:59:11 PM 4:59:00 PM 4:57:42 PM 4:59:42 PM 4:26:04 PM 1:19:33 PM 
Maximum trade size (Buy) 200  280  500  518  976  900  250  
Average trade size (Buy) 4.53  4.65  7.58  8.09  9.68  9.44  7.51  
Median trade size (Buy) 2.0  1.0  3.0  2.0  3.0  2.0  1.0  
Minimum trade size (Buy) 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  
Maximum trade size (Sell) 200  250  976  679  750  995  500  
Average trade size (Sell) 4.45  5.05  7.54  8.41  9.00  8.05  8.86  
Median trade size (Sell) 2.0  1.0  2.0  3.0  3.0  2.0  1.0  
Minimum trade size (Sell) 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  
Maximum number of trades in a day (Buy) 838  1,327  1,869  1,847  1,495  515  123  
Average number of trades per day (Buy) 307.04  287.03  207.78  182.48  72.00  60.05  13.67  
Median number of trades per day (Buy) 298.0  227.5  60.0  40.5  37.0  44.0  6.0  
Minimum number of trades in a day (Buy) 45  0  0  0  0  1  0  
Maximum number of trades in a day (Sell) 895  1,061  1,936  1,697  1,305  552  138  
Average number of trades per day (Sell) 288.80  287.98  201.95  175.31  80.00  92.09  20.18  
Median number of trades per day (Sell) 271.0  255.5  57.0  37.0  37.0  75.0  11.0  
Minimum number of trades in a day (Sell) 34  0  0  0  0  2  0  
Number of trading days 194  448  706  958  965  239  239  
Number of trades (Buy) 59,566  128,591  146,694  174,814  69,480  14,351  3,268  
Number of trades (Sell) 56,027  129,017  142,578  167,945  77,202  22,010  4,823  
Volume in lots (Buy) 269,572  598,544  1,112,282  1,414,710  672,774  135,473  24,537  
Volume in lots (Sell) 249,584  651,171  1,075,577  1,412,449  694,724  177,228  42,724  
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Table II. Sample data: General statistics 
 
Panel B: CER Futures Contracts Delivery!
  December 2008 December 2009 December 2010 December 2011 December 2012 December 2013 December 2014 
First trade: Day 03/14/08 03/17/08 03/18/08 03/17/08 03/17/08 01/24/11 03/04/11 
First trade: Time 7:00:00 AM 9:02:39 AM 1:15:58 PM 9:14:15 AM 2:25:40 PM 10:52:20 AM 4:43:35 PM 
Last trade: Day 12/15/08 12/14/09 12/20/10 12/19/11 12/30/11 12/30/11 12/20/11 
Last trade: Time 4:59:54 PM 4:56:54 PM 4:59:17 PM 4:59:28 PM 2:17:15 PM 2:17:15 PM 11:32:45 AM 
Maximum trade size (Buy) 100  100  250  250  500  200  50  
Average trade size (Buy) 8.18  9.19  10.29  8.08  8.51  5.59  4.97  
Median trade size (Buy) 5.0  6.0  8.0  4.0  4.0  1.0  1.0  
Minimum trade size (Buy) 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  
Maximum trade size (Sell) 95  200  250  500  300  250  29  
Average trade size (Sell) 8.39  8.89  9.63  8.38  8.83  5.00  7.13  
Median trade size (Sell) 9.0  7.0  5.0  5.0  4.0  1.0  1.0  
Minimum trade size (Sell) 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  
Maximum number of trades in a day (Buy) 120  79  174  275  387  181  40  
Average number of trades per day (Buy) 17.31  12.31  13.68  18.85  17.98  11.47  0.94  
Median number of trades per day (Buy) 11.0  8.0  6.5  6.0  6.0  2.0  0.0  
Minimum number of trades in a day (Buy) 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
Maximum number of trades in a day (Sell) 63  123  155  278  469  107  38  
Average number of trades per day (Sell) 13.76  13.02  13.66  18.81  19.81  10.46  0.87  
Median number of trades per day (Sell) 10.5  9.0  5.5  6.0  7.0  2.0  0.0  
Minimum number of trades in a day (Sell) 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
Number of trading days 194  448  706  958  965  239  239  
Number of trades (Buy) 3,359  5,516  9,658  18,062  17,355  2,742  225  
Number of trades (Sell) 2,669  5,834  9,642  18,021  19,118  2,499  207  
Volume in lots (Buy) 27,478  50,697  99,413  145,877  147,609  15,316  1,118  
Volume in lots (Sell) 22,406  51,864  92,866  150,998  168,826  12,490  1,476  
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Table III. Rollovers 
This table contains the rollover dates and the contracts included in all three rollover series considered in 
the study for each asset (EUAs and CERs). Through the last day criterion, we generate three rollover 
series for each asset, one with the nearest maturity contracts, another with the second nearest maturity 
contracts, and finally, a third one with the third nearest maturity contracts. According to the elected 
method, we switch from one contract to the following on the last trading day. “Date” contains the starting 
(“Start”) and ending (“End”) dates for the subsamples included in each rollover series. “Dec T” refers to 
the rollover series composed with the nearest maturity contracts. “Dec T+1” refers to the rollover series 
composed with the second nearest maturity contracts. “Dec T+2” refers to the rollover series composed 
with the third nearest maturity contracts. In the table “Dec” refers to the December futures series, and the 
following number to the year of the delivery, which goes from 2008 (“08”) to 2014 (“14”). 
 
Date December Futures Contracts 
Start End Dec T Dec T+1 Dec T+2 
3/14/08 12/15/08 Dec08 Dec09 Dec10 
12/16/08 12/14/09 Dec09 Dec10 Dec11 
12/15/09 12/20/10 Dec10 Dec11 Dec12 
12/21/10 12/19/11 Dec11 Dec12 Dec13 
12/20/11 12/31/11 Dec12 Dec13 Dec14 
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Figure 1. Probability tree of the trading model (Traditional Model) 
This figure presents the probabilities associated with the events and outcomes of the trading model 
proposed in Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1996, 1997), Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996) and 
Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002). At the left of the dotted line we find the events that take place once 
a day before the beginning of trading. Informational events occur with probability !, and if they occur, the 
information is bad (good) with probability " (1-"). At the right of the dotted line are the events that take 
place during the trading day. #B (#S) represents the rate at which uninformed buy (sell) orders are executed 
and µ is the arrival rate of informed traders. 
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" 
1-" 
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Figure 2. Probability tree of the trading model (Carbon Market Model) 
This figure presents the probabilities associated with the events and outcomes of the trading model 
proposed for the carbon market. At the left of the dotted line we find the events that take place once a day 
before the beginning of trading. Informational events occur with probability !, and if they occur, the 
information is bad (good) with probability " (1-"). At the right of the dotted line are the events that take 
place during the trading day. #B (#S) represents the rate at which uninformed buy (sell) orders are 
executed, µ is the arrival rate of informed traders, $ (1- $) is the fraction of informed traders which trade 
CER (EUA) contracts, % (1-%) is the fraction of uninformed traders which buy CER (EUA) contracts and & 
(1-&) is the fraction of uninformed traders which sell CER (EUA) contracts. 
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Figure 3. Average number of trades per futures contract 
In figure 3a (3b) we plot the monthly average number of trades per day, for each Phase II EUA (CER) 
Futures Contract with delivery in December, employed in our empirical analysis. Specifically, we plot all 
December (“Dec”) futures contracts between 2008 (“08”) and 2014 (“14”) for the period from March 
2008 to December 2011. 
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(a) EUA futures contracts 
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(b) CER futures contracts 
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Figure 4. Seasonality 
This figure presents the estimated carbon market PINs and the ! parameter, per month. In order to 
compute the estimation, we took into account all the available front contracts for each specific year. In the 
joint-estimation, we fixed ! and ", leaving free the rest of the variables (#, $, %, µ, &B and &S) along the 
different series. “PIN EUAs” refers to the total PIN for the EUA contracts. “PIN CERs” refers to the total 
PIN for the CER contracts. “!” refers to the probability of occurrence of an informational event. 
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Figure 5. PIN behavior futures contract 
The figures plot the estimated PIN variables per quarter (3 months), from the second quarter of 2008 to 
the last quarter of 2011. The PIN estimations have been computed using the three nearest December 
rollover series, fixing ! and ", and leaving free the rest of the variables (#, $, %, µ, &B and &S), along the 
different rollover series. Figure 5a plots the evolution of the ! and " estimated parameters. Figure 5b plots 
the aggregated PINs of the carbon market, where “EUA” refers to the EUA’s aggregated PIN and “CER” 
to the CER’s aggregated PIN. Figure 5c plots the different PINs per contract, where “Dec T” refers to the 
front December rollover series, “Dec T+1” refers to the second nearest December rollover series, and 
“Dec T+2” refers to the third nearest December rollover series. Figure 5d plots #, $ and % per rollover 
series, where “Dec T” refers to the front December rollover series, “Dec T+1” refers to the second nearest 
December rollover series, and “Dec T+2” refers to the third nearest December rollover series. Figure 5e 
plots µ, &b and &s per rollover series, where “Dec T” refers to the front December rollover series, “Dec 
T+1” refers to the second nearest December rollover series, and “Dec T+2” refers to the third nearest 
December rollover series. Figure 5f plots the percentage of informed trading for each rollover series, 
where “Dec T” refers to the front December rollover series, “Dec T+1” refers to the second nearest 
December rollover series, and “Dec T+2” refers to the third nearest December rollover series. 
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Figure 5. PIN behavior futures contract (continued) 
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(b) Aggregated PINs 
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Figure 5. PIN behavior futures contract (continued) 
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Figure 5. PIN behavior futures contract (continued) 
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(f) Percentage of informed trading per rollover series 
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Figure 6. Theoretical opening spreads 
In figure 6a (6b) we plot the evolution of the theoretical percentage spreads of the opening quotes for the 
three nearest EUA (CER) December rollover series. “EUA Dec T” (“CER Dec T”) refers to the nearest 
maturity EUA (CER) December rollover series, “EUA Dec T+1” (“CER Dec T+1”) refers to the second 
nearest maturity EUA (CER) December rollover series, and “EUA Dec T+2” (“CER Dec T+2”) refers to 
the third nearest maturity EUA (CER) December rollover series. 
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Appendix A. Numerical approaches 
Appendix A.1 (A.2) provides several approaches which could be computed to estimate the traditional 
PIN model’s (carbon market PIN model’s) likelihood function, in order to reduce numerical problems 
when the number of buys and sells is very large. 
 
Appendix A.1. Traditional PIN Model Approaches 
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1. Conclusions 
In this PhD dissertation thesis we have analyzed in depth the European carbon 
market, focusing on the two most-traded emissions carbon credits: European Union 
Allowances (EUAs) and Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). 
1.1. Major findings 
I. The statistical properties of EUA returns suggest we are facing a new type of 
asset. 
II. We suggest that the simplest rollover methodology, which consists in rolling 
over on the last trading day, should be employed in empirical studies on both 
EUAs and CERs. 
III. The quality of EUA prices has been dramatically affected by the market 
collapse at the end of Phase I and the posterior financial crisis, and by the end 
of 2010, the quality of prices was close to, though still below, the levels seen 
in early 2006. 
IV. We report regular and significant increases in information-motivated trading 
between December and March of each year for EUAs, and at the end of each 
year for CERs. 
1.2. Minor comments 
I. We find evidence of intermittency, aggregational gaussianity, short-term 
predictability, the Taylor effect, volatility clustering, asymmetric volatility, 
positive relationships between volatility and (a) volume and (b) changes in 
open interest, temporal dependencies (which implies modeling with ARMA-
GARCH structures), negative asymmetry, positive correlation with stock 
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indexes, higher volatility levels during the trading session, existence of 
inflation hedges and negative correlation with bonds. 
II. Liquidity analysis with different rollover criteria show that the methodologies 
based on the open interest variable, are not suitable to be used in liquidity 
studies. 
III. The quality of the ECX market has not markedly changed from futures 
contracts with maturities in Phase I to those in Phase II, even though Phase II 
shows higher trading intensity, lower immediacy, lower risk of information 
asymmetries or adverse selection costs, and lower levels of both price return 
volatility and friction-related volatility than Phase I (before the market 
collapse), friction-related volatility contribution to total volatility has been 
above ordinary Phase I levels. 
IV. We corroborate the price leadership of the nearest December contract, 
although we observe an increasing importance of those contracts with more 
distant and we illustrate the increasing importance of CERs in the European 
carbon market. 
 
2. Further research 
The results obtained in this dissertation thesis have shed light on some important 
questions which remained unanswered in the European carbon market literature. 
Nevertheless, in my opinion, more research should be done related to the microstructure 
and the efficiency of the market.  
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A key component of future research could be to develop statistical methods to 
detect price manipulation from microstructure data and demonstrate their effectiveness 
in carbon markets. The detection of price manipulation is of great importance 
nowadays; although price manipulation is illegal, many studies show that it is possible 
to manipulate the market. Sometimes the authorities manage to detect these activities, 
but many remain in the shadows and thus it makes sense to develop new models whose 
objective is to help detect these practices. To do so, we could extend the model 
proposed by Allen and Gale (1992) by adapting it to the particularities of the European 
carbon market. Allen and Gale (1992) propose a rational expectations model with 
asymmetric information, where all agents maximize their expected utility, in a finite 
horizon framework. In this economy the “manipulator” simply buys and sells a stock in 
one unique market, where firm manipulation or false rumors are not allowed. There are 
two types of investors, passive investors (risk averse) and large investors (risk neutral), 
where these last ones split in two subcategories, informed traders and manipulators 
(uninformed). Investors cannot determinate whether if a large trade is work of an 
informed investor or a manipulator. Two assets coexist in the market, a stock and cash. 
The first asset will pay a high value or a low value at the end of the last period, with a 
given probability. The second asset is riskless and zero yield. In this framework, an 
informed event can occur with a certain probability and this can be positive or negative. 
The trading process takes place in three dates, where initially the investors hold all the 
stocks. In the first step, the informed trader enters into the market only if he anticipates 
an announcement, while manipulators only enter if no news is expected. If an informed 
event occurs, bad news are revealed before than good news. Finally, all traders 
maximize the expected utility of their final wealth. The results show that manipulation 
is possible without actions that alter the true value of the firm or spreading false 
Conclusions 
!
!
204 
information, moreover, when investors’ beliefs are that the large trader is informed, 
manipulation is more profitable. 
After proving the existence of information asymmetries and informed trading in 
the European carbon market, the detection of price manipulation practices, would 
analyze other type of inefficiency. Efficiency is important because the more efficient the 
carbon market is, the better it will fulfill its real objective, that of providing a platform 
from which allowance surpluses and needs can be matched.  
A second research paper could apply the use and/or extension of the 
methodology proposed by Easley, López de Prado and O’Hara (2012) to the 
particularities of the carbon market in order to verify how informed trading behaves 
over short periods close to specific events occurring in the European carbon market, 
such as the announcements of the National Allocation Plans (NAPs) for Phase II, and 
other relevant news concerning Phase III. Easley, López de Prado and O’Hara (2012) 
take into account the traded volume and the volume-time, in order to detect flow 
toxicity in a high frequency framework. The sequential traded model assumes that 
trades are informative about the future value of the asset, and they have varying 
importance for the magnitude of future price movements.!The more relevant a piece of 
news is, the more volume it attracts. The methodology proposes to group the volume in 
buckets of equal magnitude, where through the sign of the orders included in each 
bucket, we are able to identify the trade imbalance and derive a measure of flow toxicity 
denominated VPIN or “volume-synchronized probability of informed trading”. 
Additionally, the analysis made in Chapters I and III could be extended to CER 
futures contracts, comparing the results with the ones obtained for EUAs, and applying 
other statistical properties and methodologies to both assets, while in Chapter II, a 
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complete analysis of Phase III contracts for both EUAs and CERs, could be very useful 
for future researchers in this market. 
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1. Introducción 
Dado que ninguno de los cuatro capítulos están escritos en alguna de las dos 
lenguas oficiales de la Universitat de València, y cumpliendo con su normativa, a 
continuación procederé a resumir en castellano los 4 capítulos que forman la tesis 
doctoral.1 
La presente tesis tiene como objetivo el estudio de algunos aspectos de los 
precios y transacciones llevadas a cabo en el mercado de los derechos de emisión sobre 
CO2 en Europa. El Capítulo I se dedica al estudio de las propiedades estadísticas 
presentes en los rendimientos de los precios de los derechos de emisión sobre CO2, con 
el objetivo de comprobar si dicho activo se comporta como un activo financiero, una 
mercadería u otro tipo de activo. En el Capitulo II se analizan las diferentes formas de 
enlazar series de contratos de futuro sobre los derechos de emisión, con el objetivo de 
verificar si existen diferencias significativas en los resultados obtenidos, tras la elección 
de un método concreto. El Capítulo III estudia el impacto que el colapso en precios de 
finales de 2006 y la posterior irrupción de la crisis financiara tuvieron sobre la calidad 
de precios del mercado europeo de CO2, inversamente relacionada con las distorsiones 
que sufren las serie de precios, así como la evolución temporal de las fricciones del 
mercado de futuros sobre derechos de emisión. Por último, el Capítulo IV se centra en 
la detección de asimetrías de información en el mercado europeo de derechos de 
emisión sobre CO2. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 El presente resumen se ha realizado en cumplimiento del Artículo 7.2 de la Normativa reguladora de los 
procedimientos de elaboración, autorización, nombramiento del Tribunal, defensa y evaluación de las 
tesis doctorales de la Universitat de València, aprobada en Consejo de Gobierno el 29 de noviembre de 
2011. 
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1.1. Capítulo I: ¿Es el EUA una nueva clase de activo? 
El comienzo de la negociación de cualquier activo requiere del conocimiento de 
las propiedades estadísticas derivadas de sus rendimientos en precios, para su uso ya sea 
con fines de cobertura o con fines especulativos. En el presente capítulo se estudian los 
hechos estilizados de los rendimientos derivados de los precios de los derechos de 
emisión sobre CO2 (European Union Allowances, EUAs). 
Tras la ratificación del Protocolo de Kioto y con el objetivo de cumplir con los 
compromisos alcanzados en el mismo, la Unión Europea decidió que una gran parte de 
dicha reducción debería ser asumida por las compañías de los sectores más 
contaminantes. Desde el 2005, las compañías incluidas en la Directiva 2003/87/CE 
reciben cada año derechos de emisión con el objetivo de cubrir sus emisiones de CO2 o 
gas equivalente a la atmósfera. Dichos derechos pueden ser negociados en diversos 
mercados organizados en Europa. En cualquier caso, al final de cada año, dichas 
empresas tienen que entregar suficientes derechos para cubrir sus emisiones.  
Mediante el estudio de las propiedades estadísticas de los rendimientos de los 
precios, se puede determinar desde un punto de vista estadístico, si el activo con el que 
tratamos se comporta como una mercadería, un activo financiero u otro tipo de activo. 
De hecho, los derechos se negocian en mercados organizados desde el año 2005, pero 
fue en octubre de 2011 cuando la Unión Europea decidió calificarlos como activos 
financieros. 
En este capítulo nos hemos centrado en los activos de la Fase II, puesto que la 
primera fase fue una fase piloto y de aprendizaje.2 En concreto, se han utilizado los 
datos diarios de los futuros cotizados en el ICE ECX con vencimientos en diciembre de 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 La Fase I comprende el periodo 2005-2007, mientras que la Fase II engloba el periodo 2008-2012. 
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2008, 2009 y 2010. Señalar que los futuros con vencimiento en el mes de diciembre 
cotizados en el mercado ICE ECX de Londres, son los activos más líquidos 
relacionados con el CO2 existentes hasta la fecha, de ahí que sean los elegidos para el 
estudio.3 
Las distintas propiedades que se han estudiado se han integrado en cuatro 
grupos.4 El primero es el de las características relacionadas con la distribución 
estadística de los rendimientos. En general, se ha analizado la normalidad de la 
distribución de los rendimientos, y en caso de rechazarla, se ha estudiado la presencia de 
asimetría y de colas pesadas, así como la existencia y persistencia de observaciones 
extremas. Estos resultados ayudan a determinar si la distribución estadística es 
gaussiana. En el segundo grupo se han analizado las propiedades relacionadas con la 
correlación serial, y en particular, la autocorrelación de los rendimientos, la aleatoriedad 
en la generación de los rendimientos y la prolongación en el tiempo de la 
autocorrelación de los rendimientos en términos absolutos. En el tercer grupo se han 
estudiado una serie de características relacionadas con la volatilidad, en concreto, se ha 
analizado la existencia de agrupamientos en la volatilidad, la asimetría en la respuesta 
de los rendimientos a shocks negativos, la existencia de colas pesadas en la distribución 
de los residuos derivados de la modelización de los rendimientos, la correlación entre el 
volumen y la volatilidad, y finalmente, la correlación entre la volatilidad y la variación 
en el volumen abierto. Por último, el último grupo de propiedades engloba diversas 
propiedades relacionadas con las mercaderías, entre ellas, la existencia de algún tipo de 
estacionalidad relacionada con el clima, la correlación con activos de renta fija e índices 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 La plataforma ICE ECX es una plataforma electrónica que permite la negociación de derechos a lo largo 
de una sesión abierta a la negociación de forma continua. Es de destacar, que la fluctuación mínima de los 
precios es de 0,01! y en el mercado operan creadores de mercado que deben mantener un nivel mínimo 
tanto de horquilla, como de profundidad. 
4 Muchas de las propiedades estudiadas en este capítulo fueros extraídas de los estudios de Cont (2001) y 
Gorton y Rouwenhorst (2006). 
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bursátiles, y la posibilidad de que los derechos sobre CO2 puedan servir como 
instrumento de cobertura frente a la inflación. 
En general, los resultados muestran un rechazo de la normalidad de la 
distribución estadística de los rendimientos, la existencia de observaciones extremas, la 
existencia de rendimientos mensuales gaussianos, autocorrelación en los rendimientos, 
no aleatoriedad en la generación de los rendimientos, persistencia en la autocorrelación 
de los rendimientos en términos absolutos, agrupamientos significativos de la 
volatilidad, correlación negativa entre rendimientos y volatilidad, la existencia de colas 
pesadas en los residuos tras la modelización de los rendimientos, correlación positiva 
entre volatilidad y volumen, y entre volatilidad y variación del interés abierto, la 
ausencia de estacionalidad y la ausencia de mayor volatilidad durante el fin de semana. 
Paralelamente, y contrario al comportamiento de las mercaderías, hemos encontrado 
evidencia de asimetría negativa en la distribución de los rendimientos, correlación 
positiva entre los rendimientos de los EUAs y los rendimientos de los índices bursátiles, 
y mayor volatilidad en los rendimientos cuando el mercado está abierto. 
Adicionalmente, y contrario a lo observado en los activos financieros, se ha observado 
una correlación negativa con activos de renta fija y positiva con la inflación no 
esperada.  
El conjunto de las propiedades analizadas indica que los EUAs no se comportan 
como los típicos activos financieros o mercaderías, y deberían ser considerados como 
un nuevo tipo de activo. Dichas conclusiones son de gran importancia para el análisis de 
carteras, la modelización de la volatilidad, la creación de carteras de cobertura y el 
análisis de cointegración. 
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1.2. Capítulo II: Construcción de series largas en EUAs y CERs 
Los derivados financieros tienen la particularidad de ser activos con vidas 
finitas. Los investigadores y los intermediarios financieros a la hora de analizar los 
distintos activos derivados tienen dos opciones: tomar los activos con una vida limitada 
o enlazar los diferentes activos con el objetivo de construir la serie más extensa posible. 
La mayoría de los investigadores se suelen decantar por la segunda opción, por ser 
aquella en la que obtienen las series más largas, algo necesario en la mayoría de análisis 
estadísticos y econométricos.  
Ma, Mercer y Walker (1992) observan que la distribución de la serie de precios 
era distinta en función de cómo se enlazaban los distintos contratos de futuro, mientras 
que Carchano y Pardo (2009) llegan a la conclusión opuesta para los contratos de futuro 
sobre índices y sugieren que el resultado va a depender del activo subyacente que se 
analice. El objetivo del segundo capítulo es precisamente el análisis de las 
distribuciones derivadas de los rendimientos de los dos principales activos del mercado 
europeo de derechos de emisión sobre CO2, European Union Allowances (EUAs) y 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), cuando se enlazan los futuros financieros con 
distintos métodos. 
Para el estudio se han empleado datos diarios y de alta frecuencia, de futuros 
sobre EUAs y CERs, con vencimiento en el mes de diciembre, para el periodo de 
tiempo que va desde abril de 2005 hasta diciembre de 2011. Adicionalmente, también se 
han utilizado los futuros con vencimiento en marzo de 2008, por ser éste el último 
contrato negociado para la Fase I. Toda la base de datos se obtuvo de la plataforma ICE 
ECX. 
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Se han comparado y contrastado las distribuciones de los rendimientos 
obtenidos a partir de cinco metodologías: el primer criterio especifica que el cambio de 
un vencimiento al siguiente se realiza el último día de negociación del primero; el 
segundo criterio dicta el paso de un contrato a otro en el momento en el que el segundo 
contrato muestra sistemáticamente más volumen negociado que el primero; el tercer 
criterio establece el salto de un contrato a otro cuando el número de contratos abiertos 
en el segundo es sistemáticamente mayor que en el primero; el cuarto criterio establece 
el salto de un contrato a otro con un vencimiento más lejano (no siendo necesario que 
sea el del segundo vencimiento más cercano), cuando el interés abierto es 
sistemáticamente mayor en un contrato de vencimiento más lejano; por último, el quinto 
criterio se basa en el ratio definido por Lucia y Pardo (2010), denominada como R3, y 
que establece que pasaremos de un vencimiento al siguiente, cuando en el primero 
observemos sistemáticamente que el número de posiciones abiertas en el contrato, es 
menor que el de posiciones cerradas. 
Los resultados del estudio muestran que no se puede rechazar la igualdad de 
medias, medianas y varianza, de los rendimientos derivados de las 5 distribuciones 
generadas. De igual forma, la igualdad en las distribuciones de todas las series tampoco 
puede ser descartada, por lo que concluimos que el método utilizado al enlazar futuros 
sobre EUAs de la Fase I y II, y de CERs de la Fase II, no ofrece diferencias 
significativas entre las distribuciones obtenidas, y por tanto el criterio usado para la 
construcción de series largas de contratos de futuro sobre derechos de emisión, no 
influye en los resultados de los estudios. 
Muchos investigadores, por la imposibilidad o el elevado coste de obtener datos 
intradiarios, recurren a datos diarios para realizar diferentes análisis de liquidez. Por este 
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motivo, en este capítulo, se ha comprobado adicionalmente si la elección del método 
para enlazar contratos afecta de alguna forma a la liquidez que muestran las distintas 
series generadas. En esta ocasión utilizaremos como variable de estudio el número de 
transacciones intradiarias, en lugar de los rendimientos. Los resultados muestran que 
para la Fase I no existen diferencias significativas en medias, medianas y varianzas, así 
como en su distribución, entre las 5 series generadas. Dicha situación cambia cuando lo 
que se analiza es la Fase II, tanto para EUAs como para CERs, el análisis muestra que 
dos criterios expuestos anteriormente, el basado en el volumen y el basado en la medida 
R3, y que dictan que se enlacen los contratos en base al número de posiciones abiertas, 
muestran sistemáticamente menos liquidez que el criterio basado en el último día,. Por 
tanto, dichos criterios no deberían ser utilizados en la realización de un análisis de 
liquidez. 
En resumen, a la vista de la evidencia empírica observada, consideramos que la 
medida más adecuada para enlazar los distintos contratos de EUAs y CERs es la del 
último día de negociación, por ser ésta la que requiere menos trabajo para su 
construcción. 
 
1.3. Capítulo III: La historia de las fricciones del mercado europeo del carbono 
La literatura en microestructura de los mercados financieros ha mostrado que en 
horizontes temporales cortos, los precios observados pueden diferir temporalmente de 
su “verdadero” valor a causa de las fricciones existentes en el mercado. Dichas 
fricciones son de gran importancia, porque introducen ruido en el proceso de formación 
del precio, hacen los precios menos informativos, incrementan los costes de inmediatez 
y reducen la liquidez del mercado. El objetivo de este capítulo es analizar el efecto que 
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el colapso en precios experimentado en el mercado europeo de derechos de emisión 
sobre CO2 al final de la Fase I, y la posterior erupción de la actual crisis financiera, han 
tenido sobre la importancia de este componente “ruidoso” en los cambios de los precios, 
y por consiguiente, sobre la calidad de los precios de este mercado. 
La base de datos procedente del mercado ICE ECX contiene información para 
todos los futuros sobre EUAs con vencimiento en diciembre, para el periodo de tiempo 
comprendido entre abril del 2005 y diciembre del 2010. Con el objetivo de disponer de 
una única serie representativa para cada una de las fases del plan propuesto para el 
mercado europeo, se procedió a enlazar los distintos futuros con el criterio del máximo 
volumen, puesto que se demostró en el Capítulo II que este método no pierde ninguna 
de las propiedades estadísticas deseadas. Señalar adicionalmente que en el capítulo se 
han analizado exclusivamente las órdenes “screen”, o de pantalla, siendo éstas las más 
comunes y utilizadas en el mercado. 
 Al no estar disponible el libro de órdenes del mercado, las diferentes 
metodologías utilizadas en el trabajo se han basado exclusivamente en datos de 
transacciones. La primera de ellas es la propuesta por Roll (1984). Dicha metodología 
asume un mercado sin asimetrías de información, donde las fricciones de mercado son 
debidas a fricciones reales reflejadas en la horquilla de precios. Ofrecemos también dos 
extensiones de esta metodología. En la primera, se introducen los costes de selección 
adversa permitiendo la existencia de dos tipos de información, pública y privada. En la 
segunda extensión, se relaja la hipótesis de ausencia de correlación entre el signo 
(compra vs venta) de las transacciones. La segunda metodología utilizada es la 
propuesta por Madhavan, Richardson y Roomans (1997). Dicha metodología permite la 
existencia de fricciones tanto reales (costes de inventario y operativos) como 
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informativas (costes de selección adversa) en los precios, costes de creación de 
mercado, autocorrelación en el signo de las transacciones, errores de redondeo, y 
precios discretos. La tercera y última metodología usada en el capítulo es la propuesta 
por Hasbrouck (1993), en la que se obtiene una medida inversa de calidad en precios 
por medio de la estimación de la desviación típica del término transitorio en los cambios 
de precios.  
Los resultados muestran que la mediana de la horquilla de precios (o spread) 
estimada durante la Fase I, tanto para el activo de la Fase I, como el de la Fase II, estuvo 
alrededor de los 4 céntimos de euro, mientras que en la Fase II se redujo por debajo de 
los 2 céntimos de euro. Los spreads muestran una reducción a lo largo del tiempo. En 
términos relativos, los resultados no varían en el caso de la Fase II, aunque en la Fase I, 
sí que observamos un incremento de los spreads al final de la Fase I, cuando los precios 
se encontraban cotizando alrededor de cero. El componente de selección adversa en la 
horquilla de precios muestra una tendencia negativa para los activos de la Fase I y II, 
durante la Fase I, y estable, durante la Fase II, tanto en términos relativos, como 
absolutos. Adicionalmente, la descomposición de la volatilidad reporta mayor 
importancia a las fricciones reales, que a las fricciones por asimetrías de información.  
Centrándonos en Roll (1984), los componentes de la volatilidad, en términos 
porcentuales, muestran que: (i) en la Fase I la volatilidad eficiente desciende hasta su 
mínimo durante la segunda mitad de 2007, (ii) durante la Fase II la contribución de la 
volatilidad eficiente fue menor que en la Fase I y (iii) la volatilidad transitoria fue 
superior en la Fase II con respecto a la observada en la Fase I. Paralelamente, en la 
metodología propuesta por Madhavan, Richardson y Roomans (1997), se concluye que: 
(i) los costes por creación de mercado son estables a lo largo de la historia del mercado; 
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(ii) las estimaciones de la correlación entre transacciones son consistentes con los 
supuestos; (iii) la probabilidad de reversión del signo de la transacción es siempre 
menor a 0,5 en la Fase II, y superior que en la Fase I. Adicionalmente, indicar que los 
dos periodos anormales detectados en ambas fases fueros de distinta naturaleza. 
Mientras que el periodo de la Fase I, caracterizado por rumores de exceso de derechos 
de emisión, tuvo como principal componente las fricciones relacionadas con la 
selección adversa, el periodo de la Fase II, coincidente con el inicio de la crisis 
financiera, tiene como principal componente las fricciones reales. 
Por último, las tres metodologías estudiadas muestran que la calidad de los 
precios en la Fase I sufrió un deterioro notable en la segunda mitad de 2007, 
seguramente como consecuencia del desplome de los precios debido al exceso de 
derechos de emisión existentes durante la Fase I. En cuanto a la Fase II, se observa 
también un empeoramiento en la calidad de los precios desde 2006 y hasta el primer 
trimestre de 2009, posiblemente debido al deterioro sufrido por los EUAs de la Fase I y 
a la posterior crisis financiera. No obstante, la calidad comenzó a recuperarse a lo largo 
de la Fase II y en 2010 sus niveles eran próximos a los observados a lo largo de 2006.  
En conclusión, la calidad de los precios del ICE ECX no ha variado 
excesivamente entre la Fase I y la Fase II, a pesar de que en la Fase II observamos 
mayor intensidad en el número de transacciones, menores costes por operación, 
menores asimetrías de información, menor volatilidad en los precios y menor 
volatilidad de las fricciones, la contribución de las fricciones a la volatilidad total ha 
estado presente en la Fase II por encima de los niveles observados en la Fase I. Nuestros 
resultados muestran, no obstante, que durante gran parte de la Fase II, la calidad del 
mercado ha venido recuperándose de forma progresiva del efecto negativo producido 
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por el exceso de oferta de derechos durante la Fase I y por la crisis financiera actual. A 
finales de 2010, sin embargo, esta recuperación todavía no había concluido. 
 
1.4. Capítulo IV: Modelización de la probabilidad de transacciones informadas 
en el mercado europeo del carbono 
En el presente capítulo se adapta la metodología propuesta por Easley, Kiefer, 
O’Hara y Paperman (1996), a las particularidades del mercado europeo de derechos de 
emisión sobre CO2. Dicha metodología, que se fundamenta en los modelos teóricos de 
Easley y O’Hara (1987, 1992), tiene como objetivo determinar la probabilidad de 
negociar con agentes informados. En este capítulo, adaptamos dicha metodología para 
poder estimar la probabilidad de negociación informada en los EUAs y los CERs 
alrededor de eventos que se producen regularmente en el mercado.5 
Todos los años las compañías obligadas a rendir cuentas por sus emisiones, 
deben informar de sus emisiones efectivas correspondientes al año anterior como muy 
tarde el 31 de marzo. Los permisos correspondientes deben ser entregados a la 
Comisión Europea el 30 de abril de dicho año y ésta hace públicos los datos oficiales 
alrededor del 15 de mayo. Como consecuencia de dicho calendario, durante varios 
meses, las compañías obligadas tienen en su poder información que todavía no es 
pública, por lo que puede ser utilizada en su propio beneficio. 
Con el objetivo de detectar prácticas con información privada, se ha construido 
una extensión del modelo propuesto por Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara y Paperman (1996), 
permitiendo a los operadores informados y no informados elegir entre los dos activos, a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 A pesar de que EUAs y CERs comparten el mismo objetivo, lo cierto es que los CERs están limitados 
en su uso, por lo que condicionan claramente su precio y sistemáticamente han mostrado niveles de 
precios por debajo del de los EUAs. 
Resumen 
!
!
220 
la hora de operar. El modelo plantea que proveedores de liquidez y especuladores 
interactúan durante I periodos. Al comienzo de cada periodo (o día), un evento que 
produce información privada puede ocurrir con probabilidad !. En caso de que ocurra, 
éste será positivo con probabilidad 1-" y negativo con probabilidad ". En un día sin 
ningún evento informativo, los operadores no informados lanzarán órdenes de compra y 
de venta al mercado con ratios #b y #s, respectivamente. En caso de que se produzca un 
evento informativo, los operadores informados lanzarán órdenes con intensidad µ, por lo 
que si la señal es positiva (negativa) las órdenes totales de compra (venta) vendrán 
determinadas por intensidad #b+µ (#s+µ). Adicionalmente, tanto los operadores 
informados, como los no informados, deben decidir en el mercado si comercializarán 
EUAs o CERs. $, % y & marcan el porcentaje de las órdenes lanzadas por los operadores 
informados a favor de los CERs, el porcentaje de las órdenes lanzadas por los 
operadores no informados que compran CERs y el porcentaje de las órdenes lanzadas 
por los operados no informados que venden CERs, respectivamente.  
Mediante la estimación por máxima verosimilitud del producto de todas las 
funciones específicas para cada uno de los días, se puede obtener tanto el valor teórico 
del spread de apertura como el valor de todos los parámetros del modelo que nos 
permitirán determinar qué porcentaje de las órdenes para EUAs y CERs provienen de 
operadores informados (PIN).  
En este capítulo se han usado tanto datos diarios como intradiarios del mercado 
ICE ECX, centrándonos principalmente en las transacciones “screen” de los futuros con 
vencimientos en los meses de diciembre entre 2008 y 2014. Finalmente, los distintos 
vencimientos de los contratos de futuro se han enlazado para obtener tres series 
completas con los futuros de vencimiento diciembre más cercano, con los del segundo 
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vencimiento diciembre más cercano y con los del tercer vencimiento diciembre más 
cercano, tanto para EUAs, como para CERs.  
Nuestros resultados muestran que el PIN de los EUAs aumenta entre diciembre 
y marzo, tal y como era de esperar, mientras que los CERs muestran su máximo PIN en 
noviembre y diciembre. También observamos que la probabilidad de que ocurra un 
evento informado aumenta en abril. Poniendo hincapié en la evolución de las variables 
del modelo a lo largo del tiempo. Los resultados determinan que la probabilidad de que 
ocurra un evento informado ha disminuido a lo largo del tiempo, mientras que la 
probabilidad de que este evento sea negativo, ha aumentado. Se obtienen evidencias de 
que el PIN de mercado para los EUAs se ha mantenido estable a lo largo del tiempo, 
mientras que para los CERs ha aumentado, llegando en 2011 a ser muy parejo. Un 
análisis más individualizado por series muestra nuevamente que en general los EUAs 
exhiben niveles más altos de PIN que los CERs. Se observa, también, que la serie de 
vencimiento más cercano para los EUAs muestra niveles inferiores a la serie de 
vencimientos más lejanos. En cuanto a los CERs, su comportamiento es muy similar en 
las tres series estudiadas. El análisis de !, " y #, muestra una predilección por EUAs en 
el primer trimestre de 2009. En cuanto a los parámetros que marcan la intensidad de las 
ordenes, se observa un aumento de dicha intensidad en los segundos trimestres del año, 
consistente con los aumentos de volumen de abril y mayo, y los futuros con 
vencimiento más lejano muestran en 2011 mayores volumen en términos porcentuales, 
que en los años previos. El porcentaje de operaciones informadas muestra menores 
niveles en los vencimientos más cercanos. En cuanto al modelo, se rechazan las 
hipótesis de que "=#, y que !, " y # son iguales a lo largo de las diferentes series, lo que 
implica que los agente no informadas ponderan de forma distinta su predilección por 
EUAs y CERs, a la hora de comprar y vender, y que las predilecciones por EUAs y 
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CERs cambian dependiendo del contrato en el que estén operando tanto los agentes 
informados, como los no informados. Por último, los resultados muestran que las 
horquillas teóricas de apertura de los precios para EUAs y CERs se han visto afectadas 
por la actual crisis financiera, y que en general las horquillas en precios han sido 
menores en CERs, que en EUAs, aunque en 2011 las diferencias han disminuido 
considerablemente. 
Las conclusiones de este capítulo sugieren que la importancia del CER ha 
aumentado considerablemente en el mercado de derechos de emisión en los últimos 
años y que en la actualidad atrae la atención de un gran número de agentes. Por tanto, 
los CERs deberían ser considerado por los operadores, los investigadores y los 
reguladores en el análisis de carteras, en los proyectos de investigación y en las 
decisiones regulatorias, respectivamente. Paralelamente, las ineficiencias detectadas en 
los meses previos a la publicación de las verificaciones anuales de las emisiones de 
CO2, destacan la necesidad de ser consideradas y mitigadas en la medida de lo posible 
por los reguladores, con el objetivo de aumentar la eficacia y la transparencia del 
mercado y garantizar la protección de los agentes externos.  
 
2. Conclusiones 
En esta tesis doctoral se ha analizado en profundidad el mercado europeo de 
derechos de emisión sobre CO2, haciendo hincapié en los dos principales activos 
negociados: European Union Allowances (EUAs) and Certified Emission Reductions 
(CERs). 
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2.1. Conclusiones principales 
I. Las propiedades estadísticas de los rendimientos de los EUAs sugieren que 
estamos ante una nueva clase de activo. 
II. Sugerimos que la metodología más simple para enlazar contratos, que consiste 
en pasar de uno a otro en el último día de negociación del primero, debería ser 
empleada en los estudios empíricos que trabajan con las series de precios de 
los EUAs y CERs. 
III. La calidad de los precios de los EUAs se ha visto afectada dramáticamente por 
el colapso en precios al final de la Fase I y la posterior crisis financiera. 
Además a finales de 2010 la calidad sigue por debajo de los niveles 
observados al principio de 2006. 
IV. Se han obtenido evidencias de incrementos significativos en la actividad de 
los operadores informados, entre los meses de diciembre y marzo de cada año, 
en los EUAs, y al final del año en los CERs.  
2.2. Conclusiones secundarias 
I. Se han observado determinadas propiedades estadísticas en las series de los 
EUAs tales como, la existencia de casos extremos, la gaussianidad en los 
rendimientos agregados, el Taylor effect, concentraciones en volatilidad, 
volatilidad asimétrica, una relación positiva entre volatilidad y volumen, y 
volatilidad y open interest, una dependencia temporal (implica la necesidad de 
modelizar con estructuras ARMA-GARCH), asimetría negativa de los 
rendimientos, correlación positiva con los índices sobre acciones, mayor 
volatilidad a lo largo de la sesión, la posibilidad de cobertura frente a la 
inflación no esperada y correlación negativa con activos de renta fija. 
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II. El análisis de liquidez con distintos criterios para enlazar series de contratos, 
muestra que las metodologías basadas en el número de posiciones abiertas no 
son adecuadas en los estudios de liquidez. 
III. La calidad de los precios del ICE ECX no ha variado excesivamente entre la 
Fase I y la Fase II. A pesar de que en la Fase II observamos mayor intensidad 
en el número de transacciones, menores costes por operación, menores 
asimetrías de información, menor volatilidad en los precios y menor 
volatilidad de las fricciones, la contribución de las fricciones a la volatilidad 
total ha estado presente en la Fase II por encima de los niveles observados en 
la Fase I. 
IV. Se ha confirmado el liderazgo del futuro con vencimiento diciembre más 
cercano, a pesar del aumento en importancia de aquellos contratos con 
vencimientos más lejanos, y se han obtenido evidencias de la importancia 
creciente de los CERs en el mercado europeo de derechos de emisión sobre 
CO2. 
 
3. Líneas de investigación futuras 
Los resultados obtenidos en la tesis doctoral han dado respuestas a diversas 
cuestiones planteadas pero no resueltas en la literatura existente concernientes al 
mercado europeo de derechos de emisión sobre CO2. No obstante, en mi opinión es 
necesaria más investigación en el campo de la microestructura y la eficiencia de dicho 
mercado. 
Un enfoque clave para el futuro sería el desarrollo de métodos estadísticos para 
la detección de prácticas de manipulación en precios y probar su eficacia en el mercado 
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europeo de los derechos de emisión sobre CO2. A pesar de que la manipulación es 
ilegal, diversos estudios han probado de forma teórica y empírica que la manipulación 
del mercado es posible. En algunas ocasiones las autoridades han detectado dichas 
prácticas, pero en otras, habiendo indicios, no ha sido posible. Se propone extender el 
modelo propuesto por Allen y Gale (1992) y adaptarlo a las particularidades del 
mercado europeo de derechos de emisión sobre CO2. Allen y Gale (1992) exponen un 
modelo de expectativas racionales con asimetrías de información, donde todos los 
agentes maximizan su utilidad esperada, en un número finito de periodos. En esta 
economía el “manipulador” simplemente compra y vende una acción en un único 
mercado, donde la manipulación por parte de la compañía o los falsos rumores, no están 
permitidos. Existen dos tipos de inversores: los inversores pasivos (aversos al riesgo) y 
los grandes inversores (riesgo neutrales), donde éstos últimos se dividen en dos 
categorías, en operadores informados y en manipuladores (no informados). Los 
inversores no pueden determinar si las órdenes de gran volumen vienen lanzadas por los 
operadores informados o por los manipuladores. Dos activos coexisten en el mercado, 
una acción y dinero. El primer activo tomará un valor “alto” o “bajo” al final del último 
periodo con unas probabilidades dadas, mientras que el segundo activo es un activo 
libre de riesgo y de rentabilidad nula. La negociación se produce en tres etapas, donde 
inicialmente los inversores poseen todas las acciones. En la primera etapa los agentes 
informados entran en el mercado sólo si anticipan un anuncio, mientras que los 
manipuladores entran si no esperan noticias. Si un evento informado ocurre, las noticias 
negativas son reveladas antes que las positivas. Finalmente, todos los operadores 
maximizan la utilidad esperada de su riqueza final. Los resultados muestran que la 
manipulación es posible, aunque no se tomen acciones que alteren el verdadero valor de 
la compañía o se difundan noticias falsas al mercado. Adicionalmente, cuando las 
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creencias de los inversores son que el operador es un informado, la manipulación es más 
rentable.  
Tras probar la existencia de asimetrías de información en el mercado y la 
utilización de información privada, la detección de prácticas manipuladoras en precios 
evaluaría otro tipo de ineficiencia presente en el mercado.  
Un segundo trabajo de investigación que se propone trataría el uso y/o la 
extensión (con las particularidades del mercado europeo de emisiones), de la 
metodología propuesta por Easley, López de Prado y O’Hara (2012), con el objetivo de 
verificar cómo se comportaron las transacciones “informadas” en pequeños espacios de 
tiempo, cerca de eventos específicos ocurridos en el mercado europeo de emisiones, 
tales como el anuncio de los Planes Nacionales de Asignación (NAPs en sus siglas en 
inglés), y otros eventos relevantes concernientes a la Fase III. Easley, López de Prado y 
O’Hara (2012) toman en consideración el volumen negociado y el momento en el que se 
produce la transacción, con el objetivo de estimar la toxicidad de las órdenes mediante 
datos intradiarios. El modelo de negociación secuencial asume que las transacciones 
informan acerca del “verdadero” valor futuro de un activo y su magnitud influye en el 
movimiento futuro de los precios. Cuanto más relevante sea una noticia, más volumen 
atraerá. La metodología propone agrupar el volumen en paquetes de igual magnitud, 
donde a través del signo de las transacciones incluidas en cada paquete, se identifican 
los desequilibrios entre transacciones y se deriva una medida de toxicidad de las 
órdenes denominada VPIN o “volume-synchronized probability of informed trading”. 
Finalmente, los análisis realizados en los capítulos I y III podrían ser extendidos 
mediante la aplicación de las metodologías empleadas a los CERs y su posterior 
contraste con los EUAs, y la utilización de otras propiedades estadísticas y 
Resumen 
!
!
227 
metodologías a ambos activos. En cuanto al Capítulo II, un completo análisis de la Fase 
III sería de gran ayuda para futuros investigadores del mercado europeo de emisiones.  
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